Allies and partners poll 2026: Alliances hold, views fragment

Introduction

In May 2026, the United States Studies Centre polled more than 1,000 citizens of Australia, the United States, Japan and India on their views of foreign policy, US politics and the issues shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region. The results show that while support for alliances between the four Quad countries remains robust, many citizens in Australia, Japan and India feel their governments have not properly explained why they should continue to partner with the United States.

Seventy-five years since the signing of the ANZUS treaty, majorities of Australian, Japanese and Indian respondents continue to say that US President Donald Trump’s second term has been bad for their countries. However, after a year of geopolitical upheaval, views of the United States have largely stabilised since 2025. Despite holding concerns about the future of US democracy, and with the US midterm elections fast approaching, a majority of Australians, Americans and Indians think US elections will generally continue to be free and fair.

At the same time, Australian assessments of China appear to be softening. Australians now see China and the United States as equally helpful in Asia, and are the only Quad public more likely to view China as an economic partner than a danger. This is particularly evident among younger Australians and Americans, who are more than twice as likely as those aged over 65 to view China’s role in Asia in a positive light.

Yet, when it comes to cooperation between the four states, support for a formal Quad military alliance continues to outweigh opposition, and majorities in each country would prefer to increase their economic links with each other to reduce dependence on China. Support for economic protectionism is also rising, while Australians and Americans strongly favour the regulation of artificial intelligence, compared to mixed views in Japan and India.

Together, this year’s poll reflects four Quad partners that continue to embrace cooperation but are increasingly uncertain about their future in a turbulent world.

Finding 1 on the United States and alliances

US allies and partners continue to support their alliances, but many respondents say their governments have not properly explained why their country needs the United States

• Roughly a third of Australians (32%) now say the second Trump administration has been very bad for Australia — a 10-percentage point increase since 2025. However, overall sentiment remains consistent with 2025 levels: only 16% of Australians, 8% of Japanese respondents and 15% of Indians think that Trump’s second term has been good for their countries.
• Australians are split between agreeing (45%) and being unsure (45%) about whether the United States will become a better ally of Australia after Donald Trump’s presidency ends. Only 10% disagree that this will be the case.
  • A majority of Labor voters (52%) are confident that the United States will be a better ally in the future, the most of any Australian political party.
• Japanese respondents are much less confident, with only a quarter (26%) agreeing that the United States will be a better ally. Americans themselves expect the United States to become a better ally, with 46% agreeing compared to 20% who disagree.
• As in 2025, only 42% of Australians believe that the US alliance makes Australia more secure, a 21-percentage point decline since 2022. Australian men and Coalition voters are both 19 percentage points more likely to agree, compared to women and Labor voters.
• Only 31% of Australians think that the Australian Government has properly explained why Australia needs its alliance with the United States, compared to 41% of Indians and 21% of Japanese respondents who say the same about their own governments. Less than a quarter (23%) of women agree, compared to 38% of men.
• Americans continue to believe their key alliances make the United States more secure. They are three times as likely to say so about NATO and ten times as likely to say so about Australia as not — a sentiment shared by a strong plurality of Trump voters in each case.
  • A majority of both Trump and Harris voters believe the US alliances with Australia and Japan make the United States safer.
• Compared to 2025, Australians have less confidence that the United States would come to their aid if Australia were attacked by China. Roughly two-thirds (68%) of Australians believe the United States will come to their aid if Australia is attacked by China, down from 73% in 2025 and 84% in 2023. Sixty per cent of Japanese and 54% of Indians say the same for their own countries, suggesting a broad but weakening number of people who are confident that the United States will come to their aid.
• Only 15% of Australians and 9% of Japanese respondents want to withdraw from their US alliance — almost unchanged from 2025. The majority of respondents in Australia (57%) and Japan (51%) disagree with withdrawing from their respective US alliance.
• Half of Australians (51%) say there are no circumstances in which Australia should end its alliance with the United States — more than twice as many who disagree (21%). Coalition voters (68%) and older Australians (65%) are the most likely to agree.
• Half of Australians (49%) say that Australia needs its alliance with the United States more than ever, compared to 44% of Indians and 36% of Japanese respondents who say the same. However, only 37% of younger Australians agree, compared to 63% of older Australians. This generational divide has grown by eight percentage points since 2025.
• Three-quarters (75%) of Australians want their country to deepen security relationships with other middle powers. While 61% of Australians support increased defence spending, only 42% want Australia to adopt a policy of neutrality.
  • Half of Australians aged under 35 (49%) support a higher defence budget, compared to 76% of Australians aged over 65.
• Only 18% of Australians want Australia to become closer to China instead of the United States. Compared to their Coalition counterparts, Labor voters are far more open to Australia becoming closer with China (31% opposed compared to 59%) and adopting a policy of neutrality (49% support compared to 30%).

Finding 2 on China

Australians now see China and the United States as equally helpful in Asia and are the only Quad public more likely to view China as an economic partner than a danger

• Australians now see China (23%) and the United States (22%) as equally helpful in Asia. Two years ago, Australians were twice as likely to view the United States (35%) as helpful in Asia, compared to China (18%). Japanese and Indian views remain steady.
• A plurality of Australians aged under 35 (37%) now view China as mostly helpful in Asia compared to 16% of those over 65. The number of Australians under 35 who agree has increased by nine percentage points since 2025 and by 16 points since 2023. Similarly, Americans under 35 (35%) are twice as likely to see China as helpful compared to Americans aged over 65 (17%).
• Australians are the only Quad public more likely to see China as an economic partner (64%) than a danger (47%). By contrast, Americans (55% danger, 43% economic partner), Japanese (66% danger, 28% economic partner) and Indians (59% danger, 43% economic partner), say the opposite.
• A plurality of Australians (44%), Americans (40%) and Indians (52%) view their own country’s handling of China as appropriate, compared to just 25% of Japanese respondents. One-third of Australians view Australia's handling of China as too weak, while just 4% see Australia’s handling as too aggressive. In Japan, 40% of respondents view their handling of China as too weak, a 19-point change from the 59% who said so in 2025.
• Of the countries surveyed, Australians are the most likely to view the US handling of China as too aggressive, with 32% saying so, compared to 8% of Japanese, 20% of Indians and 20% of Americans themselves. The number of respondents in each country who describe it as too aggressive has declined by 4–8 points in each country since 2025.
• The number of Australians (14%) and Americans (19%) who say they “strongly agree” with holding China to account on human rights if economic costs are involved has more than halved since 2023. Support in Japan and India has also weakened.
• The number of Australians (8%) and Americans (13%) who say it is “very likely” that their countries will be in armed conflict with China in the next 10 years continues to decline — down by 13 and 5 percentage points, respectively, since 2022. A plurality of Australians (39%), Americans (28%), Japanese (41%) and Indians (25%) now consider it to be “very unlikely.”
• All four Quad countries are more likely than not to support sending military forces to help defend Taiwan if it were to be attacked, though support remains below 40% in all four countries.

Finding 3 on the Quad

Support for a formal Quad military alliance continues to significantly outweigh opposition, with only 10% or less in the four publics opposed

• Half of Australians (50%) continue to support the Quad becoming a formal military alliance, almost identical to 2025 (49%). Australian opposition to a Quad alliance has declined to just 9%, down from 15% in 2025. American (44%) and Japanese (44%) support has similarly held steady, while Indian support has increased from 44% to 50%. Only small minorities in each country (below 10%) oppose the idea.
• The four Quad publics remain more likely to see each other as allies, economic partners, technological leaders and fellow democracies than a danger. However, Australians only narrowly view the United States (67%) as more of an economic partner for Australia than they do China (64%).
• Taiwan is described as an ally by 44% of Australians, 56% of Americans, 54% of Japanese and 36% of Indians. Seventeen per cent of Indians describe Taiwan as a danger, compared to just 5% of Australians, 7% of Americans and 4% of Japanese.
• Australian (54%) and Japanese (45%) respondents remain far more likely than not to think an Australia-Japan alliance would make their countries more secure. Only 8% of Australians and 4% of Japanese disagree.
• Over a third (38%) of both Americans and Indians believe a bilateral alliance would make their respective countries more secure. By comparison, 21% of Indians and only 6% of Americans think it would make their countries less secure.

Finding 4 on AUKUS

Support for AUKUS continues to outweigh opposition, but Australians are sceptical that it will be delivered and increasingly feel their government has not adequately explained why Australia needs nuclear-powered submarines

• Australians increasingly feel AUKUS has not been explained by the Australian Government. Only 23% of Australians agree their government has properly explained the rationale for AUKUS, down from 27% in 2025, while those who disagree have increased to 44% from 40%.
  • This includes 17% of women (compared to 29% of men) and is a bipartisan sentiment, with 25% of Labor and 29% of Coalition voters agreeing.
• Around half (48%) of Australians think Australia having nuclear-powered submarines is a good idea, compared to 34% of American, 23% of Japanese and 44% of Indian respondents. Between 10–20% of respondents in each country disagree.
  • A 19-point gender gap persists among the Australian public: 39% of Australian women think it is a good idea, compared to a majority (58%) of men.
• Few (15% or less) in each country disagree that AUKUS makes Asia safer, but around half of respondents in each country are uncertain.
• Despite their lukewarm support for AUKUS, only 20% of Australians believe the partnership should be cancelled altogether, while 41% disagree. However, 24% of younger Australians want to cancel AUKUS (up from 16% in 2025), compared to 16% of those aged over 65.
• Only 31% of Australians are confident that Australia will receive the Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines promised by the United States under the AUKUS agreement. A quarter (23%) of Australians disagree, while almost half (46%) are uncertain.
• Despite scepticism that Australia will obtain US submarines under AUKUS, a majority of Australians (55%) think nuclear-powered submarines will increase Australia's ability to defend itself.
  • There is an 18-point gender gap on the question, with 47% of women agreeing compared to 65% of men.
• Four in ten (39%) Australians continue to believe AUKUS is good for creating jobs in Australia, but also that AUKUS submarines are not worth the cost to Australian taxpayers.
  • Views on AUKUS as a job opportunity are increasingly partisan, with 50% of Coalition voters agreeing compared to 39% of Labor voters.
• Close to half (46%) of Australians think AUKUS locks Australia into supporting the United States in an armed conflict.

Finding 5 on democracy

Australians are the most concerned about future US elections, but a majority of Australians, Americans and Indians still think US elections will generally continue to be free and fair

• A majority of Australian (71%), American (82%), Japanese (58%) and Indian (65%) respondents say they are a little or very concerned about the future of US democracy.
• Despite deep concerns about the future of US democracy, a majority of Australians (51%) expect US elections to at least be mostly free and fair, as do 59% of American, 40% of Japanese and 62% of Indian respondents. Less than a third of respondents in each country expect them to be mostly unfair, while less than 5% of respondents in each country think that the United States will probably no longer hold elections at all.
• Australians and Americans have starkly different views on an autocratic system of government compared to their Japanese and Indian counterparts. Japanese (77%) and Indian (69%) respondents are far more likely to think that having an autocratic figure is a good system of governance, compared to Australian (34%) and American (32%) respondents.
  • Among Americans, 43% of Trump voters agree, compared to only 17% of Harris voters.
• Overwhelming majorities of Australian (91%), American (86%), Japanese (88%) and Indian (84%) respondents continue to say that democracy is a good way of governing their countries. However, only 44% of younger Australians describe it as a “very good” system compared to 59% of Australians over 65.
• As in 2025, majorities in each country continue to agree with promoting democracy as the best form of governance in Asia. This includes 76% of Australians, 69% of Americans, 59% of Japanese respondents and 76% of Indians.

Finding 6 on trade and AI

Australians and Americans support AI regulation while Japanese and Indian respondents are more divided

• Pluralities of Australian (34%), American (38%), Japanese (42%) and Indian (43%) want to prioritise trade and economic ties. For the Australia-US alliance, defence ties are seen as the top priority for only 20% of Australians and 9% of Americans.
• Support for the regulation of AI remains strong in Australia (68%) and the United States (65%). By contrast, Japanese and Indian respondents are evenly divided between support for AI regulation (29% and 43% respectively) and innovation (30% and 41%).
• Support for prioritising free trade has slightly declined in all four Quad countries since 2025. Two-thirds of Australians (67%), and pluralities of American (49%), Japanese (48%), and Indian respondents (55%) want to prioritise domestic manufacturing, even if it means consumer goods are more expensive.
• As in 2025, majorities in each Quad country (53–61%) want to increase the economic links between them to reduce dependence on China. Only 1 in 5 Australians, as well as 17% of Americans, 9% of Japanese respondents and 28% of Indians would instead prefer to maintain current economic policies with China to get lower prices.
• Only 23% of Americans think that increased US tariffs will be good for the US economy, compared to 45% who believe they will be bad.
• Six in ten (59%) Australians and Americans think future US presidents will be less aggressive with tariffs than President Donald Trump — a slight decline (4–5%) from 2025. One-third of Japanese (35%) and Indian respondents (33%) agree.
  • Older people in each Quad country are more likely to agree than younger people, particularly in Australia (71% of those over 65, compared to 43% of those under 35), and the United States (80% of those over 65, compared to 46% of those under 35).