Executive summary

  • The global salience of long-range strike and air and missile defence capabilities continues to grow in US and allied policymaking circles. The supply and demand for these capabilities have become a central feature of what Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review acknowledged as a new “missile age.”1 Considerable operational experience in Ukraine and the Middle East in recent years confirms the centrality of these weapons of choice.
  • The Trump administration’s Golden Dome initiative is about developing a measure of defensive protection for the US homeland. Rather than referring to the development of a specific program or system, Golden Dome represents a long-overdue and long-term initiative to better align a wide array of missile defence capabilities with the threats posed by Russia and China. This necessarily includes a focus on next-generation interceptors (NGIs) for homeland intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) defence, space-based sensing and intercept capabilities, and a range of non-kinetic intercept options. New technological investments related to Golden Dome will inform future capabilities both for forward-deployed US forces and those of allies and partners.
  • The pursuit of homeland defence must not exclude the improvement of regional and expeditionary air and missile defences. In this vein, the defence of Guam against air and missile threats is of particular importance to supporting operational plans in the Indo-Pacific. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has been developing a Guam Defense System (GDS) to counter Chinese and other regional actors’ air and missile threats, but the work has been proceeding at an anaemic pace. Improved command and control and battle management will both inform and be informed by work done on such programs as the defence of Guam and Australia’s Air 6500.
  • Recent operational engagements have involved shockingly high expenditures of US missile defence systems. Post-2022 improvements to missile and missile defence production rates have been positive, but wholly insufficient. The Pentagon under Trump is now pursuing a more robust munitions ramp of a dozen prioritised munitions, but its realisation will require additional funding both from regular defence budgeting and from congressional supplemental packages.
  • Burdensome export controls have been a barrier to effective defence of the United States and its allies and partners, including Australia. These Cold War-era regimes should be revisited and, if necessary, discarded, in the pursuit of the goals of AUKUS Pillar II and building partner capacity sufficient to deter Chinese aggression. Notwithstanding recent reform efforts, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has been and remains a particular barrier to missile and space technology cooperation.

Recommendations

  • To contend with today’s strategic environment, Australia and the United States should prioritise several critical areas in the development and mass production of advanced offensive and defensive missilery. Doing so will be essential to enhancing homeland defence capabilities for both partners and, in turn, to supporting their wider shared regional objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Lines of effort for improved US-Australia alliance missile cooperation should include:
    • Investment in long-range strike and missile defence production, including for a wider range of mutual priority systems locally in Australia.
    • Cooperation on missile development, including testing, battle management, and air and cruise missile tracking.
    • Sustained attention to a further reform agenda for US MTCR policy settings to facilitate cooperation on the above.
DownloadUS-Australia relations and the future of missilery: Long-range strike, missile defence and export controls

Introduction

America’s Golden Dome missile defence initiative has brought renewed public interest and debate about the utility and prioritisation of missile defence. Recent conflicts have demonstrated the growing salience of the missile threat and the need to counter it. As seen in Ukraine, the Red Sea and the conflict in Iran, missiles have become “weapons of choice.”2 In Ukraine, stand-off weapons have played a pivotal role in the conflict.3 With Iranian assistance, the Houthis have employed missile strikes to impose costs on US commercial and military assets operating in the Red Sea, both in terms of reduced shipping and the unfavourable cost exchange ratio of employing interceptors against comparatively cheap missiles or drones, and simple capacity limits on such engagements.4 The 2025 conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran was largely a contest of air and missile dominance, both offensively and defensively.5 Over the course of Operation Epic Fury in 2026, the US expended a stunning quantity of key munitions, raising questions about the state of inventories.6

As integrated air and missile defence continues to be prioritised by the US Government, there are opportunities for Australia to benefit from win-win cooperation on missile defence.

The rise of aerial strike and missile employment highlights the role that missiles would certainly play in a potential conflict between the United States and major powers like Russia and China — one that would invariably involve Australia, Japan, and other allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Determining how to best supply the United States and its allies with the capabilities needed to defend against these threats should be a US Department of Defense (DoD) priority for the foreseeable future. As integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) continues to be prioritised by the US Government, there are opportunities for Australia to benefit from win-win cooperation on missile defence, allowing both states to better prepare for conflicts of the future that will be dominated by long-range fires.

Next-generation missile defence

On 27 January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14186, ‘The Iron Dome for America,’ calling for the creation of a next-generation missile defence shield for the US homeland.7 As noted in the order, the policy shift is a long-overdue realignment of missile defence programs and posture to address threats from Russia and China, rather than from smaller rogue states. What has since become known as Golden Dome is not, however, a singular system or program. Rather, it is an initiative to realign these disparate efforts into a network capable of addressing the full spectrum of missile threats from major powers. Golden Dome will fill yawning gaps in the current homeland missile defence architecture for the United States.8 In technical terms, this has been designed to counter limited attacks where the incoming threat would follow a predictable trajectory and be small enough in scale as not to overwhelm a small number of US interceptors and sensors. Indeed, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is not designed to contend with drones, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons or high numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

US President Donald Trump talks about the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defence initiative with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Senator Kevin Cramer and Senator Dan Sullivan in the Oval Office, May 2025.
US President Donald Trump talks about the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defence initiative with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Senator Kevin Cramer and Senator Dan Sullivan in the Oval Office, May 2025. Source: Getty

In the coming months and years, the Golden Dome initiative will bring together and integrate existing capabilities, as well as develop new ones. Particular attention in the near term will be paid to the creation of an Integrated Battle Management Layer to secure improved domain awareness, an integrated air picture, and unified operations both left and right of launch.9 Other key lines of effort will be the integration of next-generation technology and space-based capabilities. The July 2025 reconciliation bill included US$2.2 billion for hypersonic defence, US$5.6 billion for space-based and boost phase interceptors, US$250 million for directed energy systems and US$7.2 billion for space-based sensors.10

Space-based capabilities will be central to the overall effort. Given the complexities of countering high-speed and manoeuvring missile threats that are more challenging to track and intercept than predictable ballistic objects, a successful Golden Dome must have an effective proliferated space-based sensing architecture. Space-based interceptors and other forms of space fires, while technologically challenging and in need of novel operational concepts, will also likely play an important role, even if only deployed in limited numbers.

Golden Dome is an initiative to realign these disparate efforts into a network capable of addressing the full spectrum of missile threats from major powers.

The Trump administration has set an ambitious target for fielding some operational capability and demonstrating space-based intercept and other capabilities by 2028. That urgency has been reflected in its early actions. The effort notably received nearly US$25 billion in reconciliation funding in the One Big Beautiful Bill passed in July 2025.11 Furthermore, the newly created Office of Golden Dome for America is now headed by Space Force General Michael Guetlein, who occupies the role of Direct Reporting Program Manager, a position endowed with robust acquisition authorities and reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.12 By making Guetlein a direct report to the Deputy Secretary rather than located within one of the military services, he should be able to move more quickly with fewer layers of bureaucratic oversight. The decision to structure the office in this way reflects the fact that the initiative is a DoD priority with an inter-service scope, as well as a sort of experiment in defence acquisition reform.

Aside from the Golden Dome initiative, three lines of effort by the United States to improve its missile defence include the Guam Defense System, increasing production of key munitions and reform to US export controls. Each has implications and opportunities for Australia.

Regional and forward-deployed capabilities — the Guam Defense System

While the Golden Dome initiative seeks to make up for the past neglect of homeland air and missile defences, that cannot be its only focus. In any future fight, the United States and its allies will need robust regional and forward-deployed missile defence capabilities to defend critical positions, bases and assets, especially in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s growing array of long-range strike capabilities poses acute threats to US and allied forces.

The defence of Guam, a US Pacific territory essential to regional military operations, is of outsized importance for forward-based US air and missile defence. In the event of a regional conflict with China, the island would face missile threats that are orders of magnitude greater than anything seen in recent conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. The island would be incredibly hard for the United States to resupply in a conflict: it is closer to Beijing than it is to Hawaii.13 A Chinese strike on Guam would be catastrophic for the island’s 170,000 residents and would make it substantially more difficult for the United States to execute operational plans in the Indo-Pacific, given that major air and naval bases there would be required as staging grounds for any large-scale conflict. Anderson Air Force Base is critical for aerial operations, and Naval Base Guam is used to resupply attack submarines, among other “key regional power projection platforms and logistical nodes” on the island.14 Guam cannot be moved or hidden, and therefore it must be defended.

In any future fight, the United States and its allies will need robust regional and forward-deployed missile defence capabilities to defend critical positions, bases and assets, especially in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s growing array of long-range strike capabilities poses acute threats to US and allied forces.

At present, however, Guam’s existing air and missile defence capabilities are not sufficient to defend the island from a complex missile attack by China, having been originally sized to counter a potential North Korean attack that would involve a smaller number of less-complex missiles.15 The island currently hosts one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, with six launchers and one radar. In response to the growing threat from China’s ballistic missile arsenal, in 2022, the DoD announced its intent to deploy a Guam Defense System (GDS) that will “provide a persistent, 360-degree defence of Guam against rapidly evolving threats from regional adversaries.”16 Some testing for the GDS has already been done. A GDS intercept test was conducted on 10 December 2024 by the Missile Defense Agency, in which an air-launched medium-range ballistic missile was intercepted by the Aegis Guam System with a Standard Missile-3 IIA.17 Tests are expected to continue in the coming years at the cadence of two flight tests or tracking exercises per year.18 The schedule to deliver meaningful capability is not, however, keeping pace with the threat. Under current plans, capabilities will be deployed in several phases between 2027 and 2031.19 The urgency of the Golden Dome initiative should be applied to the defence of the territory of Guam, and to force protection in other areas abroad. Improved integration of these several systems under a common battle management system will significantly improve interceptor conservation and capability. A similar approach informs Australia’s command and control efforts with the Air 6500 program.

Both Golden Dome and the Guam Defense System warrant attention from Australian defence planners as they seek to improve their sovereign air and missile defence capabilities. As a critical forward-based hub for US force projection, Guam’s defence is critical to the credibility of the ability to reinforce allies and uphold deterrence across the Indo-Pacific. In a similar manner, protecting infrastructure and power projection forces in North America directly affects the ability of the United States to sustain its deterrence and defence commitments. For Australia, this has direct implications on the availability of secure lines of communication and assured US power projection that will reduce the burden on Australian forces while enhancing collective deterrence. Degrading military infrastructure in Guam or in North America would complicate the flow of forces into the Indo-Pacific, subjecting partners to greater coercion and the potential for blackmail. Fielding improved homeland and regional air and missile defences should therefore not be seen as primarily a localised defensive capability, but rather as an enabler of alliance assurance, deterrence stability and US operational reach, each of which is central to Australia’s own defence posture and planning assumptions.

Mass production

For the United States, another critical area in need of ramping up relates to air and missile defence production capacity. The long-running tendency to underinvest in munitions stockpiles and recent interceptor expenditures have contributed to the realisation that current stockpiles are at dangerously low levels relative to present-day threats.20 Several recent developments have illustrated those risks. Inadequate missile production rates led the Biden administration to delay global Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) sales globally to meet demand in Ukraine.21 High expenditure rates of interceptors in defence of Israel in June 2025 created additional strain on US inventories and production capacity.22 US support of Israel during its conflict with Iran succeeded at the cost of a large number of missiles: over the 12 days of fighting, the United States expended “over 150” THAAD interceptors alone, costing between US$1.5 and US$2 billion.23 Significant numbers of PAC-3 and Standard Missile-3 interceptors were also employed.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).Source: Lockheed Martin

In an effort to address those shortages, successive US administrations have sought to take action. Indeed, the rapid depletion of US munitions stockpiles in support of Ukraine’s defence prompted the Biden administration to develop plans to increase production for a range of weapons, including interceptors.24 In October 2024, the US Army made a contract award to increase production of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) missiles from 550 to 650 annually.25 A further ramp of PAC-3 MSE is now underway, as the Trump administration plans to increase MSE production to at least 2,000 rounds per year by 2030.26 Similar ramps are planned for THAAD and Standard Missile interceptors, and for Tomahawk and other strike capabilities.

The rate of planned production increases, however, are nowhere near sufficient to counter the volume of expected missile threats in today’s strategic environment. The 2026 conflict with Iran has exposed enduring challenges to the United States stocks of offensive and defensive fires. The high expenditure rate of US missile stocks in Iran and elsewhere is of concern for Australia, as these munitions will be essential to any prospective high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

If the June 2025 expenditures of interceptors to defend Israel were cause for concern, they pale in comparison to the quantities fired since the start of Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026. One CSIS estimate concluded that as of April 2026, the United States likely expended over 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, between 40 and 70 Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) and between 1,060-1,430 Patriot interceptors. The significant use of offensive and defensive missiles will require significant years and major investments to reconstitute.27

These recent events have exposed and exacerbated a munitions crisis. Any future conflict with a peer adversary would involve the massive expenditure of both offensive and defensive missiles. While recent production increases are a step in the right direction, much more will be needed, and the US Congress should consider supplemental appropriations for select munitions above what is provided in regular budget measures.28 The money provided in supplemental bills helps fill near term funding gaps for unforeseen and urgent DoD needs and has been used for assistance to Ukraine and Israel in recent years.29 The industrial base for offensive and defensive fires will need enhanced production of nozzles, avionics, seekers and solid rocket motors (SRM) — all existing constraints in the munitions industrial base.30 Assistance in production of rocket motors and other components from the growing Australian and Japanese industrial base would be a welcome addition to the multinational production of missilery. Creating the facilities and workforce for that base should be a high priority of both the United States and its allies.

Export controls

A final but underappreciated area in need of critical reform is that of export controls that impede the effective buildup of partner capacity for producing and fielding missilery. The increased salience of the air and missile threat in recent conflicts has generated global demand for missile defence capabilities around the world among allies and adversaries alike.31 Despite attempts at reform in each of the past three presidential administrations, the US Government’s overly strict interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) export guidelines continues to leave the United States unable to keep pace with adversaries in technology sharing with partners.32 The existing US interpretation of MTCR creates a strong presumption of denial for exports of covered capabilities to even the closest US allies for the capabilities in Category I — certain rocket systems, complete subsystems, software and technology and production facilities — but also makes sharing much harder for those components in Category II — less sensitive and dual-use components.33

Despite attempts at reform in each of the past three presidential administrations, the US Government’s overly strict interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) export guidelines continues to leave the United States unable to keep pace with adversaries in technology sharing with partners.

Fortunately, each of the last three presidential administrations have taken steps to reduce the barriers to technology sharing with close allies and partners. The first Trump administration moved slow unmanned aerial systems (UAS) (travelling under 800 km per hour) from Category I to Category II of MTCR in July 2020.34 The Biden administration used a National Security Memorandum in January 2025 to allow case-by-case review for exports of some Category I systems, though the efficacy of this change upon implementation remains unclear.35 Most recently, the State Department under the second Trump administration released new guidance in September 2025, moving UAS from the umbrella of MTCR to instead govern their export in the same way as manned aircraft, which have never been restricted under the arrangement.36

Though these changes are steps in the right direction, they do not go far enough to allow the United States to effectively share missile technologies with allies. Because of these self-imposed restrictions, US adversaries can help their partners defend themselves more effectively than the United States. Beijing maintains a comparatively loose interpretation of the MTCR’s export restrictions. This has, in part, enabled China to transfer missile technology to its partners, including sales of thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate to Iran for use in ballistic missiles.37 US allies, by contrast, do not have the same opportunities to share technology. Restrictions on US exports have led allies to make difficult decisions adverse to US interests. South Korea, for instance, previously turned to Russia for technology covered by MTCR after US export controls blocked the state from receiving assistance from the United States for its space launch program.38 The resulting space launch vehicle, Naro-1, was launched into low Earth orbit in 2013. US allies must be allowed to acquire US missile technology and develop their own manufacturing lines using shared production facilities. Leaving partners to turn to potential adversaries for technology introduces an unacceptable degree of risk and impedes the creation of an interoperable, technologically dominant bloc, not to mention federated production capacity.

To be sure, there have been some recent sales that suggest improvements. In 2023, the State Department approved sales of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Japan and Australia.39 Despite the recent modifications, MTCR’s hurdle of a “strong presumption of denial” has not been eliminated. A 2024 Defense Innovation Board Report noted that, “We are failing to get our friends around the world the technologies they need, and to grant our warfighters access to the best technologies from allies and partners.”40 The process for technology sharing is still long and burdensome with a lengthy and uncertain review process. Some foreign companies have begun touting products as “ITAR-free,” referring to a lack of restrictions from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the set of rules that govern the US Government’s manufacture, export and temporary import of defence articles and services.41

Furthermore, there remains no recipient-based criterion for determining the legality of exports of missile technology, impeding sharing among AUKUS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other major US allies. In other words, MTCR’s criteria put missile transfers to close allies on the same legal and procedural footing as to a potential adversary. Another significant persistent hurdle is the MTCR regime’s categorical prohibition on transferring production facilities. Assisting with such facilities could help, for instance, with Australian and Japanese production of Tomahawks, hypersonic strike, or PrSM. Today’s need for advanced strike outweighs the benefits of these outdated export controls crafted in the 1980s. If the executive branch proves incapable of stripping away the barriers to effective technology sharing, US Congress could help address the problem through legislation. Legislators are already thinking about pathways to do this: a bill introduced in 2025 during the 119th Congress would eliminate the presumption of denial for transfers of MTCR Category I and Category II materials to the closest US allies.42

Recommendations

Given these trends and recent developments, Australia should consider three strategies for engagement and cooperation with the United States on air and missile defence issues going forward.

  1. Continue to make long-term targeted investments in domestic long-range strike and missile defence production capabilities. Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise’s (GWEO) work on expanding domestic production capabilities for complete production of missiles and their subcomponents, especially for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rounds, has been effective in kickstarting the country’s missile production capacity.43 Central to this initiative, Australia is expected to begin manufacturing GMLRS in a newly-constructed factory in Port Wakefield, Australia, in the near future.44 The Australian Government’s commitment of US$14.1 billion to GWEO over the next decade sent a positive signal to US and Australian defence industry alike about the profitability of investing in Australian production.45 This effort should be sustained and expanded to the extent possible. If Australia can develop a more robust solid rocket motor (SRM) industry for select subcomponents and “all up round” missiles at scale, it would be beneficial to both sovereign and alliance defence goals. The United States should do all it can to support the enlargement of that industrial base, to include removing export control restrictions and building new production facilities in Australia.
  2. Pursue cooperation in areas where the United States and Australia have aligned priorities. As indicated by the Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy, homeland defence will be a special priority for the United States.46 Given a paucity of detail in those documents for allied missile defence cooperation, another possible venue for consideration could be the forthcoming Allied and Theater Missile Defense Review, which had been directed by “the Iron Dome for America” executive order.47 Relative to the Golden Dome initiative for both missile defence and defeat, it would prove mutually beneficial for Australia to acquire new air and missile defence capability, coordinate hypersonic and other missile testing at the Woomera range complex, assist the United States on over the horizon radars (OTHRs) for cruise missile defence of North America, and coordination on space sensors and space fires. Some of these lines of effort are already underway, including sharing hypersonic missile testing facilities and data under AUKUS Pillar II, along with the United Kingdom.48 Australia and Canada are cooperating to develop the Canadian Arctic OTHR in support of modernising the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).49 Continued commitment to these kinds of joint endeavours by both the United States and Australia will be critical to their success.
  3. Continue to pursue reforms to US MTCR policy settings to enhance alliance cooperation on missile production. The recent revisions to US MTCR policy interpretations are positive but insufficient for cooperation on long-range strike and missile defence and have so far not permitted the goals of GWEO and AUKUS Pillar II to be fully realised. Although there is some interest in reform efforts within specific Congressional committees (such as the House Foreign Affairs Committee), the Pentagon and defence industry, the problems posed by MTCR on missile cooperation with allies are not as widely appreciated outside of a few narrow circles as they ought to be for the purposes of ambitious and expedited reform. Stakeholders across the United States defence ecosystem would benefit from Australian efforts to vocally communicate the need for further loosening or removing MTCR restrictions, most notably revisions to the presumption of denial on transferring long-range missiles and missile production facilities.