Meeting the moment: How the Quad can deliver in a new strategic era

Foreword

In February 2026, the United States Studies Centre (USSC) hosted the second Quad Track 1.5 Leadership Dialogue in Sydney, Australia. The dialogue convened 35 Australian, US, Japanese and Indian officials, experts, academics, industry stakeholders and policy researchers to discuss the state of play for the Quad and pathways forward in a new strategic era. Building on the outcomes of the first Leadership Dialogue hosted by the USSC in December 2024,¹ the Chatham House dialogue was held with the support of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The dialogue convened 35 Australian, US, Japanese and Indian officials, experts, academics, industry stakeholders and policy researchers to discuss the state of play for the Quad and pathways forward in a new strategic era.

This report outlines the key policy priorities and solutions identified by participants during the dialogue. It begins by examining the broad themes raised in the discussion, before turning to three specific issue areas — maritime security, economic security and critical and emerging technologies. For each of these three topics, participants assessed the current state of the challenge, identified priorities for cooperation and developed tangible policy recommendations to advance the Quad agenda.

Status update: Reflections on the Quad’s present and future

Throughout the second Quad Track 1.5 Leadership Dialogue, participants were clear: The Quad’s strategic underpinnings remain intact, and the four countries are united by geopolitical imperatives that have not diminished but intensified. However, participants also agreed that the Quad must undertake an honest assessment of its shortcomings to ensure it is sufficiently nimble and effective to deliver results in a new strategic age.

• It is not an alliance — yet. While it is not an alliance, participants noted that the Quad can generate “alliance-like” effects through socialising habits of cooperation between the four strategically aligned Indo-Pacific powers. Yet, to date, the Quad has struggled to deliver on many of its announcements, which participants viewed as a gift to the grouping’s critics and strategic rivals. Participants argued that the Quad must now focus its “sprawling” agenda and double down on a limited number of priority areas where it can have the greatest impact and deliver meaningful outcomes for regional partners.
• Work continues with or without leaders. Although a leaders-level summit has not been held since September 2024, practical Quad work has continued in the interim. This includes the four countries coordinating support in the wake of the March 2025 Myanmar earthquake, conducting the first collaborative coast guard efforts in June 2025,² convening a foreign ministers meeting³ and launching the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative in July 2025, holding the first Quad Ports of the Future Partnership conference in October 2025,⁴ as well as hosting the third meeting of the Quad Counterterrorism Working Group,⁵ the first Field Training Exercise of the Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network,⁶ and the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Tabletop Exercise and Strategic Meeting,⁷ which all took place in December 2025.
• Strategic infrastructure financing is needed. Participants argued that the Quad should finance strategic infrastructure in areas where the “economics does not make sense,” such as shipbuilding, critical minerals, subsea cables and satellites. These sectors overlap with areas of China’s overcapacity, including battery technology, critical minerals and semiconductors. While these domains hold the greatest potential for Quad collaboration, participants emphasised that they also face the most significant challenges to practical implementation, given the political difficulty governments face in pursuing sustained market intervention.
• Optimism for the Quad’s future persists. Many participants argued that the Quad has consistently outperformed expectations and that the grouping has been buoyed by leadership from all four Quad countries and by Beijing’s actions in the Indo-Pacific. While leaders’ level meetings are important in motivating domestic bureaucracies, participants noted that ongoing monthly working group-level cooperation often goes unrecognised and spoke on the importance of the Quad as an informal steering group and coalition in other multilateral fora.

Participants cautioned that global events are outpacing the Quad itself, which risks becoming “irrelevant” if its speed of delivery does not increase.

• The Quad should increase its speed of delivery. Participants cautioned that global events are outpacing the Quad itself, which risks becoming “irrelevant” if its speed of delivery does not increase. A key point of discussion was over the Quad’s “branding,” which some argued can be unhelpful when engaging partners in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In such cases, conducting efforts on a bilateral or minilateral basis may prove to be more effective, rather than “shoehorning” all cooperation into the broader Quad agenda.
• The Quad should not “self-deter” from deeper cooperation. Participants warned that the Quad must be cautious in its approach to Pacific Island countries and ASEAN to combat criticism that it is an anti-China grouping that is driving “militarisation” and “securitisation” in the region. This dynamic can make Quad countries less ambitious in their offerings, which in turn creates “no opportunity cost of saying no to Quad offerings, because the offering isn’t strong enough.” By this logic, as one participant observed, “the Quad appears to be afraid to fail, but also to succeed.” Navigating this tension is a key challenge for Quad members. However, recent polling indicates that Quad publics are more likely than not to support a Quad military alliance and that ASEAN reception of the Quad is broadly positive, leading some participants to argue that the Quad should not “self-deter” from deepening cooperation.⁸
• Quad messaging must be coordinated. A lack of coordinated strategic communications on the Quad’s activities has left an informational vacuum that can be filled by disinformation. Participants suggested increasing the public visibility of Quad cooperation and expert-level discussions to combat such narratives. In this vein, regional outreach must also be strengthened to make the case that the Quad complements — rather than undermines — other regional forums like ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. Additionally, if the Quad agenda expands to a more overt security focus, messaging on ongoing public goods work will become increasingly important. Some participants felt this spoke to a core tension at the heart of the Quad’s mission, between its identity as a public goods provider, a strategic signalling entity and a security arrangement — though they noted these were not mutually exclusive.

• The Quad depends on people-to-people links. Participants cautioned that Quad leaders’ meetings should not create pressure for leaders to ‘do’ something in areas where there is insufficient financial or political capital to deliver on implementation. In the absence of a permanent secretariat, it is the people-to-people links that these engagements foster that ultimately characterise the Quad — even between senior officials. At the leaders’ level, the opportunity for an unscripted, closed-door, face-to-face discussion is particularly important for building these relationships, in addition to their coordination function.
• Flexibility has allowed the Quad to evolve. Participants discussed the merits of introducing a permanent Quad secretariat and weighed whether this could hamper the grouping’s flexibility or instead help institutionalise cooperation. Some suggested it would provide a useful central touchpoint for coordination, or that a Quad sherpa could help to steward a shared agenda — mirroring the G20 approach. However, others argued that flexibility was a core strength of the Quad, allowing partners to avoid making binary choices regarding their involvement. The logistical and financial demands of staffing a secretariat were also raised as obstacles.
• The Quad should balance short-term pragmatism with long-term ambition. Looking to the future, participants noted that US policy under the current administration can be difficult to discern because the presidency, bureaucracy and other levers of power are “pointing in different directions.” While participants suggested this will continue to constrain the Quad in the short term, they saw value in continuing to develop an ambitious shared agenda to have “on the shelf” in the future.

The second Quad Track 1.5 Leadership Dialogue was an opportunity for a candid exchange of views between officials and experts of all four countries. While the discussion identified many of the challenges facing the Quad in a strategically uncertain region and time, it also generated clear insights into a future shared agenda between all four nations.

The following sections outline the state of play, key priorities and pathways forward for a range of policy areas that constitute this agenda.

The state of play

Participants highlighted the increased risk of a major war in the Indo-Pacific, given China’s buildup of nuclear and conventional armaments, which is shifting the regional balance of power. Simultaneously, the second Trump administration’s differential and variable treatment of allies, and its outlook which measures minilaterals on hard power deliverables, have created growing uncertainty around US reliability as a security partner. Against this backdrop, participants viewed maritime security as the most controversial and difficult domain for advancing Quad cooperation, yet highlighted its critical importance given the four countries’ interdependency in maintaining a stable regional balance of power.

Participants viewed maritime security as the most controversial and difficult domain for advancing Quad cooperation, yet highlighted its critical importance given the four countries’ interdependency in maintaining a stable regional balance of power.

Participants emphasised that many Quad activities already occurring are “security adjacent” — though mostly framed as public goods and humanitarian assistance — and have strong transferability to a harder power deterrence agenda. Key examples include the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, which is a significant development given its ability to foster shared logistics capabilities, and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness,⁹ which drives transparency and cooperation with regional states through real-time maritime surveillance and coastguard collaboration. There are also notable examples of cooperation occurring in a more deliberate military way, with Exercise Malabar now involving P-8s and other surveillance aircraft of all four Quad countries.

The goals of maritime security cooperation

Participants discussed the overall effects the Quad countries should aim to generate through maritime security cooperation, coalescing around three core goals:

1. Quad maritime security cooperation should make the balancing equation in the Indo-Pacific more, not less, complex.
2. The Quad’s forms of maritime security cooperation should be creating optionality for all four countries individually, but also for Quad-minus groupings which do not include all four members.
3. This cooperation should at least create the idea that the Quad has the potential to go further in this domain if certain red lines are crossed. As one participant described, “The Quad needs to be an instrument of collective deterrence, and if required, collective defence.”

One participant described maritime security as the “most important contribution” the Quad can make in terms of socialising habits of day-to-day cooperation. This was characterised as a decades-long project of building a culture of grassroots cooperation in the civil bureaucracies and military services through understanding differing systems. The objective should be for the sharing of logistics and capabilities to ultimately become “utterly unremarkable” between Quad nations, particularly regarding cooperation with India.

The objective should be for the sharing of logistics and capabilities to ultimately become “utterly unremarkable” between Quad nations, particularly regarding cooperation with India.

Finally, it was noted that in the past, the Quad has “leapt forward” because of regional crises such as the China-India border skirmishes. As such, participants agreed that the Quad’s maritime security agenda should be “on the shelf,” both to establish signals to strategic competitors and to allow for operationalisation in the event of a crisis.

Key priorities

Maritime Domain Awareness and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) were highlighted as critical areas of cooperation. Participants agreed that the Quad countries should aim to move towards more “real-time data sharing” across the Indo-Pacific, given the area is so large that no one country can oversee it all. The focus should be on sharing facilities in an “unremarkable” way: building interoperability, sharing equipment and understanding command structures.

There was also a strong focus on supporting smaller countries to develop their own sovereign capabilities to have agency over their own maritime spaces. Participants agreed that promoting a level of self-sufficiency in countries will lead to better regional outcomes; if a country has assets and the capability to repair and manufacture them at scale, it is more likely to take an active role in securing its own domain. This was also recognised as critical for countries within the Quad, through efforts such as building India’s sovereign manufacturing capacity.

Models at the Quad-minus level: Participants noted that existing initiatives at the bilateral and trilateral levels could provide a model for Quad cooperation. While these efforts should not be formally “Quad” branded, they could be better networked and coordinated through the Quad grouping, as well as replicated in different geographical regions. Participants raised two key priority areas:

1. Surveillance: This includes long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as P-8 surveillance aircraft. The Quad countries could create the operational capability to track a flotilla or submarine, and hand off overwatch to other Quad nations. Such a capability would have a limited escalatory effect, while still sending a strong deterrent signal.
2. Defence production and sustainment overhaul: Greater coordination on maintenance was emphasised as a clear priority area of the Quad. This includes ISR and P-8 sustainment.

For example, Australia has been invited to participate in joint intelligence collection and analysis in the South China Sea with Japan, the first live military intelligence model with Japan’s involvement. Participants suggested this bilateral intelligence analysis cell model could be networked through the Quad to have wider regional impact.

Capacity building:Participants agreed that it is not necessarily practical to undertake capacity building multilaterally as “the Quad.” Smaller regional countries would prefer to receive programs from individual countries rather than the Quad as a cohesive grouping. However, there are still benefits to coordination, to avoid the common issue of duplication of public goods programs and offerings. For example, there have been instances where an English language training program is offered to the same country four times. Recipients of well-intended aid can quickly become saturated if the Quad countries are not deliberate in their specific capacity-building roles. As one participant summarised, by coordinating bilateral efforts, “the Quad can be greater than the sum of its parts.”

As one participant summarised, by coordinating bilateral efforts, “the Quad can be greater than the sum of its parts.”

Table-top exercises: Multiple participants suggested that the Quad conduct regular crisis exercises in government to socialise key decision-makers and defence officials. This could provide an opportunity to understand burden-sharing and clarify the expectations and capabilities each country would bring to future contingencies. For example, Quad countries could wargame responses to a possible disruption to energy security in the Persian Gulf, which is vital to the flow of energy in the Indo-Pacific. Testing respective vulnerabilities could motivate governments to plug those gaps. There was a suggestion that this could occur in the Australian Defence College, which hosts experts from all four Quad countries.

The pathway forward

Develop a maritime security playbook “on the shelf” for crises, drawing on Quad-minus cooperation, wargaming and existing efforts with transferability to a hard power agenda.

Key components of this agenda could include:

• Moving towards more real-time data sharing: Prioritise ISR and MDA cooperation, recognising that no single country can oversee the region alone given its size. Support smaller Indo-Pacific states in building sovereign capabilities while fostering the trust required for information sharing.
• Leveraging Quad-minus models: While these efforts do not need to be formally “Quad” branded, they could be better networked through the grouping and replicated across geographic regions. Key priorities include (1) defence production and sustainment overhaul, and (2) surveillance capabilities (long-range UAVs as well as P-8s) to enable tracking of regional maritime activity.
• Deconflicting capacity-building efforts: While efforts should not be “Quad” branded, coordination can ensure the grouping is “more than the sum of its parts” by avoiding duplication and oversaturation of aid.
• Conducting regular tabletop exercises: Wargaming can clarify expectations and capabilities in a contingency and socialise key decision-makers and defence officials. Identifying vulnerabilities can motivate governments to plug gaps. This could occur at the Australian Defence College, which has experts from all four countries.

The state of play

In recent years, the Quad’s economic security pillar has narrowed into a focus on ports, subsea cables, critical minerals and shipbuilding. Participants argued that collaboration in these areas should be framed in terms of commercial realism and economic interests, rather than democratic values. Many also highlighted the role that Australia and Japan can play in advocating for the Quad’s economic security agenda, as nations which are uniquely positioned to communicate and drive continued collaboration with India and the United States in key areas.

The critical minerals challenge

Leveraging private sector engagement — particularly with regards to the critical minerals challenge — was a key focus of the discussion. Compared to the Quad’s initial standing as an ad-hoc mechanism for humanitarian aid cooperation, participants described critical minerals as a “boiling frog” situation and a “wicked” problem with no easy solutions. China has a unique set of economic assets, with monopsony power in key input markets bolstered by decades of progress in critical mineral and rare earth supply chains. Participants noted that Beijing is also becoming more confident in wielding this leverage and has demonstrated a willingness to forcefully protect its market dominance, such as the alleged disinformation campaign targeting Australian firm Lynas.¹⁰

Participants highlighted the likely expense of solutions to this issue. As one noted, “Historically, major acts of statecraft that bring countries together and are sustainable come at a cost and can be inflationary.” Given the lack of commercial drivers, incentivising the private sector to engage with these markets emerged as a key priority. Participants suggested that governments do not need to “reinvent the wheel,” but should expand public-private partnership mechanisms that have already been tested and introduced. Coordinated action and Japanese investment to support Australian firm Lynas after it was cut off from rare earth supplies in 2010 was highlighted as an example of a success story.¹¹

“Historically, major acts of statecraft that bring countries together and are sustainable come at a cost and can be inflationary.”

Participants noted that Quad members are the “strategic core” of countries motivated by this issue, and that the Quad’s depth of capability and flexibility are an advantage for cooperation in this area. They also highlighted that this demand signal has been “heard across the US bureaucracy,” with the US announcement in February 2026 of a US Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve or “Project Vault.”¹² This will be a public-private partnership backed by a US$10 billion US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) loan and nearly US$2 billion in private sector investment.

Key priorities

Critical minerals: Participant suggestions on critical minerals cooperation included: introducing a pooled funding mechanism to act as an investment safety net, undertaking concessional financing, instituting a Track 2 Dialogue that can continue momentum on critical minerals outside of government, convening a cohesive group together to form a ‘buyer’s club’ network of distributed resources and capabilities, and leveraging the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Export Finance Australia. Participants also emphasised the importance of leadership, suggesting that a high profile figure or senior government champion — such as a former prime minister — could serve as a visible figurehead, helping to signal government commitment. The Quad governments should also proactively anticipate and mitigate coercive responses on critical minerals projects, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

Private sector engagement: While participants agreed on the need to mobilise private investment, they noted this requires government to send clear demand signals and maintain trusting relationships with industry to ensure projects are commercially viable. Regulatory changes, subsidies and other policy actions may be needed to demonstrate long-term intent to the private sector, including providing renewed government support for the Quad Investor Network. Participants also suggested that seizing opportunities for public-private partnerships focused on specific projects and capabilities, such as ISR capabilities for space and maritime zones, requires granular discussions to progress.

Port infrastructure: The Indo-Pacific is fundamentally a maritime region, with trade, data and energy flows reliant on port infrastructure. Investment in ports is therefore a strategic tool that can transform economies and enable smaller Indo-Pacific nations to maintain their agency and security. In recent years there have been notable — though not widely publicised — developments in this area. In 2022, the Quad countries pledged over US$50 billion in Indo-Pacific infrastructure investments by 2027,¹³ and in 2025 India hosted the Quad Regional Ports and Transportation Conference under the Ports of the Future Partnership, focused on supporting high-quality port infrastructure across the region.¹⁴

Following the dialogue, the USSC convened a public event examining the regional challenges facing the four Quad countries. The panel, moderated by Matthew Knott, included Dr Michael Green, Dhruva Jaishankar, Dr Lavina Lee and Dr Charles Edel.

Yet, translating these commitments into operational benefits for Quad countries and regional partners remains a challenge. The Quad’s combined port infrastructure investments in the Indian Ocean to date (approximately US$3 billion) are dwarfed by China’s total contributions in the region, which total US$4 billion.¹⁵ Participants noted a lack of clarity surrounding the second Trump administration’s interest in and enthusiasm for the originally US-led Ports of the Future Partnership. Despite this uncertainty about the initiative’s future trajectory, participants highlighted the opportunity to reshape it in ways that maximise impact, noting that its current remit — spanning undersea cables, technology and security — would benefit from a tightened focus.

Participants highlighted a clear opportunity for the Quad to align country strengths to deliver transparent, digitally advanced and environmentally sustainable ports in the Indian Ocean, leveraging Australia’s regulatory and capacity-building expertise, US financing and security capabilities, Japan’s experience in high-quality infrastructure investment and India’s regional access.

Economic coordination: While the US Government has established internal economic coordination mechanisms within alliances such as NATO — evident in the development and implementation of coordinated sanctions packages on Russia — no comparable architecture exists in the Indo-Pacific. Participants noted that the Quad is unlikely to develop a central economic planning body or acquire the authority to undertake collective action on economic security. Nevertheless, they argued that the Quad can still serve as a valuable forum for agenda-setting and for catalysing important initiatives. In particular, participants suggested that the Quad could develop an inventory of economic tools and chokepoints to leverage in the event of a crisis.

The pathway forward

Pool resources and partner with industry to deliver strategic infrastructure, diversify critical mineral supply chains and anticipate economic chokepoints.

Key components of this agenda could include:

• Incentivising private sector engagement: Frame projects around commercial viability and growth rather than political values. Send clear demand signals through subsidies, regulation and policy tools that demonstrate long-term intent, supported by senior government champions and renewed support for the Quad Investor Network.
• Piloting public-private partnership models: Test mechanisms such as buyer’s clubs, pooled financing, Track 2 dialogue, and coordination of DFC, JBIC, EXIM India and Export Finance Australia.
• Prioritising port infrastructure delivery: Pool capital and expertise to deliver commercially viable, digitally advanced and environmentally sustainable ports that address urgent regional needs while strengthening smaller Indo-Pacific states’ agency. Identify opportunities to advance the Ports of the Future Partnership by tightening its focus.
• Improving coordination on economic tools: While not a formal economic bloc, the Quad can build an inventory of tools and chokepoints to leverage in a contingency.
• Anticipating and mitigating China’s retaliation: As projects threaten China’s supply chain dominance, firms should expect coercive responses, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The state of play

Participants argued that technology is “no longer a neutral platform,” as Beijing leverages its growing technological prowess to undermine the security of Quad members and the Indo-Pacific at large. To counter these threats, participants urged the Quad to prioritise coordinated — rather than unilateral — responses. For example, one participant noted that TikTok bans would have been more effective in addressing the risks posed by Chinese-led enterprises if Quad countries had pursued this measure as a joint effort.

Participants also noted that Quad discussions in this area tend to occur behind closed doors rather than in large public forums, due to sensitivities regarding technology infrastructure and intellectual property. Moreover, domestic political constraints — particularly in India — have historically hampered cooperation. Participants emphasised that empowering India to develop its technological capabilities is in the Quad’s interests, as India’s participation in forums in which the United States, Australia and Japan are not present can help disrupt damaging technology narratives and norms.

Participants argued that technology is “no longer a neutral platform,” as Beijing leverages its growing technological prowess to undermine the security of Quad members and the Indo-Pacific at large.

China can offer critical and emerging technologies at scale, subsidised and priced below market value. Because of this advantage, participants agreed that Quad nations should not seek to compete with China across every segment of the technology supply chain. Instead, they encouraged the grouping to narrow its focus to a limited number of priority areas where the Quad can make a meaningful near-term impact and most effectively compete with China.

Key priorities

Subsea cable resilience: Subsea cables underpin approximately 95% of global financial transactions and connectivity.¹⁶ However, a lack of subsea cable redundancy has created critical chokepoints for the global economy. This increases exposure to disruption and heightens risks of sabotage in the region. Participants highlighted the need for the Quad to accelerate risk mitigation by increasing their repair capabilities for subsea cables and creating redundancies that can be deployed quickly and at low cost. However, they acknowledged that there is often a clash between the commercial incentives and strategic logics of cooperation in this area.

Participants argued that Australia can play a critical role by leveraging its workforce, habits of cooperation and software engineering capabilities. For example, there is an opportunity for the Australian Government to partner with industry and commercial entities to map subsea cable chokepoints, diversify landing points, develop alternatives and build redundancy of subsea cable systems in the Indo-Pacific region. One participant also suggested establishing an Australia-India bilateral cable to build redundancies across the Indian Ocean, which is not widely covered by subsea cables or repair zones.

Participants also suggested that the Quad countries should consider adopting legal and policy frameworks to deter subsea cable sabotage, following Australia’s model of imposing meaningful consequences regardless of whether intent or negligence can be conclusively proven. Taiwan was raised as an illustrative case study: despite having been a victim of subsea cable sabotage, its existing legal frameworks require mandatory proof of intent, which creates a barrier to timely legal accountability following incidents.

Participants suggested that the Quad countries should consider adopting legal and policy frameworks to deter subsea cable sabotage, following Australia’s model of imposing meaningful consequences regardless of whether intent or negligence can be conclusively proven.

Space security: Space security is central to national resilience, economic security, and maritime and space domain and situational awareness. One participant argued that the Quad must prevent further deterioration of space security as a result of the militarisation and weaponisation of space.

Given the lack of consensus among major powers on space, participants highlighted the opportunity for “networked minilateralism” in this area, leveraging the Quad as a trusted forum for consensus-building on strategic space priorities. For example, the Quad could consult on global governance measures to regulate space activities by state and non-state actors. This could involve engaging in open discussions on shared space security rules, norms and values. These technical agreements and standards-setting in smaller groupings can lay the groundwork for future legally binding mechanisms.

Participants also argued for sustainable linkages between space security networks of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) across Quad members to encourage resiliency and redundancy. One participant highlighted the lack of long-term private investment in space and the reliance on government funding, and suggested pooling space capital among Quad nations for space security programs and infrastructure initiatives. The participant suggested that Australia can “step up” its sovereign space capabilities by investing in space situational and domain awareness, leveraging its bilateral ties with Japan and its Mitsubishi Heavy Industries ground station space capabilities to create unique ground station integrated space analysis for Australia.

Digital infrastructure: Participants noted that China currently enjoys a first mover advantage and is replicating elements of the Belt and Road Initiative “playbook” in Southeast Asia, while advancing a strong narrative in the Global South. They emphasised the need to scale digital infrastructure projects that position Quad countries as collaborative, federated suppliers across the security stack.

Successful models include expanding the Australia–CyberCX partnership,¹⁷ piloted in the Pacific Islands, to other strategic locations, and leveraging the US artificial intelligence exports program in the Indo-Pacific through a consortium-based arrangement.¹⁸ Participants argued that the Quad should focus on responding to clear regional demand signals and working collaboratively with partners. One example was the deployment of Open Radio Access Network technology in Palau in response to Palau’s call for improved connectivity.

One participant also highlighted the opportunity for Australia to deepen engagement with Indonesia. Indonesia was characterised as a leading destination for the internationalisation of China’s technology sector. Participants suggested that Australia could leverage concerns around the prevalence of low-quality Chinese offerings to position itself as an alternative supplier.

Cybersecurity threat messaging: Participants argued that the Quad should prioritise “strategic interdependence,” and leverage its collective capabilities to be a trusted regional technology provider for partners unable to protect themselves from cyber vulnerabilities. They suggested that improving transparency and aligning messaging on malign cyber activities would empower partners through information-sharing, while also reducing risks of retaliation from rivals.

Semiconductor cooperation: One participant also argued that the Quad should reassess whether the 2023 MoU on a semiconductor supply chain contingency network remains fit for purpose, given surging demand and constrained production capacity.

The pathway forward

Advance public-private partnerships to counter China’s first-mover advantage and respond to regional demand in digital infrastructure, subsea cables, space and semiconductors.

Key components of this agenda could include:

• Forging norms of responsible behaviour: Prioritise technical agreements and standards setting in smaller groupings, laying groundwork for legally binding mechanisms when politically feasible.
• Accelerating work on subsea cable resilience: Prioritise securing and diversifying technology supply chains. For example, Australia could partner with industry to map chokepoints, diversify landing points, develop alternatives and build redundancy to enhance resilience of subsea cable systems.
• Responding to regional demand signals: Scale digital infrastructure projects that position Quad countries as collaborative, federated suppliers across the security stack. For example, expand the Australia-CyberCX model piloted in the Pacific Islands to other strategic locations.
• Advancing space security through “networked minilateralism”: Consult on rules of the road for space activities, promote Quad SME linkages to improve resilience and redundancy, and enhance sharing of military grade and commercial interoperability data to support robust space infrastructure.
• Revisiting semiconductor cooperation: Reassess whether the 2023 MoU on a semiconductor supply chain contingency network remains fit for purpose, given surging demand and constrained production capacity.
• Coordinating cyber threat messaging: Improve transparency and align messaging on malign cyber activities to reduce risks of retaliation and empower partners through information-sharing.