AJUSINT: Advancing defence information and intelligence sharing between Australia, Japan and the United States

Executive summary

• Australia, Japan and the United States (AJUS) have articulated an expansive agenda for defence cooperation, ranging from joint military operations to sharing strategic assessments, greater defence industrial integration and command and control (C2) coordination. Yet realising these ambitions will be impossible without first deepening and expanding trilateral information and intelligence sharing between the three countries. Experts and practitioners alike agree that advancing such cooperation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels will be essential to realising almost every objective on the AJUS partnership’s agenda.
• Doing so will require overcoming a number of cultural, legal, political and technical barriers. Historically, Japan’s place outside of the Five Eyes (FVEY) partnership, along with a range of domestic legal and political factors, have constrained its ability to share information and intelligence more broadly with its AJUS partners. Though these constraints are beginning to loosen, capacity constraints in Australia and cumbersome information classification and release procedures in the United States are among a number of factors that will continue to slow progress on deepening trilateral information and intelligence sharing if left unaddressed.
• This report presents the views of three experienced policy professionals from all three countries on the current state of AJUS information and intelligence sharing, identifying points of consensus between the three countries on the essential next steps for advancing cooperation in this space. These include the following policy recommendations:
  • Establishing a trilateral mechanism to identify and address key pain points in defence information and intelligence sharing between the AJUS countries, including comparative regulations, technical innovation and comparable implementation guidance across the three countries.
  • Developing a roadmap for Japan towards achieving ‘Five Eyes-like’ sharing status with Australia and the United States, without necessarily being integrated into that grouping.
  • Accelerating Australia’s integration into the US-Japan Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell (BIAC), with the objective of creating a trilateral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) arrangement with a broad regional remit.
  • Harmonising and, where prudent, combining separate bilateral defence industrial and technology initiatives to simplify and standardise information-sharing reforms across various trilateral projects.
  • For Australia and Japan, greater cooperation on space-based intelligence collection figures as a means both for developing both countries’ sovereign capabilities and, by extension, making greater contributions to a trilateral defence information and intelligence sharing enterprise with the United States.

Introduction

Tom Corben
Research Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence, United States Studies Centre

For all the disruption to the United States’ engagement with the world since the return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025, US defence strategy in Asia has figured as a remarkable example of policy continuity.¹ Indeed, for all its talk of ‘free-riding’ and ‘burden-owning’, the Trump administration has readily embraced alliances and minilateral security partnerships as the essential building blocks of its regional defence strategy. Foremost among these groupings is the Australia-Japan-United States (AJUS) partnership. Widely regarded by policymakers in all three capitals as the “core” of all three countries’ defence strategies in Asia,² AJUS has proven politically durable not only with respect to Trump’s second coming, but in the broader context of the re-election of the incumbent Labor government in Australia and a uncharacteristic period of minority government and “fractured” politics in Japan.³ Such continuity was on full display during the trilateral defence ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri La Dialogue in May 2025, with the three countries restating their “shared commitment… to collective deterrence” and lauding the “remarkable progress made by our three countries to advance trilateral interoperability and operational coordination.”⁴

The success of just about every major objective on the trilateral defence agenda — from defence industrial and technology collaboration and maritime surveillance operations to developing the requisite architecture for combined command and control and integrated air and missile defence — hinges on closer, full-spectrum defence intelligence and information-sharing cooperation between Australia, Japan and the United States across the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Yet giving full operational expression to the three countries’ strategic alignment will require ensuring that the foundational building blocks of such cooperation are fit for purpose. Foremost among these is information sharing and intelligence cooperation. The success of just about every major objective on the trilateral defence agenda — from defence industrial and technology collaboration and maritime surveillance operations to developing the requisite architecture for combined command and control and integrated air and missile defence — hinges on closer, full-spectrum defence intelligence and information-sharing cooperation between Australia, Japan and the United States across the strategic, operational and tactical levels. There are encouraging signs of progress, including greater policy coordination through the newly established Trilateral Defence Consultations mechanism intended to align policy and operational objectives through regular high-level meetings, the conclusion of new defence technology and information-sharing agreements, and the partial trilateralisation of bilateral initiatives focused on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), among other things.

Notwithstanding those successes, further deepening defence information and intelligence cooperation between the AJUS countries will require addressing a range of long-standing cultural, legal and technical barriers. Many of these challenges reside fundamentally at the national or bilateral level. Foremost among these challenges is overcoming Tokyo’s outlier status on intelligence sharing with its AJUS partners, stemming from the real and perceived deficiencies in the legal and technical specifics of Japanese information and cybersecurity protections, and its place outside of the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence grouping of which Australia and the United States are members. Notwithstanding that relationship, the United States still harbours concerns about Australian industrial and cybersecurity standards in the context of streamlining defence trade and innovation through AUKUS.⁵ For their part, Australia and Japan are often left frustrated by cumbersome US information classification and release procedures that often hamper even basic collaboration, as well as entrenched bureaucratic culture and institutional instincts that militate against sharing information and technology more widely with even America’s most trusted partners.⁶ This is to say nothing of what will be required to institutionalise and facilitate more seamless trilateral information and intelligence sharing at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

In that spirit, the United States Studies Centre, with the support of the Australian Department of Defence, is bringing together leading policy experts and practitioners from across Australia, Japan and the United States to identify the art of the possible across a number of areas for practical trilateral defence cooperation. It is convening a series of five workshops featuring experts and officials from Australia, Japan and the United States focused on these areas, and publishing corresponding reports that will highlight points of consensus or difference between the policy communities across all three countries on priority topics and will provide consolidated analyses of the opportunities for advancing cooperation in these areas. This compendium is the second in that series, featuring contributions from three leading experts from Australia, Japan and the United States which collectively unpack the current state of trilateral defence information-sharing and intelligence cooperation and offer policy options for advancing this critical component of the overall AJUS agenda.

Undertaking concrete trilateral cooperation on information sharing: Opportunities and challenges from a Japanese perspective

Hirohito Ogi
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics, International House of Japan

Introduction

To consolidate the power of Australia, Japan, and the United States to address any military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, trilateral cooperation among these countries could serve as the centrepiece, given their capabilities and willingness. Such cooperation would range from operational collaboration to technological and industrial projects. However, without a solid basis for information sharing, prospects for such collaboration will be limited. While there are concerns among Australians and Americans about the reliability of the Japanese information security system, Tokyo has been steadily improving these capabilities over the last ten years. Although there may be some areas requiring additional efforts on the side of Japan, these should not trump the need to accelerate trilateral defence collaborative projects.

Why information sharing?

In the Indo-Pacific region, which is surrounded by three revisionist states, China, North Korea and Russia, there are only a few nations capable of countering these threats while maintaining regional security. Under such a constrained environment, like-minded countries must collaborate to address military threats, and trilateral cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States would provide a valuable framework for this objective. This is why Japan’s National Security Strategy in 2022 pledged to “build a multilayered network among its allies and like-minded countries, expand it, and strengthen deterrence,” including through the trilateral framework.⁷ In other words, the presence of trilateral cooperation is growing in the minds of defence policymakers to deter military threats in the region.

Operational cooperation would be one of the two major areas that need to be further enhanced. Japan has been strengthening its bilateral defence operational capability with the United States since the Cold War era, and it has also pursued deeper cooperation with Australia through joint exercises and enabling agreements like the 2010 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the 2023 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). But to increase preparedness in wartime, the integration and connectivity of individual operations, as well as bilateral cooperation in the trilateral setting, would be the key to improving the effectiveness of aggregate capabilities. To this end, deeper information sharing is an essential enabler for trilateral operational cooperation and strategic coordination. Indeed, Japan’s National Defense Strategy recognises this by stating that “[g]iven the prospect of cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia, in the event of contingencies, Japan will mutually consult and collaborate with Australia, focusing on logistics support and information sharing.”⁸

A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Kawasaki P-1 aircraft at RAAF Base Darwin during Exercise Kakadu 2024. Source: Australian Department of Defence

Information sharing is also important from a defence industrial perspective. Not only the United States, but Japan and Australia are actively strengthening and modernising their defence capabilities. This includes bilateral joint research and development (R&D) in emerging technologies, and trilaterally that could serve the core defence capabilities of the countries in the future. In addition, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of wartime surge capacity in defence production through international cooperation. This recognition will necessitate standardisation and interoperability of major weapons and equipment in the expectation that the trilateral parties can augment wartime surge production capabilities with each other. Prompting technological exchanges is made possible based on an information-sharing infrastructure.

Integrating operational and technological cooperation

Both Japan and Australia have accelerated operational and defence technology cooperation while incorporating the pivotal roles played by the United States. The two parties agreed on reciprocal exchanges of liaison offices between the two joint operational headquarters, the Japanese Joint Operational Headquarters (JJOC) and the Australian Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), to facilitate information exchanges and operational coordination.⁹ Australia also decided to dispatch personnel to the Japan-US Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC), which jointly analyses information collected by ISR assets belonging to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and US forces.¹⁰

On the technology front, the two countries signalled their intent to cooperate on long-range strike missiles in 2024, though the specific direction of such cooperation is still unclear.¹¹ They also agreed on joint research to advance the autonomous undersea capability with a specific focus on undersea communication technology.¹² The trilateral parties, including the United States, are also planning to construct a future networked air and missile defence architecture.¹³

The direction of these efforts seems reasonable, but the trilateral parties can upgrade the level of cooperation by integrating operational and technological aspects of their cooperative activities. For instance, BIAC could include Australian assets such as MQ-4Cs and P-8s to augment the joint surveillance and analysis capabilities through developing network connectivity. This would connect situational awareness in the Northern Pacific with the Southern Pacific. Given that China’s maritime activities expand not only to the First Island Chain but also to the Second and Third Island Chains, seamless ISR operations and information analysis beyond one region will enhance integrated maritime domain awareness.

Given the uncertainty the Trump administration poses to its allies, the small start between Japan and Australia, which could ultimately stimulate the United States’ appetite for partnering, is a wise step for practical cooperation.

To further enhance the coverage of ISR operations, the trilateral parties can also collaborate on space-based ISR assets. For example, Japan is planning to construct a satellite constellation comprised of a vast number of small ISR satellites to support standoff strike missions from FY2025.¹⁴ Related to this project, domestic startup manufacturers of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites are developing prototypes of satellites to test the technology related to this constellation.¹⁵ However, while operating a vast number of satellites requires a large amount of funding, the Earth orbit that covers the area of Japan’s interest would be only 10-20% of the total. This means that Japan may need a partner located on the opposite side of the Earth to operate the constellation efficiently. Australia would be one of the best candidates for this partnership as it is acquiring long-range strike missiles, which need real-time target tracking. Partnering with Australia is unlikely to create competing demands for satellite operations, while both parties can also reduce their own operational costs by pooling their resources. The United States, presently developing its own satellite constellation, can also assist the two countries’ efforts by connecting them with partners’ constellations. On this point, given the uncertainty the Trump administration poses to its allies, the small start between Japan and Australia, which could ultimately stimulate the United States’ appetite for partnering, is a wise step for practical cooperation.

Are concerns about Japan’s information security legitimate?

There persists a concern among Australians and Americans as to Japan’s information security capacity. According to a survey conducted by the United States Studies Centre (USSC), the majority of Australian and American experts would welcome Japan to AUKUS Pillar II if Japan strengthened its information security.¹⁶ This underwrites their recognition that Japan’s information security measures are still inadequate to protect classified information and to promote technological cooperation.

While Japan needs to address this concern in close coordination with Australia and the United States, it is also true that such concerns often lack specific grounds for concern, let alone recommendations for how to improve the Japanese system. Indeed, Japan has incrementally improved its information security system. The enactment of the government-wide Specially-Designated Secrets Protection Act (SDS Act) in 2013 was a decisive step to enhance Japanese security clearance measures on defence-related secret information.¹⁷ But because new measures, including this Act, have been added to the old legal frameworks, the resulting patchwork of disjointed legal structures can be difficult to interpret for Japan’s international partners and policy experts. For instance, while the SDS Act stipulates the details on personnel security clearance (PCL) requirements, the 1954 Act on Protection of Secrets Incidental to the Japan-US Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDA Secrets Act) does not provide such requirements in detail.¹⁸ However, because the MDA Secrets Act is the primary device in protecting classified information related to US-made weapons, US counterparts might have been puzzled by the opacity or vagueness of the MDA Secrets Act enacted 70 years ago, even though the level of protection is equivalent to the SDS Act in some categories.

Trilateral meeting with the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, Japan Minister of Defense, Gen Nakatani and the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2025.Source: Australian Department of Defence

Meanwhile, the Guidelines for Protecting Classified Information Related to Defense Procurement (PCL) announced in December 2014 clearly state that defence contractor employees who are allowed to handle classified information other than SDSs, including MDA Secrets, require the consent of the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD).¹⁹ Because these Guidelines are integral in defence contracts having binding power, the PCL procedure is ensured not only in relation to SDSs, but also with other classified information, including MDA Secrets, strengthening information security concerning defence procurement. As a result, for instance, since Japanese defence companies have participated in the US-led international maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade (MRO&U) partnership of F-35s, no incident of compromised classified information related to F-35s from Japan due to personnel security issues has been reported so far. Furthermore, the JMOD released the Special Clause for Cybersecurity on Defense Contracts, which incorporated requirements outlined in the US NIST SP800-171 on ‘Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations’ in 2022, as well as the Defense Industrial Security Manual (DISM), similar to the US National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) in 2023.²⁰ These documents help current and future contractors understand the requirements to meet the strict standards in defence contracts.

Taking into consideration these developments, contemporary discussions about Japan’s information security measures must account not only for long-standing concerns, but equally for recent improvements, notwithstanding the incremental and opaque nature of progress on this front. Of course, the areas that need further efforts may remain in the eyes of international partners. If that is the case, rather than voicing abstract concerns, experts from three countries should conduct a comparative study on their respective architectures of information security systems, including not only statutory texts but also their implementation.

Protecting emerging dual-use technology

Yet, there are two remaining issues in Japan: the protection of dual-use technology, and active cyber defence (ACD) measures. As for the former, Japan enacted the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Critical Economic Security Information (tentatively referred to as the “CESI” Act) in 2024 to expand the coverage of information security measures to information related to dual-use technology.²¹ This move was based on the expectation that constructing the security clearance system in this area would increase opportunities for Japanese companies to pursue international collaboration. However, the actual contours and remit of the Act remain somewhat unclear, perhaps due to the hasty nature of their promulgation by the Japanese government. The biggest problem is that the Act supposes the Japanese Government, instead of the industry, generates CESI worthy of qualification as classified information. But because government agencies do not usually have the capability to indigenously generate sensitive dual-use technology — different from defence-related technologies, which could be generated by research institutes subordinate to the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) attached to the Ministry of Defense) — the concept of CESI risks failing to cover the very information it seeks to protect.

Instead, the Act should have designed the provisions to designate government-funded, privately generated sensitive dual-use technology as classified CESI. As a result, it is unclear whether this Act applies to a number of recently established government grant programs to promote sensitive emerging technology. These newly established grant programs, such as the Key and Advanced Technology R&D Collaboration Program (K Program), are administered by the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).²² Because those agencies and the recipients of grants were not previously familiar with information security measures established by the defence community, it is suspected that they hesitated to introduce such a straightforward but forcible measure.

This deficiency could probably be fixed in the course of its implementation by predesignating the information to be generated by government-grant recipients as CESI when grants are provided. Still, uncertainty remains as to the effective implementation of this Act.

Active cyber defence measures

The lack of domestic legal ground for the Japanese Government to conduct ACD measures — operations to neutralise cyberattacks by intruding into private cyber systems — has been another chronic issue in Japanese information security. The Japanese Government had been reluctant to introduce such forcible measures while being overly mindful of the secrecy of correspondence with respect to the intended meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution and other statutory regulations.²³ This was a source of doubt about Japan’s capacity to protect sensitive information in cyberspace among its partners, including Australia and the United States.²⁴ But confronted with an increasing number of cyberattacks, some of which were deemed to originate from foreign countries, the Japanese Government finally submitted a package bill to the Diet in February 2025 to enable the government to monitor suspicious private internet communication and neutralise cyberattacks on private cyber networks.²⁵ This bill was approved at the Diet in May 2025 and is currently waiting for enactment.

The lack of domestic legal ground for the Japanese Government to conduct ACD measures — operations to neutralise cyberattacks by intruding into private cyber systems — has been another chronic issue in Japanese information security.

Although this will become a big step for Japan, enacting this bill may not solve all the problems related to cybersecurity due to a two-fold problem of stove-piping in the Act. On the one hand, while the Cabinet Secretariat’s National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) is designated to be primarily responsible for monitoring internet communication, including suspicious ones, the legal authority to neutralise cyberattacks is entrusted to the National Police Agency (NPA) and the JSDF. This division of authority between monitoring and neutralising would raise the question of the feasibility of quick responses to cyberattacks unless the NCO constantly shares all information obtained by its monitoring of private networks with the NPA and the JSDF. However, the ACD Act provides that the Prime Minister (meaning NCO) “may share” such information with these agencies “if it deems necessary” (Article 27 of the Act), casting doubt on the Japanese Government’s seamless information-sharing capability.

On the other hand, the NPA will be designated as the primary actor in operations to neutralise cyberattacks on private cyber systems in peacetime, and the JSDF can only operate when the NPA requests and the Prime Minister orders to do so (Article 81 ter of the JSDF Act). This may create a big problem, as currently, the number of cyber-savvy personnel in the NPA seems to be smaller than that of the JSDF. Moreover, issuing a Prime Minister’s order requires a strict Cabinet Decision, which is similar to the procedure of issuing a Public Security Order to the JSDF (a requirement for the JSDF to suppress domestic insurgencies and terrorism, and has never been issued since the establishment of the JSDF in 1954). This might imply that the anachronistic view that the authority and reach of the JSDF should be strictly constrained continues to dictate the whole architecture of the ACD Act, undermining the whole-of-government response likely required to address cyberattacks. As a first aid, the Japanese Government should improve this construct in its implementation. At least, the Japanese Government should prompt constant information sharing between the NCO and the NPA/JSDF on monitoring suspicious internet communication. Furthermore, it would be possible to issue a predesignated semi-permanent authority to the JSDF to take ACD measures against cyberattacks on defence-related private cyberinfrastructure, such as that of defence contractors, in the newly established procedure of the SDF Act.

Policy recommendations

In summary, the trilateral parties should undertake the following actions to enhance information sharing.

• Designate Australian assets such as MQ-4Cs and P-8s to BIAC to augment the joint ISR capabilities and initiate trilateral operational intelligence analysis to synthesise threat perceptions/maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific.
• Construct trilateral ISR satellite constellations or increase network connectivity among space-based ISR assets of three countries.
• Initiate a trilateral comparative study on their respective architectures of information security systems, focusing not only on statutory texts but also on their implementation, possibly inviting industry representatives and academic experts.

In addition to these cooperative actions, the Japanese Government should improve its newly introduced information security legislation at the implementation phase.

• Predesignate information related to dual-use R&D programs and generated by government-grant recipients as CESI, consistent with the meaning of the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Critical Economic Security Information when grants are provided.
• Ensure seamless information sharing from the NCO to the NPA and the JSDF obtained by monitoring of communications in cyberspace in peacetime.
• Predesignate the semi-permanent authority to the JSDF to take active cyber defence measures against cyberattacks on defence-related private cyberinfrastructure, such as that of defence contractors, in the framework of the newly amended SDF Act.

Conclusion

Information sharing is the foundation for advancing both operational and technological cooperation among trilateral parties. To accelerate the trilateral partnership, each party needs to understand the other parties’ capabilities as well as constraints in great detail. Only with a clear grasp of this can relevant, meaningful policy recommendations be made possible. Japan certainly requires additional efforts in information security as described above, but these are not inherently difficult tasks, and should not be grounds for stalling deeper trilateral information and intelligence-sharing cooperation within the realm of the possible. This forward-leaning attitude would make it possible to exploit the full potential of trilateral cooperation.

Enabling trilateral operational cooperation through deeper information sharing: A US perspective

Luke Collin
Principal, The Asia Group

Over the past decade, Australia-Japan-US trilateral defence cooperation has evolved into one of the most operationally relevant minilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Complementing the United States’ bilateral alliances with Australia and Japan, respectively, the trilateral relationship has driven progress on enhancing interoperability and operationalising high-end military cooperation, including through regular and increasingly sophisticated trilateral military exercises, maritime patrols, and collaborative research and development programs. Taken together, these efforts have advanced the US strategy to build a latticework of like-minded partners across the Indo-Pacific that can collectively uphold deterrence and promote a free and open, rules-based order.

Despite this substantial progress, the full potential of the trilateral partnership remains unfulfilled due to limitations and restrictions on information and intelligence sharing. Deeper cooperation in sensitive defence areas such as bilateral contingency planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and advanced capability development cannot proceed until a strong foundation of information and intelligence sharing is established. Until this occurs, the trilateral partnership will peak at a level well below what the United States and its allies can do bilaterally or through other multilateral frameworks, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral partnership and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing arrangement.

Progress toward operationalisation…

The trilateral partnership has made commendable progress in operationalising its agenda over the past several years, including on joint exercises and training, maritime patrols, integrated air and missile defence, and collaborative research and development. For example, Australia participated as a full partner in the US-Japan bilateral exercise Orient Shield for the first time this year, and Japan is now a full partner in the US-Australia Talisman Sabre exercise.²⁶ This cooperation has extended to trilateral presence and maritime patrol operations across the region, including asset protection missions in which Japanese units have assumed operational responsibility for defending nearby US and Australian assets — a mission that would not have been possible ten years ago.²⁷ The partners have also increased trilateral cooperation on integrated air and missile defence and on developing advanced capabilities, including announcing plans to field a regional integrated air missile defence (IAMD) architecture that incorporates the three countries’ sensors²⁸ and to co-develop collaborative combat aircraft.²⁹

Impediments to growth

Notwithstanding this progress, cooperation in the above-mentioned areas — as well as in new domains — will not mature or come to fruition until there is similar growth in the trilateral information and intelligence sharing relationship. Specifically, the three partners must take further steps to expand information sharing at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to establish the foundational base required to achieve seamless, integrated trilateral operational cooperation.

The three partners must take further steps to expand information sharing at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to establish the foundational base required to achieve seamless, integrated trilateral operational cooperation.

Strategic-level information sharing

At the strategic level, close information and intelligence sharing enables informed and time-relevant policy discussions, the development of accurate and reliable regional contingency plans, and the transfer of sensitive military technology necessary for trilateral research and development efforts. High-level policy discussions, such as the Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting and the Foreign Minister-led Trilateral Security Dialogue, facilitate coordination on regional security issues and response actions, but they are only as effective as the quality and sensitivity of the information that can be shared.³⁰ Similarly, the ability to share the most sensitive intelligence is essential to developing trilateral contingency plans with accurate assumptions about adversary forces, indications and warnings of adversary aggression, and mission planning and targeting.³¹ Finally, a close information-sharing relationship is essential for facilitating the technology sharing and release authorities necessary for trilateral co-development and co-production projects, including the aforementioned collaborative combat aircraft program, advanced capabilities such as hypersonic and counter-hypersonic missile systems, and highly capable and interoperable platforms such as Japan’s Mogami-class frigate, which Australia has selected as its next future-frigate.³²

Operational/theatre-level information sharing

At the operational level, information sharing enables effective operational coordination among military commands, particularly the Japan Joint Operations Command (JJOC), the Australian Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) and US Forces Japan (USFJ), which is being upgraded into a joint operational headquarters.³³ Without the information sharing systems and processes in place to enable the three countries to possess a common operating picture and rapidly coordinate and de-conflict theatre-wide activities, the trilateral partnership will not be able to execute seamless, integrated military operations in peacetime or conflict. Similarly, the envisioned theatre-wide IAMD network linking together strategic and tactical sensors across the three nations is dependent on a robust information-sharing framework for both technical development and data sharing.

Tactical-level information sharing

At the tactical level, information sharing allows units such as maritime patrol aircraft, tactical fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial systems and warships to communicate, link their sensors, and share track data when operating in proximity to each other, including through secure communications channels and networks such as Link-11, Link-16 and the Cooperative Engagement Capability. Without robust information systems and processes, including interoperable secure communications systems and cryptologic keys, the partners will be unable to conduct integrated trilateral operations across various domains — including air defence, anti-submarine warfare and mutual asset protection — in both peacetime and conflict. Although the three partners can currently connect over some of these systems, the quality of the track data that can be shared varies according to the level of technology release each partner has received approval for.

Barriers to increased information sharing

The strategic, operational and tactical-level information sharing necessary to realise the full operational potential of the trilateral defence partnership is being stymied by legal, institutional, resourcing and cultural challenges in the three partners countries.

For the United States, Japan’s inadequate information security procedures, training and network security protocols, which create significant vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries, are among the largest roadblocks to the trilateral agenda. To be clear, Japan has made major strides in enhancing its information security over the past several years, including legislative reforms such as the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in 2013, the updated Economic Security Promotion Act in 2024 and the recently enacted Active Cyber Defense legislation.³⁴ These legislative changes are complemented by significant institutional steps Japan has taken to strengthen its internal controls in partnership with the United States, particularly through the Ministry of Defense-Department of Defense Bilateral Information Security Consultations (BISC) forum.³⁵ Despite this noteworthy progress, more action by Japan is needed to bring its information and cyber security levels up to the standards of the United States and Australia, especially steps to build a culture that prioritises information security within government ministries and action to replace its legacy, server-based network architecture with the more secure hyperscale cloud platforms that the United States and its other close allies have adopted.³⁶

Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton.Source: US Navy

At home, the United States’ own challenges to closer information sharing are more cultural and bureaucratic. Some elements of the Department of Defense and the broader US interagency often fail to see the value of greater information sharing with international partners, or they exaggerate the risks of doing so without fully appreciating the strategic benefits.³⁷ Compounding this problem is an institutional bias within parts of the US Government against sharing information on sensitive military technology that could lead to arms proliferation, diminish US qualitative military superiority and increase the risk of exploitation or theft by adversaries.³⁸ While the aforementioned risks are real, they are overstated and fail to account for Japan’s and Australia’s sterling non-proliferation record, and in Japan’s case, the major progress it has made to strengthen its information security. More importantly, these views fail to recognise the significant strategic risks of not enhancing trilateral information sharing with Japan and Australia, namely that the United States will not be able to leverage the benefits of scale that operating seamlessly with highly capable and geographically distributed allies provides in deterring and responding to larger and increasingly powerful potential adversaries.³⁹

Finally, for Australia, the key challenge is resourcing and bandwidth constraints. Australia is embarking on a historic defence buildup — with AUKUS as the centrepiece — but funding the required defence investments will strain its defence budget and will likely require difficult trade-offs.⁴⁰ For example, Australia recently cancelled its military satellite communication program partly due to cost concerns, meaning it will likely be dependent on the United States and commercial providers for the foreseeable future.⁴¹ Resourcing the capabilities and operations necessary for effective trilateral information sharing could face similar funding constraints, especially as AUKUS-related spending ramps up. Compounding this challenge is Australia’s relatively small institutional capacity compared to the United States and Japan, which may make it more difficult to focus senior-leader attention and adequately staff the structures and deploy the assets necessary for expanded trilateral information sharing and operational cooperation. Finally, although Australia has a strong record protecting classified information, the United States has raised concerns about the sufficiency of Australia’s defence trade regulations and industrial security measures, which were key sticking points in the development of AUKUS implementation agreements.⁴²

Recommendations

To realise the full potential of trilateral cooperation, the partners should consider pursuing the following ambitious policy initiatives, which will help to overcome some of the barriers noted above. None of these proposals will be easy or simple to implement, but they are necessary steps to take to advance the broader trilateral partnership agenda.

1. Develop a roadmap for Japan’s integration into the Five Eyes (FVEYs)

The “Five Eyes” (FVEYs) security classification arrangement between the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom is the gold standard for multilateral intelligence sharing. Bringing Japan into this exclusive group would be the simplest way to enable the seamless and timely intelligence sharing necessary for everything from contingency planning to sharing tracking data for adversaries’ defence assets to transferring sensitive technology. Japan would also bring significant intelligence collection value to FVEYs; although its human intelligence capabilities are negligible, it possesses highly capable signals and imagery collection capabilities — including space-based.⁴³ There has already been some recent progress toward bringing Japan closer to FVEYs — including Tokyo hosting a FVEYs officials meeting for the first time last November 2024 — but much more could be done.⁴⁴

Bringing Japan into this exclusive group would be the simplest way to enable the seamless and timely intelligence sharing necessary for everything from contingency planning to sharing tracking data for adversaries’ defence assets to transferring sensitive technology.

To be clear, Japan does not currently have sufficient information and cyber security standards in place to match FVEYs standards. Yet producing a multi-phase, multi-year roadmap for Japan’s accession to FVEYs — with clearly defined actions and milestones such as measures Japan must enact over specified timeframes to improve its network security, physical security, training curriculum and security clearance processes — could incentivise Japan to make the necessary improvements required to fully integrate with the United States, Australia, and other like-minded partners. A similar roadmap approach was pursued through the aforementioned BISC process, and it has resulted in demonstrable improvements to Japan’s information security practices; replicating that process in a FVEYs context could achieve similar positive outcomes over time.

2. Establish a trilateral ISR hub

The AJUS countries should pursue novel operational initiatives that hinge on trilateral information and intelligence sharing, along with the institutional architecture required to implement them. Evolving the existing US-Japan Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) at Yokota Air Base into a full-fledged trilateral ISR hub would be one of the simplest and fastest ways to trilateralise information sharing across multiple levels. The three partners operate similar, interoperable ISR platforms, including Triton/Global Hawk unmanned aerial systems and P-8 and P-1 maritime patrol aircraft. Collecting, fusing and analysing data collected from these platforms in a central hub using a shared, AI-enabled hyperscale cloud platform would go a long way toward enabling more seamless and integrated trilateral operational cooperation. A trilateral cell could also play a role in coordinating and deconflicting each partner nation’s ISR missions across the region to maximise efficiency and coverage while reducing redundancy.⁴⁵ Over time, a trilateral ISR hub could also pave the way for more integrated and seamless operational command and control among the three national military commands that could eventually morph into a multi-domain trilateral command and control node.

3. Trilateralise existing bilateral industrial cooperation structures to increase technology information sharing

The United States has launched several promising bilateral efforts with Japan and Australia, respectively, that could be trilateralised to facilitate increased trilateral technology information sharing. This would involve bringing Australia into the US-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) forum, and including Japan in the US-Australia Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) co-production effort. For example, a trilateral DICAS would incentivise and enable technology information sharing to co-develop advanced capabilities like collaborative combat aircraft and counter-hypersonic interceptors, and a trilateral GWEO could promote similar technology sharing on the co-development and co-production of long-range munitions. Japan and Australia each have unique technical strengths and industrial capacity, and adding them to the aforementioned fora would enable increased technology information sharing that benefits all partners.⁴⁶ Finally, the AJUS partners should consider setting up a new trilateral capability requirements cell between their Defence departments/ministries to align acquisition decisions so they are all procuring interoperable and complementary systems that will enable seamless trilateral information sharing, especially command and control systems such as “mesh networks” for decentralised wireless communications at the tactical level, as well as the interoperable ISR platforms necessary to establish a theatre-wide common operating picture.

Conclusion

Although trilateral operational cooperation between the United States, Australia and Japan has grown exponentially over the past decade, its full potential will not be reached until the partners make further progress to expand trilateral information and intelligence sharing across the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Each country should implement tailored reforms to address long-standing gaps and deficiencies that are holding back further progress, while coalescing around ambitious new initiatives to take the trilateral information-sharing partnership to the next level. None of these changes will be simple or easy, but they are necessary to ensure the trilateral partnership can continue to evolve and maintain collective deterrence in the face of growing regional security challenges.

Advancing AJUS trilateral information and intelligence sharing: An Australian perspective

Carl Herse
Chief Executive Officer, Kohei Consulting

Introduction

In a strategically contested Indo-Pacific region, Australia, Japan and the United States (AJUS) should do all they can to share understandings of the strategic, operational and tactical environment through the free exchange of information and intelligence. A common understanding will be essential in coordinating military, diplomatic and other statecraft efforts against what each has confirmed is a common threat — a shifting balance of power driven by an unprecedented and opaque build-up in China’s conventional and nuclear military capabilities.⁴⁷ Understanding an adversary’s strategic intent and capabilities ahead of time will help reduce both the likelihood of key indicators of action being missed and the chance that information is misidentified through lack of available context, especially where each individual nation has only part of the picture.⁴⁸ When it can be demonstrated that technologically enhanced, coordinated capability can detect and attribute offensive activities at an early stage, it stands to reason that an adversary will think twice before taking action.⁴⁹

For AJUS to reach this level will take concerted efforts between the three governments to overcome long-standing cultural, political, procedural and technical barriers to collaboration. Doing so will be essential to fully realising the ambitious agenda the three countries have set for themselves.

The logic for Australia

From Australia’s perspective, there are good reasons to pursue greater trilateral intelligence sharing. Firstly, insights from like-minded nations with different geographic and geopolitical perspectives on intelligence gathering and assessment on China and its activities naturally complement Australia’s own efforts. For instance, while Australian perspectives on China’s regional activities are influenced heavily by its actions in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia,⁵⁰ enhanced access to Japanese open-source and classified intelligence on Chinese activities in Northeast and Southeast Asia may illuminate at a depth greater than Australian — or US — intelligence agencies can achieve alone.⁵¹ The United States retains both a global and regional perspective on China, and its strong strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific will endure under the Trump administration, evidenced by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s repeated identification of the region at America’s “priority theater” during his 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue address.⁵² Bringing perspectives together provides all three countries with a more well-rounded picture of Beijing’s actions and intentions than would be possible alone.

In September 2022, Australia and the United States declared Initial Operational Capability for the Space Surveillance Telescope at the Harold E. Holt Satellite Sensor Site facility near Exmouth, Western Australia.Source: Australian Department of Defence

Secondly, getting intelligence sharing arrangements in place now will be effort well spent if the imperative to share becomes immediate in the future. Given the deterrent effect, ironing out processes for trilateral sharing now would be both an investment toward smooth future cooperation in crisis and insurance against that outcome. Ensuring intelligence-sharing arrangements are in place will aid operational planning and coordination, allowing the three countries to put their strategic consensus into more effective action.⁵³ It will also help to facilitate defence industrial and technology cooperation, in light of initiatives like AUKUS and the selection of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) as the preferred supplier of Australia’s General Purpose Frigates.⁵⁴

Current state of cooperation

Fortunately, the architecture required to operationalise greater AJUS information and intelligence sharing is already robust. Beyond sharing a common worldview and long-established strategic relationships, many of the prerequisite mechanisms and policy settings to enable trusting intelligence interactions already exist. For example, Australia and Japan and separately, Japan and the United States, have signed General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA),⁵⁵ while Australia and the United States have a long history of high-level sharing through the Five Eyes arrangement. All three nations are part of minilateral security groupings, including AJUS and the Quad, many of which include intelligence cooperation components of varying significance.⁵⁶

Though long-regarded as the ‘weak link’ in any minilateral information-sharing enterprise, Japan has also pursued major improvements to its domestic legal, procedural and technological capabilities to improve its intelligence cooperation potential. Japan’s 2015 Peace and Security Legislation expanded the scope for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to engage in cooperation with US and other coalition forces, including in relation to intelligence cooperation, in the interests of collective security.⁵⁷ More recently, Japan has bolstered its cyber intelligence capabilities and begun exchanging data and, presumably, capabilities with the United States and Australia.⁵⁸

Importantly, Canberra and Tokyo have sought to strengthen bilateral cooperation to better support trilateral objectives, including on defence intelligence.⁵⁹ Notably, the Australian media reported in 2015 that the Australian foreign human intelligence (HUMINT) agency, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), was conducting operational training for Japanese government officials,⁶⁰ suggesting a recognition that Japan should consider creating an indigenous foreign HUMINT agency,⁶¹ a capability which Japan has not had since the Second World War. More recently, the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2022) placed heavy emphasis on information sharing, particularly on building a shared awareness of cyber threats, enhancing cooperation in the space domain and strengthening broader intelligence cooperation across the board.⁶²

The AJUS partners are also seeking to put greater intelligence cooperation into practice at the trilateral level. The joint statements from Trilateral Defence Ministers’ meetings in November 2024 and May 2025 detailed a growing agenda for trilateral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.⁶³ Practically speaking, this has included commitments to stand-up a trilateral integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) capability by 2027, pursuing trilateral maritime domain awareness (MDA) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) through the addition of Australia to the US-Japan bilateral intelligence analysis cell (BIAC), and the regular sharing of strategic assessments at the ministerial level as part of a newly created Trilateral Consultations Mechanism (TCM).⁶⁴

Barriers to enhanced sharing

It is fair to say that the deepest and longest-enduring intelligence sharing relationships have most often been forged during periods of conflict, driven by profound imperatives to share. The challenge for AJUS is to realise such a relationship before a crisis even occurs, but doing so will require overcoming a number of challenges.

Reconciling different approaches to intelligence

Analysts commonly point to membership in the Five Eyes grouping as a goal Japan should strive for, one that would greatly aid trilateral defence cooperation. Yet this is far from a simple proposition. The sharing of intelligence between states is historically a fraught exercise shot through with parochialism, occasional suspicion of attempts to influence rather than inform⁶⁵ and concern about the ability of one’s counterpart to adequately protect sensitive information. Developing bilateral intelligence sharing systems is difficult enough: harmonising security classifications, validating information protection processes, and developing trust between governments and their constituent intelligence organisations only becomes more difficult as more partners are added.⁶⁶

Thus, advancing AJUS intelligence cooperation may not be simply a case of emulating a single unified systemic approach to intelligence collection, analysis and sharing across all three states, but rather having three separate bespoke solutions that are, nonetheless, acceptable to the other parties.⁶⁷ In the interests of accelerating trilateral cooperation, each system must be allowed to come up with a bespoke approach that fits its own context, even if these must meet a combined standard of security acceptable to the other parties. For these reasons, creating an AJUS trilateral intelligence sharing arrangement would be easier than adding Japan to Five Eyes, and it would have the advantage of focusing the arrangement primarily on Indo-Pacific intelligence challenges.

Trust, reliability and influence

Trust is foundational for effective intelligence exchanges. In this context, generically, the term ‘trust’ can apply to:

• faith in the recipient that intelligence shared follows robust efforts to ensure an acceptable level of reliability or, at the least, contains riders that flag concerns about reliability; and
• confidence in the recipient that the intelligence is not being ‘spun’ to influence, rather than inform, a counterpart; and
• belief on all sides that the distribution system for that intelligence in the receiving country is efficient and secure; and
• certainty on behalf of the provider that recipients of the intelligence will protect that intelligence from adversarial access.

At a high level, trust can be affected by historical instances where intelligence assessments have been subject to political influence or have been found over time to have been erroneous, particularly where the perception that the sharing of the intelligence occurred without due diligence, such as the use of flawed intelligence to justify the 2003 Iraq War.⁶⁸ There have also been more recent concerns around potential signs of intelligence manipulation or politicisation associated with the 2025 US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program.⁶⁹ Ultimately, even the perception of adulteration of intelligence or ‘spin’ associated with its supply could undercut the value proposition of greater sharing, particularly considering risks identified by some experts that intelligence assessments shaped primarily by domestic political considerations could obfuscate the risks of “a surprise attack, a misreading of an adversary, or an inability to anticipate another consequential event,”⁷⁰ including with respect to deterrence challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Any trilateral arrangement will need to account for this if it is to be an effective tool for all three AJUS partners.

Raw versus processed

One way to counteract these concerns might be to share more rather than less. Where there may be concerns around reliability, intelligence recipients will undertake due diligence to determine the accuracy of that information, including to ‘situate’ it within a broader understanding of the operating environment and wider intelligence context. Providing the same ‘building block’ or ‘raw’ intelligence on which the supplier has based their assessment is likely to increase the odds that the recipient will accept that assessment as accurate because they can conduct their own, informed assessment of reliability.

This perspective argues strongly for the development of a systematic approach where relevant raw or building block intelligence is routinely shared on a trilateral basis. This would require building trust in each country’s systems and distribution procedures, but also needs the education of users of those systems, including the progenitors of the intelligence, so that they are aware that such intelligence should be shared on a trilateral basis by default. In that respect, fostering greater people-to-people ties in the processes of intelligence collection and assessment to create trusted and trusting relationships is essential.

Distribution and safeguarding

Having a distribution system that safeguards the intelligence supplied by a counterpart through appropriate protection and distribution measures is a fundamental part of developing the trust needed to share sensitive intelligence. Though cyber security often dominates this discussion, one less-examined aspect of these concerns relevant in the trilateral arrangement is the lack of a foreign HUMINT agency in the Japanese system. The lack of such an agency means that a natural counterpart for the distribution of Australian and US HUMINT does not exist. This matters logistically, given that a national HUMINT agency would have a secure distribution system established, and the foreign-supplied intelligence could ‘piggy-back’ on that, presumably secure, system. From a trust point of view, a counterpart will also likely assume that the nuances of protecting HUMINT, which may differ from other forms of intelligence, will be understood and applied.

The absence of such an entity means that the exchange process will be complicated by the need to engage more than one Japanese agency and be assured of each organisation’s safeguarding processes and distribution channels. Even were one agency to assume the responsibility, the education process around the requirements vis-à-vis HUMINT, the need to confirm the nature and reach of the distribution system outside that agency and confirmation of overall security would impose a significant administrative overhead and would be a drag on confidence in sharing the most sensitive intelligence. It is worth noting here that Australia’s ASIS has been previously identified, due to appropriate size, palatable remit and geographic focus, as perhaps a better model for such an agency than other examples, like the CIA.⁷¹ In this context, deeper Japanese engagement with Australia would be advantageous in establishing and expanding its own intelligence capacity.⁷²

Personnel security

Though cybersecurity is often cited as a key requirement of a secure system, the most effective way to compromise electronic systems remains subverting human users. Thus, security clearances and ongoing monitoring of personnel are critical components of safeguarding national security information, but must also be streamlined to ensure that national collection and assessment capacities remain fit for purpose.

None of the AJUS countries have fully optimised systems in this regard. For example, both Australia and the United States have long delays on clearances processes, particularly for the highest-level clearances. Questions have been raised over Australia’s lack of a continuous vetting system in the recent past,⁷³ though a growing number of cases of information and intelligence leaking from the United States and Japan have shown that even continuous vetting cannot completely eliminate insider threats.⁷⁴ Though Australia’s personnel clearance systems are well-established and well-integrated, they are still based largely on manual, rather than digital, workflow systems.⁷⁵ Australia’s system is also beset by significant delays in granting the highest level clearances and may not be optimally effective in the long-term monitoring of clearance holders.⁷⁶ Until the 2013 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, Japan lacked a robust legal framework for handling classified information. Even now, penalties for leaking secrets are lighter than either Australia or the United States.⁷⁷

Rightsizing and optimising these settings will be essential to grease the wheels of AJUS projects. For instance, both the supply of frigates by MHI and of nuclear-powered submarines from the United States for the Australian Navy will require new approaches to clearing and monitoring civilian staff.⁷⁸ Establishing mutually acceptable civilian clearance systems will be essential for both current and possible future joint defence industry projects, such as sharing technology associated with Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) systems.

A new model?

Rather than simply retrofitting existing structures, the imperative of advancing trilateral intelligence cooperation presents opportunities for fresh thinking. The fact that Japan has less legacy technology and fewer analogue bureaucratic processes at play could present an opportunity to leapfrog its allies and create a new, modern and high-tech, ideally centralised, clearance system. A centralised capability would have benefits from an economies of scale perspective, and would enable the quick establishment and easy maintenance of appropriate standards.

The fact that Japan has less legacy technology and fewer analogue bureaucratic processes at play could present an opportunity to leapfrog its allies and create a new, modern and high-tech, ideally centralised, clearance system.

It may well be possible to utilise existing open-source tools, bulk data analysis and AI capabilities in the design of a new clearance system aimed at producing both shorter initial clearance times and more effective ongoing monitoring of cleared staff. This is an area where Japan and Australia could collaborate more vigorously, with the objective of creating bespoke, modern approaches to intelligence sharing and personnel security. Such a system would draw upon similar capabilities as those that are used offensively to identify the security-cleared personnel within the AJUS nations, as highlighted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in its recent statement of concern.⁷⁹ Japan may also benefit from heeding lessons Australia has learnt from the creation of a centralised approach in the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA).⁸⁰

Conclusions and recommendations

The rationale for AJUS trilateral intelligence sharing rests both on immediate strategic necessity and longer-term imperatives of fostering resilience and interoperability. Historical precedent, existing bilateral and trilateral frameworks and the already substantial levels of trust between the three nations provide a strong foundation. Yet, achieving profound systemic integration faces challenges rooted in legacy institutional practices, divergent legal and cultural traditions, and concerns about information protection and reliability. These barriers are real, but they are not insurmountable.

In terms of matters of administration, politics and trust, AJUS should accept that a bespoke trilateral intelligence sharing arrangement may be easier to achieve than the addition of Japan to the Five Eyes construct.

The analysis presented here suggests that the following could accelerate progress.

• In terms of matters of administration, politics and trust, AJUS should accept that a bespoke trilateral intelligence sharing arrangement may be easier to achieve than the addition of Japan to the Five Eyes construct. Moving beyond the Five Eyes discussion would open opportunities to build an intelligence agreement optimised for regional trilateral purposes and unlock creative thinking about how to design and implement that arrangement.
• Collaboration between Australia and Japan on the (re)design of their respective personnel security systems, including the harnessing of advanced technologies such as open-source search, bulk data analysis and AI-driven capabilities, would provide a step towards a trilateral model. Australia’s existing experience in creating a culturally appropriate and somewhat centralised system may be useful in the discussion around the design of such a system in Japan.⁸¹ A joint design process that establishes relevant standards should include the flexibility to develop culturally appropriate bespoke solutions which are acceptable from a security perspective to each of Australia, Japan and the United States.
• Notwithstanding likely political difficulties, Japan should continue to pursue a dedicated foreign HUMINT agency, analogous to the Central Intelligence Agency and Australian Secret Intelligence Service. The existence of such an entity would provide both operational value and a clearer channel for sharing of trilateral HUMINT. Once again, Japan could stand to work with Australia on lessons learnt from the development of its own intelligence capabilities.
• The three countries should seek to normalise the sharing of raw intelligence, alongside assessed reporting, to deepen mutual trust by enabling each nation to validate and contextualise conclusions within their own operating picture. This will require policy settings that push intelligence operators to share indigenous building block intelligence within a trilateral environment by default. Doing so would combat perceptions/risks of politicisation or selective framing, thereby strengthening the credibility of trilateral intelligence as the basis for trilateral action.

Conclusions and recommendations

Tom Corben
Research Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence, United States Studies Centre

The three expert contributions and trilateral 1.5 workshop conducted in support of this publication suggest that policy thinkers in Australia, Japan and the United States are well-aware of the necessity of deepening trilateral information and intelligence sharing, and that they share a consensus on several ways to do so. However, they also suggest that there remains much work for all three countries to do to address a range of technical, political and cultural challenges to advancing this agenda, including managing differences in expectations when it comes to the best way in which to formalise or institutionalise such cooperation. The recommendations below capture the central discussion points from the contributions to this report, along with potential areas for further investigation.

1. For the trilateral defence cooperation agenda to fully reap the benefits of enhanced information and intelligence sharing, the three countries will need to coordinate reform and modernisation efforts across the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

This is particularly important given the uneven nature of AJUS’s constituent bilateral information and intelligence-sharing relationships, and the relationship between cooperation at these different levels. Simply further enhancing tactical or operational level information cooperation, for example, will neither support nor benefit from joint trilateral strategic assessments of the major challenges to and objectives for trilateral defence cooperation if intelligence sharing at this level is not commensurate with ‘lower’ level operations. Fortunately, there is a forum in which to pursue such cooperation. The Trilateral Defense Consultations, held for the first time in May 2025 and intended to “support trilateral alignment of policy and operational objectives… coordinate existing regional activities, align strategic communications, and discuss effective cooperation,” offer a convenient forum for discussing intelligence and information-sharing requirements at each of these levels and for coordinating efforts to implement guidance effectively across all three.⁸² As a starting point, this could include discussions on coordinated preclearance policies for designated information categories in the service of trilateral objectives, but should embrace innovation in intelligence collection, assessment and sharing at the design phase.

2. There is no clear consensus among the AJUS partners on whether Japan should join the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence sharing agreement, but experts concur that Tokyo would benefit from a clearly defined pathway towards achieving a FVEY-like intelligence sharing status.

Such a clearly defined pathway may be necessary to clearly articulate technical requirements and to overcome less tangible cultural and political barriers to wider sharing with Tokyo. Reservations in the Australian and US intelligence communities over Japanese information security systems and processes linger despite Tokyo’s recent efforts to improve its cybersecurity standards and security clearance processes. As such, there are growing concerns that these ingrained suspicions of Japan’s information security measures do not adequately acknowledge these recent improvements, short-changing Japan’s trustworthiness as an intelligence partner and discounting the real advantages and capabilities that Tokyo could bring to bear in a trilateral information-sharing enterprise.

Flight crews from the Royal Australian Air Force, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the US Air Force participated in information-sharing exercises at Kadena Air Base, Japan, September 2023. Source: Australian Department of Defence

In that respect, a defined pathway would help to address Japan’s concerns that long-held views in Australia and the United States of its information security weaknesses do not obscure the real and considerable changes that policymakers in Tokyo have pursued and implemented to improve the country’s best practices. Such an arrangement would focus both on a “clear and measurable” standards-based threshold for wider sharing in support of AJUS objectives across “physical, personnel, communications, and cyber-security areas,”⁸³ as well as an assumption of trust and approval when it comes to streamlining sharing and assessment procedures.⁸⁴ For such a roadmap to be successful would also require commitment from Australia and the United States to deliver on their promise of greater sharing should Japan meet these measurable thresholds, both in terms of giving and receiving information.⁸⁵

3. Relatedly, advancing trilateral defence information and intelligence sharing will require policy attention in all three countries, not just in Japan.

In the United States, this will likely include changes to information classification and foreign disclosure procedures for trilateral collaboration, particularly with respect to ‘not releasable to foreign nationals’ (NOFORN) rules that often restrict allied access to sensitive information. Reducing or removing such barriers has been a consistent theme in America’s major alliances for several decades, yet finding lasting resolutions to these challenges is complicated by the often-competing priorities of “risk minimisation (including sharing unclassified information)” and “the strategic imperatives of greater integration” with close allies.⁸⁶ Australian and Japanese policy thinkers will also be wary of recent developments within the US intelligence community, particularly the risks that intelligence assessments shaped primarily by domestic political considerations could obfuscate the risks of “a surprise attack, a misreading of an adversary, or an inability to anticipate another consequential event,”⁸⁷ including with respect to the deterrence equation in the Indo-Pacific. For its part, the Australian Government will need to pursue broad-based buy-in from its national intelligence and defence communities in order to identify its share of the aforementioned ‘roadmap’ for greater information and intelligence sharing with Japan. This could be done through increased reciprocal language and other training exchanges with Japan’s intelligence community “as part of a long-term objective of secondments within respective intelligence communities.”⁸⁸

4. Accelerating Australia’s integration into the US-Japan Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell (BIAC) is the most direct route towards operationalising trilateral intelligence gathering and information-sharing cooperation.

At present, the BIAC functions as a means for US and Japanese forces to “jointly analyse and process information gathered from assets of both countries” in the East China Sea, in order to “support informed decision making by defence leaders of both countries.”⁸⁹ This forum offers an ideal testing ground for deeper trilateral maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collaboration, including joint collection and assessment at the tactical level, and offers a template for future initiatives vis-à-vis other regional flash points and/or with a wider array of partners. Indeed, just as the BIAC constitutes the first real-time information sharing capability between Japanese and US forces, so too would this be the case for the Australian Defence Force and the JSDF.

It is unclear what a prospective Trilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell (TIAC) might look like in practice. The AJUS countries are presently working through the most appropriate format for Australian participation in the BIAC, with Canberra initially committing to dispatch personnel in anticipation of a “further commitment of Australian intelligence and capabilities” on an unidentified timeline.⁹⁰ Several experts have suggested that the remit of the TIAC could be expanded both in terms of intelligence feeds and geographical scope. The BIAC currently pivots on the deployment of unmanned systems such as the medium-range MQ-9B currently operated by US forces and on order for the JSDF.⁹¹ While Australia previously cancelled plans for its own MQ-9B fleet,⁹² its growing fleet of long-range Triton UAVs will provide one means for contributing unmanned intelligence-gathering capabilities to the expanded BIAC.⁹³

The integration of longer-range assets could pave the way for a geographical expansion of the TIAC to include adjacent regional flashpoints, including the South China Sea. This would effectively link BIAC or TIAC activities in the East China Sea with a growing pattern of trilateral surveillance and presence operations across the wider region. Future options could include the integration of Australian and US P-8 and Japanese P-1 maritime surveillance aircraft, assets frequently deployed in support of other regional security activities, including North Korea sanctions enforcement under Operation Argos, maritime cooperation activities between the AJUS countries and the Philippines and as part of other trilateral maritime domain awareness activities.⁹⁴ In this manner, the TIAC could perform a cohering or disciplining function for collecting, sharing and assessing information and intelligence gathered from the AJUS countries’ full suite of regional maritime surveillance activities.

5. Space cooperation could offer a way for Australia and Japan to make more substantial and tangible contributions to trilateral information and intelligence cooperation.

These capabilities would help to bring additional value to trilateral tactical, operational and strategic collaboration in an area where the United States has traditionally assumed the lion’s share of the load. They would also be especially relevant in the context of cooperation on integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), already flagged as a top priority for the partnership in successive defence ministers’ statements. Indeed, the most recent AJUS defence ministers’ meetings on the sidelines of the May 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue highlighted efforts underway to “establish an information sharing mechanism through technical working level consultations” to support the development of “a networked air and missile defence architecture to counter regional air and missile threats.”⁹⁵ Furthermore, both space and IAMD cooperation are already increasingly central to both the US-Australia and US-Japan alliances,⁹⁶ while Australia and Japan have also pledged to expand their bilateral space cooperation, including through greater information sharing.⁹⁷

Japan is presently expanding its space-based intelligence capabilities, including through establishing a new low earth-orbit satellite constellation to track enemy missiles and to enhance the effectiveness and independence of Japan’s own counterstrike capabilities.⁹⁸ However, some analysts worry that this is being “conducted mostly in isolation from the United States and lacks clear operational requirements.”⁹⁹ Australia is also prioritising low earth orbit communications satellite capabilities, including through collaboration with the United States,¹⁰⁰ though the Australian government’s decision to cancel a project focused on larger systems in November 2024 led several analysts to worry that the country could be left with a space intelligence and communications deficit.¹⁰¹ Indeed, many Australian and Japanese analysts worry that extensive reliance on what are ultimately finite US space-based intelligence and information-gathering assets could limit their sovereign options for independent targeting, domain awareness and battle damage assessment in the event of a regional crisis, let alone those available to a trilateral enterprise in the event of a multi-front regional contingency.¹⁰²