Western defence industrial bases have come under the weight of a growing number of intersecting and sustained pressures. From the COVID-19 pandemic to the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and renewed conflicts in the Middle East, these crises have had global impacts on defence production rates and supply chain resilience across the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. This has raised concerns about the ability of the United States and its allies and partners to generate and sustain the military capabilities needed to deter or respond to conflict.
Under President Joe Biden, the United States sought to address these challenges by pursuing deeper peacetime defence industrial cooperation with its allies and partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Established in May 2024, following the 2024 US National Defense Industrial Strategy and the Regional Sustainment Framework, the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) emerged as a key US-led mechanism for identifying shared regional maintenance and production challenges specific to the Indo-Pacific — the first of its kind. Comprising 16 member states (see Figure 1), PIPIR coordinates these lines of defence industrial cooperation among Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic nations through four dedicated workstreams: Sustainment, Production, Supply Chain Resilience and Policy and Optimisation. Inspired by the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), collaboration takes the form of technical cooperation, information exchange, and the establishment of co-production and co-sustainment projects, with involvement at the levels of government, industry, private capital and academia across participating nations.
As stated by then US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition William LaPlante at the inaugural PIPIR plenary meeting in October 2024, “today's security environment demands closer collaboration with our allies and partners. PIPIR will help strengthen our collective ability to produce and sustain warfighting capability in the Indo-Pacific.” More recently in March 2026, the current US Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Michael Duffey commended PIPIR’s progress in building a network of trusted partners working to enhance the resilience of their industrial bases underpinning deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
With two years having passed since the creation of PIPIR, this explainer outlines the initiative’s activities to date and explores the barriers that currently prevent it from realising Indo-Pacific defence industrial resilience at a rate and scale commensurate with the region’s evolving strategic environment.
What progress has PIPIR seen to date?
Sustaining political commitment from the second Trump administration
As a US-led initiative, the future of PIPIR is dependent on the current Trump administration’s continued political support for deeper defence industrial cooperation. The integration of Indo-Pacific allies and partners into the United States’ industrial base deepened during the Biden administration, as the United States pursued increased regional maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) cooperation, co-production and co-development projects with Australia, Japan, South Korea and India, among other partners. As a Biden-era initiative, PIPIR naturally aligned with that administration’s “latticework” framing of mutually reinforcing regional security relationships. Since taking office, the second Trump administration has sought to reshore defence industrial manufacturing as part of a broader initiative to restore US “industrial prowess,” through increased investment in domestic industrial manufacturing and high-profile agreements with US primes and new entrants. That said, PIPIR has maintained its relevance to the United States by furthering the administration’s goal of reestablishing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through greater integration of defence industrial bases and supply chains, and improved capacity to sustain forces in theatre.
This alignment culminated in US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s endorsement of PIPIR at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, where he announced the first official PIPIR projects. These included the establishment of a repair hub for the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft radar system in Australia, and the development of common standards between PIPIR nations for the procurement and production of small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS). Securing Washington’s ongoing support of PIPIR has thus been a significant achievement.
Official PIPIR projects announced at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue
P-8 Radar System Repair Hub – Australia
This project pertains to the establishment of a South Australian repair facility for the AN/APY-10 radar systems, which are built by Raytheon Technologies for the Boeing P-8 Poseidon aircraft. Eight countries operate P-8 Poseidon aircraft — Australia, Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States (Canada, Singapore and Denmark are at various stages in the process of acquiring their own fleets) — though servicing of these aircraft currently takes place in the United States and Germany. Completed in early 2026, the Australian hub supports the maintenance of aircraft from New Zealand and the United States, though PIPIR nations have agreed to expand the scope to include more P-8 operators.
Common standards for small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS)
PIPIR nations will develop common standards for the procurement and production of SUAS, which is intended to reduce the reliance of Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic nations on Chinese-manufactured drones and components. China dominates the global SUAS market, supplying approximately 80% of all drone systems and components. Though countries have taken measures to reduce their reliance on Chinese-made drones, the ubiquity of Chinese-made electronics, motors and sensors means that other countries are still reliant on these components when assembling SUAS systems. PIPIR nations have signed four Statements of Intent to foster cooperation on the development of SUAS batteries and motors and intend to explore the co-production opportunities for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) — though no further detail has been provided as of yet.
Securing support for PIPIR among US allies and partners
PIPIR's pursuit of regional defence industrial production and supply chain resilience aligns with the domestic agendas of participating nations and their existing relationships with the United States, while also offering practical solutions to industrial challenges. The result of this has been the sustained and expanding support for PIPIR among Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic countries.
US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have increasingly prioritised the development of their respective sovereign defence capabilities in recent years. That said, decades of familiarity with US defence systems — due, in large part, to US foreign military purchases (see Figure 2) and regular training with US forces — have meant that the defence supply chains and production capacity of the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners remain intimately connected. PIPIR responds to the challenges arising from this interwoven relationship in a manner that aligns the domestic priorities of participating nations with the partnership’s collective pursuit of enhanced Indo-Pacific industrial resilience and in-theatre sustainment of common military assets. This is achieved through US-endorsed co-production and co-development projects hosted in regional nations.
The establishment of regional sustainment hubs for US-made capabilities mitigates strategic risks that would arise during conflict.
For treaty allies such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, participation in PIPIR complements their respective security relationship with the United States, while building upon existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives that facilitate greater integration with the US defence industrial base. For example, Australia has leveraged the AUKUS partnership and GWEO initiative to reduce legislative barriers preventing defence trade and technology sharing, and to co-produce advanced capabilities and munitions with the United States. Through the US–Japan Defence Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) forum, Japan is strengthening its maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities for US aircraft and ships, while also exploring the co-development and co-production of missiles.
With the United States being the dominant provider of arms and major security guarantor to the region, the establishment of regional sustainment hubs for US-made capabilities mitigates strategic risks that would arise during conflict. As shown in Figure 2, US-supplied arms constitute 95% of capabilities imported by Japan, 93% of South Korean imported arms, 89% of New Zealand imported arms and 85% of Australian imported arms. In-theatre MRO hubs would reduce the reliance on facilities primarily located on the mainland of the United States to perform maintenance on capabilities located in the region. This would shorten repair timelines for key capabilities, which would be beneficial to the United States and its allies and partners in both sustaining regional deterrence and in the event of a regional contingency.
Share of total arms imports, by supplier (%)
This push for regional industrial resilience is contextualised when compared with China, which has expanded its defence industrial capacity on “a wartime footing” for decades. Over the last thirty years, Beijing has increased its defence spending 13-fold, including growing by at least 7% each year for the past three years. Reports indicate that China is acquiring high-end weapons systems at five to six times the speed of the United States and has a shipbuilding capacity 230 times larger. In contrast, chronic issues facing Western defence industrial bases have only compounded in recent years, as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East add to the strain caused by years of decreased defence spending, diminishing stockpiles and fragmentation across the industry.
As US allies and partners see their domestic priorities reflected in PIPIR, and as understandings of the interconnected challenges of the current strategic environment develop, support for PIPIR has sustained and expanded — seen in the increase of member nations from 14 to 16 in 2026.
Establishing a roadmap for PIPIR’s future development
In addition to the official PIPIR projects announced by Secretary Hegseth in 2025, PIPIR nations provided a roadmap for future collaboration with the endorsement of several new ‘lines of effort’ at the second plenary meeting in March 2026. While still in their initial planning phase, these collaborative projects are outlined in the text box below.
PIPIR lines of effort announced at the 2nd Annual Plenary meeting in 2026
F100/F110 Engine Repair Hub – Japan
PIPIR nations will explore the feasibility of establishing a F100/F110 engine repair hub in Japan. The F100 and F110 engines are produced by American companies Pratt & Whitney and GE Aerospace for the F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, which have been operated by countries including the United States, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Thailand and Norway. Repairs for these engines take place in the United States, the Middle East, Belgium and Poland. The location of this hub has not been confirmed, however IHI Corporation recently completed a maintenance facility in Tokyo for F-135 engines, which are also produced by Pratt & Whitney.
CH-47 Chinook T-55 Engine Repair Hub – Republic of Korea
In July 2025, the United States and South Korean militaries announced plans to develop a South Korean repair hub for the T-55 engine, which is produced by Honeywell Aerospace for the Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The CH-47 Chinook is operated by over 20 countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. This South Korean facility would be the first T-55 MRO hub to be located outside of the United States.
Solid Rocket Motor Production Initiative – Japan
This line of effort seeks to establish a Japan-led Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) production initiative, in collaboration with the United States. Just over 42% of the global SRM market is concentrated in North America, where primes like Northrop Grumman and L3Harris dominate production of the SRMs fitted into missiles systems acquired by countries globally, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and NATO countries. SRM supply chains in the United States are fragile, where primes rely on the same limited number of suppliers for components and materials. Construction is underway on IHI Corporation’s SRM production facility in Tokyo, which is due to be completed in 2028.
Munitions Production Facility – the Philippines
PIPIR nations will explore the funding of a loading, assembly and packaging facility for 30mm-by-173mm ammunition rounds in the Philippines. Demand for this type of ammunition has increased as the number of armed conflicts have risen. Production is geographically concentrated to the United States, with North America accounting for around 67% of market in 2025. US lawmakers have previously expressed interest in expanding production to the Indo-Pacific through the establishment of a Philippines-based munitions production and storage hub, with the idea that its location along the First Island Chain would be of benefit to the United States in the event of a conflict while aligning with Manila’s push to increase domestic manufacturing.
These lines of effort demonstrate long-term political investment in PIPIR from member nations, and indicate where Washington seeks input from its allies and partners to be most effective in responding to US and regional defence industrial supply chain vulnerabilities and production gaps.
What are the challenges facing PIPIR?
Differentiating PIPIR from existing defence industrial cooperative efforts
A key challenge for PIPIR is defining how it complements and interacts with existing bilateral, trilateral and other minilateral defence industrial cooperation relationships with PIPIR members that similarly align with PIPIR’s focus on improving production, sustainment and supply chain resilience (see Figure 3). For example, US-Australia defence industrial collaboration on advancing Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise includes the establishment of a solid rocket motor manufacturing capability in Australia by the early 2030s, while Japan is working closely with the United States to domestically manufacture and export Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors to help ease US stockpile shortages. Although both initiatives closely align with PIPIR's objectives and principles, they are treated separately from the framework. For instance, where Japan's solid rocket motor production has been designated as a PIPIR initiative, Australia's equivalent solid rocket motor manufacture capability has remained exclusively a bilateral US-Australia defence industrial effort, raising questions over which supply chain and production requirements are needed to work within the PIPIR framework.
In addition, official PIPIR projects to date have involved collaboration between Washington and select partners — primarily US treaty allies with existing defence industrial relationships. As a result, its 2025 and 2026 lines of effort have focused on discrete production components and platform-specific activities that may leave PIPIR’s broader, non-treaty ally membership with uncertainty over how they participate or enable cooperation with members who do not operate, sustain or meet the necessary information-sharing requirements to collaborate on sensitive defence technologies. For example, PIPIR countries that do not operate the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, such as Japan, will be excluded from this early initiative of the PIPIR ecosystem. Non-treaty partners such as Singapore or New Zealand will face considerable collaboration challenges in the missile defence space since the US Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has proved to be a significant barrier to developing missile components even with close treaty allies.
The extent to which PIPIR complements existing defence industrial efforts, while encouraging participation from its broad membership, will be a key determinant of its long-term relevance and the extent of member engagement.
Without a shared understanding of collective defence industrial vulnerabilities, PIPIR is likely to continue limiting cooperation to lower-end systems and components.
Select non-PIPIR initiatives
Sources: Kongsberg, Australian Defence, Korea Times, Taiwan News, Australian Department of Defence, The Defense Post and Naval Technology.
Supply chain visibility and information-sharing among PIPIR members
PIPIR faces further challenges as it must accommodate competing defence priorities and differing supply chain vulnerabilities across participating states. Identifying areas where members’ production and supply chain vulnerabilities overlap and warrant a collective PIPIR response may prove difficult. Sharing sensitive information on industrial dependencies and supply chain risks may conflict with national security considerations, members’ respective data protection and counter-espionage laws, or competing commercial interests that could discourage governments and industry from disclosing such information.
Without a shared understanding of collective defence industrial vulnerabilities, PIPIR is likely to continue limiting cooperation to lower-end systems and components. More ambitious areas for defence industrial production and supply chain cooperation are likely to be furthered with select US allies possessing existing intelligence-sharing arrangements and more mature defence industrial relationships — like Australia and the United Kingdom have through the Five Eyes arrangement and AUKUS — or viewed as more complementary to US defence industrial objectives than those perceived as commercial competitors. The absence of a comprehensive and common operating picture limits the realm of possibility for PIPIR’s industrial scope, and risks replicating existing defence industrial networks rather than developing PIPIR as a multinational forum for coordinating defence production and supply chain resilience in the Indo-Pacific, as intended.
Determining PIPIR’s use for deterrence and wartime contingencies
Finally, PIPIR is yet to define the circumstances in which it is intended to be used. PIPIR was modelled off the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDGC), which was created in direct response to the defence industrial crisis emerging from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With its clearly defined mandate, the UDGC succeeded in synchronising the production and delivery of capabilities to Kyiv between over fifty nations. Two years since its creation, it remains unclear whether PIPIR is intended to be used as a peacetime mechanism for strengthening defence industrial resilience and supporting deterrence, or whether it is also expected to coordinate industrial mobilisation during regional contingencies and wartime scenarios.
Two years since its creation, it remains unclear whether PIPIR is intended to be used as a peacetime mechanism for strengthening defence industrial resilience and supporting deterrence, or whether it is also expected to coordinate industrial mobilisation during regional contingencies and wartime scenarios.
This distinction is important because PIPIR participants will likely differ in their willingness to contribute fiscal and industrial support during peacetime and conflict. While some US allies and partners may be prepared to assume greater defence industrial responsibilities in peacetime, they may be more reluctant to participate in activities that risk retaliation or horizontal escalation during a regional conflict. For example, South Korea has expanded cooperation with the United States through naval MRO and shipbuilding initiatives; however, this has not translated into Seoul’s participation in multinational operations such as freedom of navigation patrols through the Taiwan Strait. Likewise, many Southeast Asian PIPIR participants’ deep concern with intensifying great power rivalry may make them reluctant to support defence industrial activities that could be perceived as directly contributing to a contingency involving China. These differing political thresholds could limit which industrial capabilities are available during a crisis and result in only a subset of PIPIR members participating in wartime mobilisation.
The lack of clarity surrounding PIPIR's intended role — as a peacetime industrial resilience initiative, a wartime mobilisation mechanism or both — remains a barrier for identifying the contours of PIPIR’s capability priorities and membership expectations. Without a shared understanding of its operational purpose, PIPIR risks pursuing industrial objectives without agreement on when, how or under what circumstances its capabilities would be employed.