Posturing the ADF to maintain an Indian Ocean strategic balance

Executive summary

Australia has long struggled to establish and sustain an effective force posture in its strategically critical northwest approaches and the broader Indian Ocean, despite the region’s growing importance amid rising strategic competition. To ensure credible operational readiness and meet emerging security challenges, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must increase investment, resources and political attention toward Western Australia and ADF forward bases across the Indian Ocean region.

Changes to the ADF’s defence posture are not keeping pace with an Indian Ocean that is becoming a key focal point for intensifying strategic competition.

This brief analyses the trajectory of Australia’s regional engagement over the past five decades, examining how Western Australia and the broader Indian Ocean has featured in Canberra’s strategic thinking and subsequently shaped its force posture efforts. While successive Australian governments have increasingly recognised Western Australia and the Indian Ocean as of strategic significance to Australia’s security fortunes, changes to the ADF’s defence posture are not keeping pace with an Indian Ocean that is becoming a key focal point for intensifying strategic competition.

In order for Australia to effectively address the security challenges and seize the strategic opportunities presented by the Indian Ocean region, this policy brief offers recommendations that reinforce Australia’s defence and strategic posture in Western Australia and its littoral forward base network. These include:

1. Implement overdue commitments from the 2012 Force Posture Review regarding Australia’s Indian Ocean coastline.
2. Empower the Assistant Defence Minister to prioritise the Northern Base Network through the Defence Estate Review process.
3. Elevate defence planning for the northeast Indian Ocean, factoring in shifting regional power dynamics, Western Australia’s proximity to East Asia and the region’s significance for US-Australia posture cooperation.
4. Align infrastructure development across the Northern Base Network with the objectives of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) to ensure the ADF can conduct sustained operations from these bases.
5. Fast-track base upgrades and posture initiatives at Cocos (Keeling) Islands and North Western Australia, utilising funds freed up from the 2023 Defence Estate Audit.
6. Expand ADF training and exercise programs in North Western Australia to strengthen readiness and interoperability.
7. Develop Western Australia as a testing and evaluation hub, capitalising on its expansive air, land and maritime domains.
8. Align Australia’s force posture initiatives with allies and partners to maximise the impact of Australia’s enhanced regional defence presence.

Introduction

In 2023, the Albanese government tasked a Defence Strategic Review (DSR), led by two Independent Leads, Professor the Hon Stephen Smith and Air Chief Marshal (rtd) Sir Angus Houston, to assess the political and material factors of Australia’s defence strategy. The approach taken by the Independent Leads was to initially focus on assessing the political factors of strategy: assessing the problems that Australia faces in its strategic environment,¹ interrogating their broader context and assessing the “goals, resources and policies” that were required to address them.² The DSR subsequently recommended that the Albanese government formally adopt a regional balancing strategy for the Indo-Pacific, enabled through collective deterrence in the region; deterrence by denial at the national level; and a focus for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on a military strategy of denial.³ This approach was codified through the concept of ‘National Defence’ — a “unifying national strategic approach” that is both “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-nation.”⁴ Given the scale of the problems and the threats that Australia faces, this approach was not something, as the DSR explicitly noted, the Department of Defence could “grapple with alone.”⁵ As such, it emphasised supporting concepts such as “integrated statecraft” and “national resilience.”⁶

With the political elements of strategy in place, the focus of the DSR’s Independent Leads then turned to more material factors of strategy.⁷ Specifically, the DSR’s ‘Terms of Reference for the Independent Leads of the Review’ focused heavily on the material factors of strategy. It directly tasked the Independent Leads to undertake “a holistic consideration of Australia's Defence Force structure and posture by including force disposition, preparedness, strategy and associated investments.”⁸ The focus of force posture in the review was particularly specific. According to the DSR’s Glossary of Terms, Force Posture:

Encompasses where the Australian Defence Force's units, facilities, and support elements are located, the capabilities (equipment and the force structure) that can be deployed at short notice, the quality of training facilities and bases, the ability of our personnel to sustain high-tempo operations and our connectedness with partners, allies and industry to achieve intended objectives during war and peace. This includes the estate and infrastructure elements of the Defence Integrated Investment Plan.⁹

Australia's northwest approaches

The DSR placed renewed focus on the strategic significance of Australia’s northwest approaches, long viewed by Australian defence planners as a vulnerability to adversary exploitation due to their geographic isolation and relatively sparse population: a perception shaped by the Japanese attacks on Darwin and other northern bases during the Second World War.¹⁰ While conscious of these concerns, the DSR also underlined the strategic opportunities that these areas offered to Australia’s strategic fortunes. Positioned at the maritime junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, northern and western Australia were identified, as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles coined, critical platforms for “impactful projection” into the broader region and enabling the ADF to “hold an adversary at risk further from [Australia’s] shores”.¹¹ As a result of the northwest approaches, the review reconceived the geographic lens of Australian strategy to focus on a primary area of military interest (PAMI) that encompasses the northwest Indian Ocean, maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This arc focuses on Australia’s northern approaches and its relative geography to East Asia, placing a strong emphasis on the eastern Indian Ocean and Australia’s Indian Ocean territories and coastline.

This emphasis was followed through in Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), where the government codified the recommendations of the 2023 DSR into policy.¹² The NDS committed to deepening defence relationships with countries in the Indian Ocean, with a particular focus on strengthening Australia’s relationships with Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh. The NDS also identified India as a “top-tier” security partner for Australia.¹³ As such, Australia’s interest in security cooperation in this region has considerably surged in recent years. Beyond long-term shared strategic interests in ensuring peace and stability in Indian Ocean waterways, the immediate priorities for Australian defence partnerships include deepening defence industrial cooperation; improving maritime search and rescue capability; countering transnational crime, terrorism, and piracy; addressing people smuggling and other human security risks; and responding to natural disasters.¹⁴

The Australian Department of Defence’s (hereafter, Defence) mechanism to enhance this engagement came in the form of the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP).¹⁵ The DCP supports regional countries in developing their own defence capacities through a range of training initiatives and bilateral exercises, capacity building initiatives, and equipment and infrastructure projects. In recent years, the DCP has made important progress in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The program’s inclusion of the northeast Indian Ocean provides an opportunity to link emerging efforts there with existing measures in Southeast Asia, as well as to enhance many of Australia’s bilateral and minilateral engagements with Southeast Asian partners on Indian Ocean region-related issues and developments. Most recently, the Australian Government’s announcement in June 2025 that it would gift a Guardian-class Patrol Boat to the Maldives is a significant step in developing its partnerships and engagement in the Indian Ocean region, having learnt from the DCP’s similar accomplishments in the Pacific and recognition of the critical role that smaller states play in securing maritime security.¹⁶

The greatest challenge for Australia, however, is resourcing this capability uplift and delivering the required infrastructure and force posture to ensure a more sustained presence in and beyond Australia’s territorial waters.

In terms of hard power, Australia’s all-domain maritime capability in the northeastern Indian Ocean has grown considerably. The AUKUS partnership to deliver nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia, along with related infrastructure and sustainment facilities at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, are central to the ADF’s future presence in the northeast Indian Ocean and Australia’s broader contribution to maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance. More immediately, concurrent modernisation efforts are underway in Australia’s force posture that will equip the ADF to undertake more effective and ambitious operations in the Indian Ocean in the future. The Albanese government has committed A$11.1 billion over the decade to expanding the naval fleet, including doubling the number of major surface combatants.¹⁷ Programs are also underway to improve infrastructure on Cocos (Keeling) Island, as well as other key locations across the northwest of Australia, to better support maritime surveillance operations by P-8A Poseidon aircraft.¹⁸ The greatest challenge for Australia, however, is resourcing this capability uplift and delivering the required infrastructure and force posture to ensure a more sustained presence in and beyond Australia’s territorial waters. Compounded by Australia’s emphasis on the Northeast Indian Ocean and developing its relationship with India in particular, the Southern Indian Ocean has emerged as a less developed aspect of Australia’s defence strategy.¹⁹

Force posture in Western Australia: From Dibb to the DSR

The development of Australia's post-Vietnam force posture initiatives in Western Australia has, in recent decades, been a tale of lost opportunities. The original developments occurred from the late 1960s to the early 1980s as the Department of Defence shifted focus to a more self-reliant defence of Australia. The first of the ADF’s ‘bare bases’ — forward operating bases located in remote areas and designed for rapid activation during wartime or exercises — were established at Tindal and Exmouth in the early 1970s, and HMAS Stirling in Western Australia was established in 1978.²⁰ During the 1980s, and following on from the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (known as the Dibb Review), HMAS Stirling became the main submarine base; the Army’s presence in northern Australia was enhanced; RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory was established as a permanent forward base, and an additional bare base was added with RAAF base Scherger in Cape York Peninsula, Queensland. Progress on these facilities was limited, given the limited threat Australia faced at the time. ²¹

With an increasing focus on major power competition in the region and as a precursor to the 2013 Defence White Paper, which introduced the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a strategic framework to Australia's defence planning, then Minister for Defence, The Hon Stephen Smith, commissioned a Force Posture Review in 2011. This review, conducted by two former defence secretaries, Allan Hawke and Ric Smith, was released in 2012. This review highlighted the:

limitations to the capacities of the ADF bases, facilities and training areas, particularly in Australia’s North and West and our ability to sustain high tempo operations in Northern Australia and our approaches, the immediate neighbourhood and the wider Asia-Pacific region.²²

The Hawke-Smith review included a range of recommendations to enhance force posture in Western Australia. To strengthen Australia's northern and western defence posture, the review recommended the ADF to prioritise upgrades to key air and naval facilities. This includes enabling sustained operations of KC-30 and P-8 aircraft from RAAF Learmonth, enhancing the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield for UAV and limited tanker use, and improving infrastructure at Curtin and Learmonth to accommodate future combat aircraft. They recommended additional investment for Broome as a forward operating base, while Fleet Base West required expanded wharf and support capacity to host major surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and submarines, including those of the US Navy, supporting broader Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia deployments. The ADF was recommended to deepen operational readiness in Northwest Australia through increased joint and simulated exercises, frequent aircraft and ship visits and senior leadership study programs. These efforts should be supported by improved communication about ADF presence and activities in the region. To ensure resilience during high-tempo operations, the Hawke-Smith review recommended that Defence assess fuel, munitions, and logistics requirements at forward bases, implement physical hardening, and enhance base repair and missile support capabilities.²³

The 2012 Force Posture Review recommendations were included in the 2013 Defence White Paper and budget planning. However, the Gillard-Rudd government’s loss in the 2013 election led to most of the 2012 Force Posture Review’s recommendations being shelved by the new Abbott Coalition government. The outcomes of the 2012 Force Posture Review were revisited during the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and reassessed in light of the worsening strategic situation. The DSR noted that “Most of those recommendations relating to the northern bases have not been implemented… Irrespective of this history, it is now imperative that our network of northern bases is urgently and comprehensively remediated.”²⁴

Subsequently, the 2023 DSR outlined a framework of three layers of defence bases and infrastructure that includes “a network of fully enabled northern operational bases, a series of bases in depth to support the Defence enterprise and identification of relevant Civil infrastructure for Defence needs.”²⁵ This framework includes the development of the:

key line of forward deployment for the ADF stretches across Australia’s northern maritime approaches. Integral to this sovereign Australian posture is the network of bases, ports and barracks stretching in Australian territory from Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the northwest, through RAAF bases Learmonth, Curtin, Darwin, Tindal, Scherger and Townsville.²⁶

As the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical importance continues to rise, Australia’s vast and strategically advantageous geography supports the need for multiple operational lines of deployment.²⁷ As such, a distributed network of well-established bases and facilities across the country provides the “strategic depth” necessary to integrate and sustain defence capabilities in order to maintain a credible deterrent and conduct military operations if required.

The DSR outlines this concept through three distinct operational and support lines:

1. Forward Line of Deployment: This primary arc stretches from Cocos (Keeling) Islands through RAAF Base Learmonth in Exmouth (2,140 km), to Darwin and Tindal (including RAAF Base Curtin, 2,000 km), then to Weipa (RAAF Base Scherger, 1,230 km), and finally to Townsville (904 km).
2. Operational Support Line: This secondary axis runs from Perth to Alice Springs (2,000 km), then across to Brisbane (2,000 km), forming a central spine of logistical and operational support.
3. Industrial and Strategic Depth Line: The third line connects Adelaide to Sydney (1,200 km), covering the densely populated southeast corridor — home to most of the nation’s defence industry, training facilities, headquarters, and broader economic infrastructure.²⁸

Australia’s lines of defence bases and infrastructure (Courtesy of the Australian Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review 2023)

The DSR called for a range of measures to increase Australia’s force posture and defence preparedness across the frontline Northern Base Network, a number of bases, ports and barracks stretching across or adjacent to Australia’s northwest approaches.²⁹ It noted that “Defence infrastructure must provide a hardened and dispersed platform to support the deployment of the ADF and the defence of Australian territory and our interests.”³⁰ Additionally, “[t]he priority for this network is the series of critical air bases. This series of northern air bases must now be viewed as a holistic capability system and managed as such by the Chief of Air Force.” The review stated that there must be immediate and comprehensive work on these air bases undertaken in hardening and dispersal; runway and apron capacity; fuel storage and supply; aviation fuel supply and storage; GWEO storage; connectivity required to enable essential mission planning activities; accommodation and life support; and security.”³¹

Subsequently, the Albanese government agreed, in principle, with these recommendations. These force posture provisions were followed up in the 2024 NDS chapter on ‘Defence Force Structure, Posture and Bases’, noting that “Defence must posture to enable the impactful projection of military effects from Australia to project and sustain a deployed force and to drive efficient use of training areas. Defence’s domestic force posture is to:

• Deliver a logistically networked and resilient set of bases, predominantly across the north of Australia, to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s ability to recover from an attack.
• Increase protection of bases and provide the ability to withstand disruption in crisis or conflict.”³²

The NDS also included a commitment in the 2024 Integrated Investment Program to advance the implementation of the Australian Government’s six immediate priorities announced in response to the Defence Strategic Review. This includes: “improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases…to ensure the ADF can project deployed forces and continue to operate through disruption.”³³

The Cocos-Keeling Islands and the Gascoyne Gateway

While the measures previously outlined offer clear priorities, implementation has proven to be challenging. The delay in upgrading the Cocos-Keeling Islands between the Force Posture Review in 2012 and the DSR in 2023 was considerable. This had a significant financial impact, particularly with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic disruption, supply chain shortages and workforce shortages. More recently, it has been reported that part of the upgrades, which were initially costed at A$184m, were reported in a 2022 parliamentary committee to have tripled to A$568m, resulting in a A$384m cost blowout.³⁴ Additionally, the project has exceeded its deadline. According to Defence, construction on the island commenced in late 2024, with all works forecast to be complete by early 2028, rather than the original 2026 deadline.³⁵

The importance of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to military operations in the Indian Ocean is underscored by a May 2024 US Naval Facilities Engineering Command project seeking proposals for new facilities, repairs, renovations and infrastructure, worth a combined US$15 billion.³⁶ To be funded from the US Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it included a focused reference to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands (along with the Philippines, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea). According to former senior Australian defence official Ross Babbage, the United States has shown an interest in P-8 Poseidon planes, E-7 Wedgetail early warning aircraft, aerial refuelers and UAVs to operate from the island.³⁷ The ADF has also indicated that it intends to operate its electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, the MC-55A Peregrine fleet, from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, with the first aircraft available for operations within the next 12 months.³⁸

The nearest point from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to the mainland is Exmouth in northwest Western Australia, home to RAAF Base Learmonth. Learmonth has seen extensive use for Operation Sovereign Borders — a military-led border protection operation — but the base remains underdeveloped. Defence has tasked upgrades that include strengthening the runway and parallel taxiway; constructing new connecting taxiways; replacing associated airfield lighting; and constructing dedicated parking aprons for KC-30A and other large aircraft to support the loading and unloading of cargo and explosive ordnance. The aircraft aprons will incorporate high-volume in-ground hydrant refuelling points.³⁹

One of the key limitations to the development of RAAF Base Learmonth and the surrounding area, which includes the North West Cape US-Australia joint intelligence facility, is the limited availability of aviation and diesel fuel.⁴⁰ Exmouth is critical for its suitability as a location for the development of a dual-use civil and military port that would include large-scale fuel provisions. Fuel and regional infrastructure are key to ensuring Learmonth can operate as a base for daily operations and not as a fallback zone.

A commercial development proposal for the Gascoyne Gateway Limited Project (GGL Project) is underway to deliver on these needs. The GGL Project is a multi-user marine facility development located south of Exmouth in the Gascoyne region of Western Australia and envisioned to support a number of stakeholders’ interests for use in the region and surrounding waters, including cruise ships, super yachts, oil and gas industries, rare earths and critical minerals mining, transport and logistics, Australian Border Force and Royal Australian Navy vessels.⁴¹ The GGL Project will include developments on a major harbour, wharf and fuel facilities, which would enable a significantly enhanced force posture commitment in the region. Originally expected to start in mid-2023, with a completion date of 2025, the project has been delayed by regulatory processes at both the state and federal levels.⁴² It is now expected that construction will commence in 2027 and be operational by early 2029.⁴³ The facility will include multi-user berths capable of hosting Collins-class and nuclear-powered submarines, as well as all of the Navy’s principal surface combatants.⁴⁴ It also includes facilities for scalable fuel storage, providing an additional storage and supply site between HMAS Stirling in Perth and Darwin.⁴⁵

This commercial activity presents a unique opportunity for Defence to establish a fuel pipeline to RAAF Base Learmonth (25 km) from the GGL Project facilities, thereby significantly enhancing operational capability. For Defence, engagement with the port development would also allow the navy to use facilities some 1,200 km further north of HMAS Stirling, thereby providing a forward-operating base. The Gascoyne Gateway project is a wholly commercial activity with no requirement for government investment, although Defence would have to pay for the use of the facilities.

Defence would stand to be a major customer and has a significant interest in supporting the project, yet that support remains undeclared, limiting the project's development.⁴⁶ Additionally, direct engagement with the project would offer several potential opportunities for co-development. The most important engagement with Gascoyne Gateway offers the potential to provide an opportunity for Defence not just to use a commercial port and fuel storage facility, but access to develop hardened fuel storage facilities to better withstand an adversary attack and to provide broader infrastructure that directly meets Defence’s needs. This is a unique opportunity for a government and commercial partnership, yet, despite being made aware of the benefits of this program on multiple occasions, Defence remains disengaged from the project.

Additional work and funding are required to ensure a sustained and efficient force posture readiness for operations in the Indian Ocean.

Beyond these two facilities, Defence has invested in the expansion and upgrade of RAAF Base Darwin, with a US$239 million contract being signed with Texas company SLSCO for the construction of an aircraft parking apron and supporting facilities by 2027.⁴⁷ RAAF Base Curtin planned upgrades, along with the enhancements to Learmonth, are under contract with CIMIC’s CPB Contractors, and construction is expected to be completed in 2028.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, work has continued on US-Australian joint force posture initiatives in northern Australia, as agreed upon at previous AUSMIN meetings for Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger in far north Queensland.⁴⁹

While the Department of Defence under the Albanese government has seen significant enhancements for Australia’s northern base network, specifically in Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Learmonth and Curtin, additional work and funding are required to ensure a sustained and efficient force posture readiness for operations in the Indian Ocean. This is primarily due to the decade of lost opportunity between the 2012 Force Posture review and the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, during which these bases received little to no funding to implement much-needed and identified upgrades.

Opportunities in Western Australia

Beyond these specific defence sites, there are broader opportunities for improving force posture in Western Australia. Western Australia has already recognised these opportunities as seen through the state government's 2025 Western Australian Defence and Defence Industry Strategy, which notes:

WA’s vast landmass, uncluttered airspace and coastline of more than 10,000 kilometres offers significant opportunities for exercising multi-domain ADF capabilities, including alongside our nation’s allies to rehearse for joint and multinational operations. The State’s vastness also provides opportunities to establish world class multi-use testing and evaluation facilities to accelerate the acquisition of world leading equipment capability, particularly Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) and Counter UAS capabilities.⁵⁰

Western Australia also provides opportunities for the Australian Government’s broader Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance (GWEO) storage and to develop opportunities for engaging in GWEO maintenance and sustainment for the ADF, the United States and regional partners across a range of capabilities. This could include the Australian Navy and the US Navy’s recently announced decision to jointly develop additional Mark 48 torpedoes, which will support Australia in upholding a strategy of denial.⁵¹

A fresh impetus for action

Despite the delays in implementing many of these force posture initiatives since the 2012 Force Posture Review, 2025 has brought fresh impetus to this critical work. At the Defending Australia Conference in June 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles reiterated “that we need to meet the strategic moment, it is all about capabilities that project [and this includes] A much more capable set of Northern bases, which can send our Air Force further.”⁵² Most significantly, Marles highlighted the critical logistical opportunities of Australia’s geography to potential US operations in the Indo-Pacific in the face of a major contingency. He acknowledged the importance of Australia’s “continental geography…in the event of a US-China conflict,”⁵³ also noting that “our continent is more relevant to great power contest now than it's ever been before.”⁵⁴

At the Defending Australia Conference in June 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles reiterated “that we need to meet the strategic moment, it is all about capabilities that project [and this includes] A much more capable set of Northern bases, which can send our Air Force further.”Source: Australian Department of Defence

In addition, the Hon Richard Marles announced, as part of “a continual process of reprioritisation,” the new Assistant Minister for Defence, Peter Khalil, “will lead the government's work this term in responding to the Defence Estate Audit.” A response to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review, the audit was conducted by Jim Miller, Chair of the Infrastructure Victoria Board, and Jan Mason, former Managing Director of Defence Housing Australia, to assess the Department of Defence’s estate and infrastructure, including protective security and work health and safety.⁵⁵

The audit’s findings were received by the government back in December 2023. While yet to be made public, Marles quoted from the audit report:

Defence is constrained by the weight of its past when it comes to the management of the estate. Today’s estate footprint comprises numerous legacy sites without a clear ongoing link to current or future capabilities. Urgent interventions are needed to correct the unsustainable trajectory that has resulted from decades of deferred decisions on contentious estate issues.⁵⁶

He went on to note that this audit offers an opportunity “to save billions of dollars on the one hand and reprioritise them back into much-needed areas of defence, whilst on the other ensuring that we have a defence estate which properly supports the contemporary Australian Defence Force.”⁵⁷ As part of this reprioritisation in response to the estate audit, the northern base network must be treated as a major priority.

Working with allies and partners

Lastly, any evolution in Australia’s force posture should be undertaken in close coordination with concurrent defence efforts with its key intra-regional and inter-regional strategic partners. Effective alignment will not only avoid redundancies and mitigate strategic gaps but also ensure a more cohesive deterrent architecture that is more resilient to rapid changes in the strategic environment.

The link between aforementioned changes in Western Australia’s force posture to the US-Australian alliance is already clear, as evident from both the Deputy Prime Minister’s speech at the Defending Australia Conference and the program of combined force posture developments. As part of the 2021 United States Force Posture Initiatives, “site surveys have begun to scope additional upgrades at new locations such as RAAF Bases Scherger and Curtin…[for] increased rotations of US Navy Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft.”⁵⁸

The Northern Base Network is crucial for the defence of Australia and the broader region, as well as enhanced force posture engagement with the United States. To date, more recent work has primarily focused on Tindal and Darwin, with significant projects underway as part of a US-Australia partnership. The next level of enhanced US-Australia force posture engagement in northern Australia must now focus on northwest Western Australia and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. As Deputy Prime Minister Marles noted in May 2025, our “strategic geography is as much of a question in the here and now as is the building up of our defence capability.”⁵⁹

Similarly, the planned rotational presence of four US and one UK nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling under the AUKUS Submarine Rotational Force–West (SRF–West), beginning in 2027, will play a central role in building Australia’s technical proficiency, regulatory confidence and operational familiarity required for a sovereign nuclear-submarine capability by the 2030s.⁶⁰ This capability, as previously outlined, and the necessary sustainment and operational facilities from Australia, will play a central role in sustaining a favourable balance of power in the broader Indian Ocean region.

The planned rotational presence of four US and one UK nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling under the AUKUS Submarine Rotational Force–West (SRF–West), beginning in 2027, will play a central role in building Australia’s technical proficiency, regulatory confidence and operational familiarity required for a sovereign nuclear-submarine capability by the 2030s.Source: Australian Department of Defence

Looking beyond its traditional partnerships, Australia should also better leverage the momentum generated by its deepening strategic ties with India and Japan to expand joint force posture arrangements, either on a bilateral or minilateral basis. Since the elevation of India-Australia ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020, defence cooperation has advanced significantly, including regular maritime exercises such as Malabar (with the US and Japan) and AUSINDEX.⁶¹ Likewise, Australia’s strategic and defence relationship with Japan has made significant strides from the 2007 Joint Declaration to the 2014 Special Strategic Partnership, culminating in the landmark Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement signed in 2022.⁶² These developments in the bilateral relationship have similarly catalysed a dramatic uptick in the scale and sophistication of bilateral and multilateral operational engagement.⁶³

Australia’s future force posture planning efforts should seek to sustain and better integrate these evolving relationships. This could include considering trilateral P-8 Maritime Patrol aircraft surveillance patrols with India and the US from Australia’s forward basing locations like the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, enhancing Indian Ocean situational awareness.⁶⁴ Selective intelligence sharing with Indian Ocean partners could also offer Australia and regional partners more persistent domain awareness and reinforce the shared commitment to secure sea lanes and a free and open maritime order.⁶⁵

Policy recommendations

To enable the Australian Defence Force to sustain an adequate force posture and operational readiness that better addresses the shifting strategic situation and strengthens engagement in the Indian Ocean, the Australian Government should consider the following recommendations:

• Deliver on the overdue 2012 Force Posture review requirements for Australia’s Indian Ocean Coastline.
• Prioritise, through the Assistant Defence Minister Peter Khalil, the Northern Base Network in this role in delivering and implementing the Defence Estate Review.
• Prioritise defence policy planning in the northeast Indian Ocean, as part of a holistic consideration of the changes in the regional strategic balance, the geographic proximity of northeast Western Australia to East Asia, and the importance of this region to US-Australia enhanced force posture agreements.
• Ensure that the capability requirements for the northern base network reflect the standards and intent of the Defence Strategic Review to provide the requisite infrastructure support for the ADF to conduct major operations from these bases.
• Accelerate the basing and force posture elements of the DSR and NDS at Cocos (Keeling) Islands and North Western Australia, utilising funds released from the implementation of the December 2023 Defence Estate Audit.
• Accelerate enhanced exercise and training opportunities for the ADF in North Western Australia.
• Explore the development of Western Australia as a hub for testing and evaluation, taking advantage of its vast air, land and maritime spaces.
• Ensure alignment between Australia’s force posture initiatives with concurrent strategic and defence activities of allies and partners to maximise the impact of Australia’s enhanced regional defence presence.