Sydney International Strategy Forum 2025: Conference summary
5 December 2025
Amid rising geopolitical uncertainty and a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific, leading strategists at SISF 2025 assessed how allies can navigate disruption – examining US political change, regional security risks, and new opportunities in trade, technology and alliance cooperation.
On 17 September 2025, the United States Studies Centre (USSC) hosted the third annual Sydney International Strategy Forum (SISF) on navigating disruption. SISF brought together key strategists and national security experts from Australia, Japan, the United States and the wider Indo-Pacific region to assess the state of play amidst geopolitical uncertainty.
The forum interpreted a year of dramatic developments in the United States and what it meant for the rest of the world, contextualising a deteriorating regional security environment and historic lows in trust in the United States. Experts laid out new strategies to leverage trade, AI and critical minerals, and considered ways to adapt alliances to a contested Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, the event offered invaluable insight into ways forward for allies navigating an increasingly disrupted world.
Dr Michael Green, Chief Executive Officer of the United States Studies Centre, opened the conference by remarking that the forum had convened in a moment that “feels like an inflection point in world history.”
Welcome and opening remarks
Dr Michael Green, Chief Executive Officer of the United States Studies Centre, opened the conference by remarking that the forum had convened in a moment that “feels like an inflection point in world history.” Dr Green discussed the rising threat level in the Indo-Pacific and unpredictability within the United States, making this a “dramatic time” in geopolitics.
Dr Green encouraged conference attendees to consider the context of the change and evaluate which elements of the Australia-US relationship endured. He noted that even as trust in the United States had fallen to record lows among Japanese and Australian publics, support for the US alliance remained steady. Dr Green emphasised that understanding areas of continuity against areas of change is critical to navigating the current era of disruption, a theme which would become a key focus of the conference.
Fireside conversation with former US Deputy Secretary of State, Dr Kurt Campbell
Australia is uniquely positioned to shape how the United States thinks about and engages in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia should approach the United States with a clearly defined strategy focused on long-term orientation towards China.
The United States, Australia and Japan should be more focused on command-and-control risks and the threat of nuclear proliferation.
In conversation with Dr Michael Green, Dr Kurt Campbell emphasised that Australia has a unique opportunity to shape how the United States engages with the Indo-Pacific. Dr Campbell urged Australian policymakers to be ambitious in setting the agenda, leveraging their unique advantages to shape the alliance. He pointed to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's position as a key driver of the Quad, Australia’s economic resilience, and relationships with Japan, India, and Europe that placed Australia at the centre of regional diplomacy. These advantages, according to Dr Campbell, formed a strong case for Australia to take an outward facing, risk-taking posture.
Dr Campbell advised that Prime Minister Albanese approach negotiations with the United States with a clear plan of action, demonstrating what Australia can do for and with the United States. He argued that Australia should resist the temptation to focus narrowly on economic issues, instead focusing on navigating the long-term challenge of strategic competition with China. Dr Campbell believed that Australia could make a strong case for the United States stepping up in the Indo-Pacific, particularly focusing on areas of cooperation such as critical minerals and technology.
Dr Campbell urged Australian policymakers to be ambitious in setting the agenda, leveraging their unique advantages to shape the alliance.
Dr Campbell concluded with a review of challenges facing Australia, Japan and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. He highlighted the risk of miscalculation, given that US and Chinese forces operate in close proximity without adequate command-and-control measures. He also expressed concern regarding proliferation given China’s nuclear build-up. US extended deterrence has historically limited the desire of allies to develop their own capabilities, and Dr Campbell urged the United States to reaffirm its willingness to play a role as deterrence guarantor.
Ultimately, Dr Campbell acknowledged that this was a disruptive era but pointed out that the United States has faced more difficult moments in the past. For Australia, Dr Campbell had a simple message: “Don’t give up on the United States.”
US extended deterrence has historically limited the desire of allies to develop their own capabilities, and Dr Campbell urged the United States to reaffirm its willingness to play a role as deterrence guarantor.
Session 1 | America abroad, America at home: How much has changed?
The United States and the international order are experiencing historic, rapid change.
The United States is damaging the sources of its own power under the second Trump administration.
Areas of continuity between the second Trump administration and prior administrations include pessimism towards free trade and support for the idea of allies sharing more of the burden for their own defence.
Panellists assessed that the world is currently in an era of profound system change. Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper stated that the international order was headed decisively towards multipolarity. Though this shift was set in motion over a decade ago, Dr Rapp-Hooper noted that the second Trump administration had rapidly accelerated the pace.
Panellists noted that international system change has been matched by rapid changes within the United States that have fundamentally disrupted US foreign policy. Lisa Curtis pointed to the cutting of State Department and National Security Council staff as examples. Clay Lowery explained the Trump administration’s strategy of disruption in the context of economic and fiscal policy, as reflected in dramatic changes to regulation, tariffs and trade.
Panellists noted that international system change has been matched by rapid changes within the United States that have fundamentally disrupted US foreign policy. Lisa Curtis pointed to the cutting of State Department and National Security Council staff as examples.
Panellists agreed that the United States is currently doing "great damage” to the sources of its own power, including alliances, trade and soft power. Dr Kori Schake, pointed to President Trump’s coercive approach to allies, which reverses decades of cooperation that made a US-led international system cost-effective and easy to maintain. Lowery described how the highest US tariff rates in 100 years reverse decades of free trade and economic collaboration. Meanwhile, Curtis argued that Trump administration cuts to foreign aid have damaged United States soft power, giving China room to position itself as a more reliable diplomatic partner.
The United States will not be able to return to the role it formerly occupied given the magnitude of system change.
Dr Rapp-Hooper emphasised that the United States will not be able to return to the role it formerly occupied given the magnitude of system change. However, panellists agreed that there were still important elements of continuity. Dr Rapp-Hooper and Lowery both pointed out a pessimism towards trade and a persistent idea that the global trading order was not benefitting everyday Americans. Dr Schake and Dr Rapp-Hooper discussed the enduring sentiment that US allies should be doing more to provide for their own defence, an idea shared by President Trump’s predecessors.
Dr Schake and Dr Rapp-Hooper discussed the enduring sentiment that US allies should be doing more to provide for their own defence, an idea shared by President Trump’s predecessors.
Panellists concluded that, while this is an unprecedented era of disruption, there are still mechanisms to constrain change, including Congress, the judiciary, bond markets and the private sector. Curtis reminded the audience that the change inherent to the second Trump administration also leaves room for learning, lending cause to measured optimism for a more holistic and balanced approach.
China is ‘winning’ in terms of economic influence in the Indo-Pacific and expanding capacities to close the gap with the United States in military capabilities and diplomatic influence.
US cooperation with allies is fundamental to countering the expansion of Chinese influence and achieving the goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The intelligence community can contribute by building shared capacity among allies, developing relationships with the private sector and adopting developing technology.
Avril Haines laid out her assessment that while China is currently winning in terms of economic influence in the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies maintain an advantage in military and technological capabilities and diplomatic influence. However, she pointed out that China was rapidly expanding its capacities to close those gaps. Haines expressed concern over China’s considerable investment in expanding military influence beyond nearshore waters and financing infrastructure projects that build diplomatic influence.
Haines expressed concern over China’s considerable investment in expanding military influence beyond nearshore waters and financing infrastructure projects that build diplomatic influence.
Haines stated that cooperation and coalition building with allies was fundamental to achieving the shared goal of peaceful coexistence between China and the United States. She emphasised that a free and open Indo-Pacific was possible but not assured, heightening the imperative for allies to be diligent about responding to aggression where it occurs. Haines highlighted that the United States must aim to make their supply chains resilient to Chinese economic pressure and to support allied efforts to do the same for their own supply chains.
Haines drew again on alliances in her discussion of the intelligence community's role in combatting Chinese areas of influence. She stated that coalition building and real-time intelligence sharing were essential and commended Australia for its leadership in fostering intelligence partnerships. Haines also advocated for more partnerships between the intelligence community and the private sector to expand response capacity as the threat landscape evolves. Finally, Haines urged the intelligence community to be ambitious in adopting new technologies and learning how to defend against them. Ultimately, Haines emphasised that the intelligence community must be forward-looking, investing in innovative long-term strategies in cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners.
The United States maintains a margin of advantage in the Indo-Pacific, but China’s rapid increase in military, economic and logistical capacity makes maintaining this margin a central challenge.
The best way to preserve the United States’ margin of advantage is through allies.
Countries in the Indo-Pacific do not see their choices in simple binary terms, recognising that they will have to deal with the United States and China simultaneously.
When asked to assess whether China was ‘winning’ in the Indo-Pacific, panellists found that the United States maintained an advantage that was rapidly shrinking. General David Berger (Ret’d) found that the United States retained superior technical capability and military organisation and execution. However, he emphasised that China’s capacity building and production vastly outpaced the United States. Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper added that China has been particularly effective in utilising grey zone tactics that leave allies few options to respond. Panellists agreed that the United States faces a fundamental challenge in the military domain and must move decisively to press advantages in areas in which it still has overmatch.
Panellists agreed that alliances were the most effective way to extend the United States’ advantage. Professor Nobukatsu Kanehara emphasised that no one country acting alone can deter China. Outweighing China’s rising military power depends on building durable partnerships. General Berger pointed to modernisation and increased cooperation between the Australian Defence Force, Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the United States as a positive signal of the alliance’s capabilities. Diplomatically, Dr Rapp-Hooper urged the United States to knit together European and Indo-Pacific treaties, fostering a strategy led by middle powers like Australia.
While Kausikan agreed that partnership with the United States was essential for Indo-Pacific countries, he argued that China’s presence in the region made engagement an inevitability.
However, in discussing partnership with Southeast Asian nations, Bilahari Kausikan upended the framework of the panel. He argued that phrasing the question as a matter of either the United States or China ‘winning’ in the Indo-Pacific oversimplifies the complexity of strategic calculations made by Southeast Asian states. While Kausikan agreed that partnership with the United States was essential for Indo-Pacific countries, he argued that China’s presence in the region made engagement an inevitability. For countries in the region, agency is created in leveraging the complex balance of the United States, China and other partners. Dr Rapp-Hooper echoed this point, emphasising that the goal of United States Indo-Pacific strategy should be to give countries in the region diverse choices that they can exercise fully.
Session 3 | Are US alliances fit for purpose? AUKUS, the Quad and the future of security cooperation
Changes under the second Trump administration have shifted the way that the United States operates in the Indo-Pacific, but elements of continuity make continued partnership possible, if along different terms.
Despite challenges, regional alliances and partnerships including AUKUS, the Quad and Pacific nations retain the capacity to execute strategy in the region.
Australia should recognise that the current era of disruption presents opportunities to advance the alliance, provided they take a forward-leaning approach.
Panellists examined US alliances across the Indo-Pacific to assess whether they remained fit for purpose. While Professor Peter Dean acknowledged that this was an era of profound system change, he predicted that the United States would stay engaged in the region. Lisa Curtis indicated areas of continued security cooperation under the surface of massive changes to the trade relationship, including military cooperation with Japan, India and the Philippines and the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. Professor Dean also highlighted spoke-to-spoke cooperation amongst allies, which Dr Lavina Lee said indicated an increased seriousness within Indo-Pacific countries about developing their own defence capabilities. Panellists determined that while the United States would stay engaged, the question became what terms it would engage on.
Panellists predicted that AUKUS would still move forward, given its mutual benefit to Australia and the United States. Professor Dean emphasised the groundbreaking new capabilities that Australia would gain and the investment in its industrial base received by the United States, while Curtis cited strong support from Congress and the State Department. However, Dr Lee voiced concerns that Australia had not done enough to clarify AUKUS’ value for the Australian public, while Professor Dean indicated different expectations for deterrence between Australia and the United States. Panellists expressed more caution about the position of the Quad given the rocky state of US-India relations. However, Dr Lee emphasised that India would remain in partnership with the United States as a matter of necessity because, despite the current trust deficit towards the United States, the trust deficit towards China is much larger. Expressing optimism for improving cohesion between Quad parties, she recommended that the partnership accelerate its defence cooperation. Finally, Professor Dean discussed the role of Pacific nations, which remain strategically important to Australia as it seeks to prevent any adversary from gaining a foothold in the Pacific. Curtis acknowledged that there was less of a focus on Pacific states under President Trump than there was under President Joe Biden but anticipated that strategic necessity would eventually drive a return to increased engagement.
Dr Lee pointed out that US posture had shifted to more seriously manage competition in the Indo-Pacific. She recommended that Australia meet this by emphasising its own unique defence contributions to the United States.
Finally, panellists discussed the opportunities available to Australia amongst the dramatic changes in United States politics. Dr Lee pointed out that US posture had shifted to more seriously manage competition in the Indo-Pacific. She recommended that Australia meet this by emphasising its own unique defence contributions to the United States. Professor Dean echoed this, calling on Australia to take a forward-leaning stance on security and deterrence. Provided it could do so, Curtis was confident the alliance would endure given the strength of the collective interests holding it together.
Keynote address from Australia's Ambassador to the United States
The principal driving factor of pan-regional disruption is the military, economic and technological rise of China.
Profound shared interests between the United States and Australia allow observers to remain bullish about the alliance’s ability to navigate disruption.
The overall state of the Australia-US alliance remains strong.
In his keynote address, HE the Hon Dr Kevin Rudd AC explored the nature of the disruption facing the United States and its partners and explained why he remains “bullish” about the alliance’s capacity to navigate it. Despite the challenges presented by an increasingly assertive China, Ambassador Rudd emphasised that the Australia-US alliance continues to go from “strength to strength.”
Ambassador Rudd opened by attributing the disruption faced to the rise of China. In military terms, he highlighted growing defence expenditures, the expansion of the Chinese surface fleet and the manifestation of that surface fleet activity throughout the region. Economically, he pointed to China’s export strategy as the “world’s factory” and their drive for economic self-sufficiency as economic sources of disruption. Finally, Ambassador Rudd described the technology race between China and the United States and its partners, particularly in artificial intelligence, as the third great disruption.
In economic terms, Ambassador Rudd highlighted the extensive trade relationship between Australia and the United States and dynamic new investment strategies, such as leveraging Australian superannuation funds as a vehicle for investment.
However, Ambassador Rudd said that shared interests between the United States and Australia fuel an alliance that is more than capable of navigating these disruptions. He pointed out the defence relationship, the strength of which is evident in record levels of Australian expenditures across military assets and the scale of exercises unfolding between the two countries. In economic terms, Ambassador Rudd highlighted the extensive trade relationship between Australia and the United States and dynamic new investment strategies, such as leveraging Australian superannuation funds as a vehicle for investment. Finally, he spoke about critical technology and critical minerals cooperation, which he said would allow Australian critical mineral supplies to meet United States demand while reducing dependence on China.
Finally, Ambassador Rudd emphasised that the state of the Australia-US alliance is in “first class working order.” Referencing sets of phone calls between Prime Minister Albanese and President Trump, along with frequent meetings between senior-level officials of both governments, Ambassador Rudd concluded that the alliance is capable of meeting the challenge of a rising China.
Session 4 | Navigating disruption in trade and finance
US partners have employed various strategies to adapt in the face of economic disruption, but inherent uncertainty has made these efforts more challenging.
The impact of economic disruption is not just attributed to tariffs, but also encompasses uncertainty, increasing government interference in the private sector, the collision of various economic instruments and attacks on the independence of the Federal Reserve.
There are still opportunities for countries and companies to adapt and a case for enduring US economic power.
Panellists approached the discussion of disruption in trade and finance by outlining strategies that US partners have used to adapt. Ziad Haider outlined a playbook including negotiating and initiating investments into the United States, diversifying markets, considering potential responses or retaliation and investment in stabilising allies’ own business bases. However, adaptation remains difficult. Bilahari Kausikan discussed the economic challenges facing Southeast Asia, which has struggled to construct a united response to disruption. Additionally, Kausikan highlighted that the United States remains indispensable, limiting the attempts of Southeast Asian nations to hedge. Meanwhile, Dr John Kunkel discussed trade disruption in the Australian context, saying that Australia must make difficult decisions to reconcile its three competing strategic interests in preserving the liberal world order, pursuing security objectives in deterring China and attempting to reach net-zero emissions.
Masters emphasised that the United States remains an exceptional consumer market, energy and technology innovation superpower and anchor of the global financial market, giving it a dominant economic position which is unlikely to diminish even as individual elements weaken.
Even as tariffs capture the greatest share of the headlines, panellists emphasised that disruption was attributed to a wide range of factors. Haider cited increased government interference in capital markets, the heightened scope and velocity of economic tools including sanctions and export controls and the elasticity of the conception of critical interests as factors that cloud decision-making for businesses. Additionally, Jo Masters raised attacks on the independence of the Federal Reserve as a variable that could drive up inflation rates.
However, panellists maintained optimism that economic outcomes for the United States would be more moderate than many economic forecasts have predicted. Masters emphasised that the United States remains an exceptional consumer market, energy and technology innovation superpower and anchor of the global financial market, giving it a dominant economic position which is unlikely to diminish even as individual elements weaken. Kausikan reiterated the strength of the United States economy, pointing out that there is "very little alternative” to the United States in terms of markets and reserve currency. The combination of these factors led panellists to conclude that, while growth may slow, economic outcomes likely will not be as ‘doomsday’ as economic forecasts have predicted.
Session 5 | Leading on economic security: AI and critical minerals
China’s dominance in rare earth mining and processing represents a critical vulnerability for allies and partners.
The United States and allies must work to preserve and extend their advantage in semiconductors and artificial intelligence.
The United States and its partners must start intervening in markets to counteract Chinese monopolies over critical minerals.
An expert panel discussed the vulnerabilities and opportunities created by artificial intelligence and critical minerals as China strives to establish dominance in both sectors. Dr Jeffrey Wilson noted that China currently has a near monopoly on critical mineral processing and refining, and that massive government subsidies and pricing mechanisms effectively prevent new entrants to the industry. Dr Wilson emphasised that this dominance over critical minerals is a vulnerability for the United States and its partners.
In the artificial intelligence and semiconductor industries, Olivia Shen underlined opportunities to preserve the United States’ advantage. She pointed to the dominance of the United States and partners over the semiconductor supply chain, particularly in design stages. Shen emphasised that this was an existing area of allied cooperation that should be built upon to maintain an allied advantage over semiconductors and artificial intelligence.
In the artificial intelligence and semiconductor industries, Olivia Shen underlined opportunities to preserve the United States’ advantage. She pointed to the dominance of the United States and partners over the semiconductor supply chain, particularly in design stages.
Panellists outlined several steps necessary to build resilience against critical mineral vulnerabilities and extend advantages in semiconductors and AI. Yoshiaki Wada highlighted the need for greater government intervention into markets. He raised Japan as an example, citing its investment into AI and semiconductors in the wake of the 2010 rare-earth supply shock. Yoshiaki emphasised that more investment of this type is needed across the alliance to secure supply chains. Dr Wilson added that allied market intervention was necessary to allow the private sector to circumvent Chinese pricing manipulation tactics and allow new companies to enter the critical mineral processing sector. Panellists further highlighted opportunities for allies, including building talent pools, technology sharing, customising AI towards local needs and identifying common goals to build alliance strength.
Allies have influenced US policy in the past and can do so in the future.
Allies can shape US strategy by employing their deep understanding of US culture and interests, defining goals and leveraging human networks.
The time to leverage the soft power that Australia and Japan have built over decades of cooperation with the United States is now, as the window of opportunity to influence US policy and assume a regional leadership role is closing.
In his keynote address, General David Berger (Ret’d) argued that allies can shape US strategy, and that the time has come for them to do so. He noted that Australia and Japan are currently in a strong position to step into a leadership role in the security relationship with the United States and urged them to seize the opportunity while it was still available.
General Berger pointed to a variety of historical instances in which pressure exerted by allies compelled the United States to change policy “for the right reasons.” In particular relevance to the alliance, General Berger spoke about the 2012 stationing of a rotational force of 250 US Marines in Darwin, Australia, which has since expanded to a permanent force of 2,500 along with equipment and aircraft. The move was a reversal from initial US policy that regarded Australia as too far removed from the core of Indo-Pacific strategy, and came as the result of consistent, targeted pressure from Australia.
General Berger urged allies to act decisively to steer the relationship. He emphasised that the influence that Australia and Japan have over the United States is not a resource that should be held in reserve until time of crisis nor a finite resource that can be depleted through overuse.
General Berger laid out a variety of tools that allies should employ to use this agency to steer US policy. He noted that allies have a highly advanced understanding of US culture and interests, which gives them leverage. He also advised allies to remain focused on long-term goals, rather than concentrating on short-term disruption. General Berger recommended that allies find a way to make concessions not appear to be a net loss to the United States, and to consider the benefit to the United States when advocating for a new policy. Finally, he recommended that allies find new places to inject policy proposals within “human networks” in the United States rather than relying on traditional official channels.
To conclude, General Berger urged allies to act decisively to steer the relationship. He emphasised that the influence that Australia and Japan have over the United States is not a resource that should be held in reserve until time of crisis nor a finite resource that can be depleted through overuse. Rather, it is a capability that should be drawn on immediately, while the window of opportunity to influence United States policy is still open.
Australia and Japan should “go big” in their approach to the United States, being ambitious in shaping the larger agenda rather than seeking to make themselves smaller targets.
Australia and Japan will grow closer because of decreased trust in US institutions and interests, but in ways that complement US strategy.
In response to US burden-sharing concerns, Australia and Japan should act promptly to demonstrate capabilities and shape the agenda in line with their own interests.
As allies navigate the second Trump administration, the panellists agreed that the time had come to “go big.” General David Berger (Ret’d) emphasised that a “small ball” strategy was likely only to lose allies their seat at the table, while failing to guarantee any insulation from collateral damage. Instead, General Berger and The Hon Arthur Sinodinos AO urged allies to approach President Trump with a confident, focused strategy. Importantly, allies should frame relationships in terms of the benefits that they can offer to the United States, as discussed by Sinodinos and Takashi Yamashita. Dr Kori Schake stressed that allies must crystallise a single unified policy when framing these benefits, strengthening their message by presenting it as a united front.
Panellists then turned to a discussion of decreased trust in the United States, which has hit record lows in polling of Australian and Japanese publics. Sinodinos and Representative Yamashita pointed out that even amid faltering trust in the United States, trust in the alliance had increased in both Australia and Japan, particularly as perceptions of China had decreased. However, given the United States’ unpredictability, both allies acknowledged a need to work more closely together, irrespective of US participation. Sinodinos explained that a tightening in the Australia-Japan relationship reflected a desire for greater optionality, in which allies sought alternatives beyond the United States that nevertheless remained consistent with US goals. Panellists agreed that a closer alignment of Japan and Australia stood to benefit the United States, as all three nations shared a common interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific. General Berger specifically noted that a stronger network of alliances across the region would create advantages in sustaining military logistics.
With US interests in the region often difficult to discern, Sinodinos argued that the onus rested on allies to influence perceptions of the value they could bring to Washington.
Finally, panellists discussed the question of what ‘America First’ meant for burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific. With US interests in the region often difficult to discern, Sinodinos argued that the onus rested on allies to influence perceptions of the value they could bring to Washington. Specifically, Dr Schake viewed disruption as an opportunity for allies to demonstrate their leadership, coalition-building and military capabilities. She said that allies should assume the greatest risk and responsibility over outcomes in the Indo-Pacific, approaching the United States to act in a supporting capacity. By acting early and decisively to assume a leadership role, allies then gain the opportunity to steer policy in ways that benefit their own interests.
In his closing remarks, The Hon Arthur Sinodinos AO, chairman of the United States Studies Centre, reiterated his belief in the Australia-US partnership. He emphasised areas for cooperation built from a strong foundation of mutual understanding, including shared narratives and critical and emerging technologies. Ultimately, Sinodinos urged Australians to continue doubling down on the relationship, even as it builds other partnerships.
Ultimately, Sinodinos urged Australians to continue doubling down on the relationship, even as it builds other partnerships.
Amid rising geopolitical uncertainty and a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific, leading strategists at SISF 2025 assessed how allies can navigate disruption – examining US political change, regional security risks, and new opportunities in trade, technology and alliance cooperation.
