Two years ago, USSC described AUKUS as a "case study in generational politics". At the time, younger Australians were far less likely than older Australians to support nuclear-powered submarines, raising questions about the long-term public and workforce support for a project designed to stretch across decades. The latest polling suggests that divide is becoming much less pronounced.

At the national level, remarkably little appears to have changed. Support for nuclear-powered submarines has hovered around half of Australians since 2023, moving from 49.6% to 47.9% over four surveys. But beneath that steady headline, the age profile of support has shifted substantially.

In 2023, support among Australians aged 65 and over exceeded support among 18–34-year-olds by 28.6 percentage points. By 2026, that gap had narrowed to under 10 points, becoming considerably less distinct.

The change has come from both directions. Support among Australians under 35 rose from 33.6% in 2023 to 46.3% in 2026, increasing in each successive survey. Older Australians remain the most supportive group, but their backing has softened from its 2024 peak. Meanwhile, the 2026 estimates for Australians aged 18–34 and those aged 35–64 are now almost level.

The age divide has also nearly disappeared on one of AUKUS’s central criticisms: taxpayer cost. In 2023, 47.4% of 18–34-year-olds agreed that nuclear-powered submarines were not worth the cost to Australian taxpayers, compared with 25.4% of Australians aged 65 and over—a 22.0-point gap. By 2026, that gap has narrowed to under 1.0%.

The closing age divide extended beyond support for the submarines and concerns about their cost. By 2026, younger and older Australians also held similar views on several of AUKUS’s perceived risks, while clearer differences remained over its perceived benefits.

Only 1.5 percentage points separated the youngest and oldest Australians on whether AUKUS could draw Australia into supporting the United States in a conflict. They were similarly close on the security value of the US alliance, with 43.9% of 18–34-year-olds and 42.5% of those aged 65 and over saying it makes Australia more secure. The contrast was sharper on perceived benefits. Older Australians were 9.8 points more likely to say AUKUS makes Asia safer and 8.8 points more likely to say it creates Australian jobs. The remaining age divide appears to lie less in perceptions of risk than in whether Australians see AUKUS as delivering tangible strategic and economic benefits.

This matters because AUKUS is not a short-term procurement program. Under the revised submarine pathway, Australia is expected to receive three in-service Virginia-class submarines in 2032, 2035 and 2038, while the first SSN-AUKUS boats are expected from the early 2040s. That time horizon means younger Australians will make up a larger share of the workforce building and sustaining the fleet, and of the electorate deciding whether government should continue the program.

Support for nuclear-powered submarines remains close to half nationally: 47.9% agreed in 2026, while 20.0% disagreed. In 2025, 50.4% agreed and 20% disagreed; the 2024 figures were similar, at 51% versus 19%. Outright opposition has remained around one in five, even as the age divide has narrowed. AUKUS can no longer be understood simply as a project backed by older Australians that still needs to win over the young.