Analysts see strategy, election politics and personal legacy driving the US president's renewed interest in meeting the North Korean leader.
U.S. President Donald Trump has broken so many political and foreign policy norms in the first 600 days of his second term that many had forgotten his “love affair” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The 2018 and 2019 Trump-Kim meetings in Singapore; Hanoi, Vietnam; and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) produced no diplomatic breakthroughs and appeared to confirm Pyongyang’s disinterest in denuclearization. Yet analysts expected Trump would want another summit if re-elected. After months of silence, he responded to a reporter’s question on Aug. 19 about whether he would meet Kim by saying, “Yeah, I will.”
Why does Trump want a summit when he is mired in an Iran war that is going badly and his Republican Party faces a possible mauling in November’s midterm elections? There are three possible explanations.
First, foreign policy strategy. Commentators trying to find a doctrine in Trump’s erratic foreign policy can offer several realpolitik explanations. Because the Iran war is consuming attention in the United States, the president may need North Korea to behave for now. The problem is that Trump abruptly canceled South Korea-U.S. military exercises needed to deter Kim from misbehaving. Nor is a summit necessary simply to signal North Korea.
There may be strategic logic in diplomatic engagement with North Korea, but little in canceling military exercises and insisting on a summit when no working-level diplomacy exists.
Others might argue this reflects Trump’s “sphere of influence” approach: ceding influence to former adversaries in Asia and Europe so the United States can concentrate on the Western Hemisphere. But that construct fell apart when Trump attacked Iran. There may be strategic logic in diplomatic engagement with North Korea, but little in canceling military exercises and insisting on a summit when no working-level diplomacy exists.
Second, election politics. Presidents conduct diplomacy for domestic political reasons too. Trump may be looking for a dramatic win to reverse disastrous trends for Republicans before the midterms. I am skeptical. Polls show U.S. voters are deeply unhappy with Trump because of the high cost of living. If anything, they see foreign policy ventures as a distraction from solving that problem.
A Trump-Kim summit might impress some core “Make America Great Again” voters shaken by Trump’s abandonment of his “no more forever wars” pledge in Iran. He needs that base to turn out, but a North Korea summit would probably have only a marginal effect on their enthusiasm. The political benefit, in other words, would be limited.
Third, historical vanity. Trump appears far more invested in his personal legacy. “Regime Change,” the best-selling book on Trump’s second term by New York Times journalists Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, includes a revealing scene: Trump shows them a list of 10 historical figures, including Napoleon and Genghis Khan, and declares that he — Donald Trump — is the most powerful figure in world history.
His advisers are urging greater focus on the economy and the Iran war, but the president’s real passion seems to be lasting, visible demonstrations of power: his ballroom in the White House’s East Wing, a new “arc of triumph” in Washington and glossy summit photographs fit for coffee-table histories. A summit with Kim can provide that imagery in ways the Iran war, trade deals with allies or regular military exercises cannot. The most obvious explanation for Trump’s interest in another Kim summit is vanity.
Will there actually be a summit? The North Koreans probably understand much of this. The Kim dynasty is hardly opposed to theatrical summitry, which helped lure Kim to Singapore, Hanoi and the DMZ. In 2018 and 2019, Pyongyang may also have viewed Trump as an iconic, history-changing leader in the mold of President Richard Nixon, whose diplomacy with China has long fascinated North Korean analysts.
Today, Trump is a weaker political figure, and his war in Iran suggests he lacks Nixon’s realpolitik skills.
But today, Trump is a weaker political figure, and his war in Iran suggests he lacks Nixon’s realpolitik skills. Moreover, since the Ukraine war, North Korea has gained far more diplomatic, technological and operational support from Moscow and Beijing. Trump has less to offer, while Pyongyang needs less from the United States thanks to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
Even without a grand bargain, however, Pyongyang could gain tactical advantages from a summit by interfering with South Korea-U.S. military exercises and undermining confidence in Seoul and Tokyo, even if those gains prove fleeting. If Trump announced a peace treaty and the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, that would be a bigger prize, though still tactical because the U.S. Congress would immediately move to block him.
I read Kim Yo-jong’s statement that her brother likes Trump but there are no summit plans as a signal that Pyongyang is weighing these calculations and testing whether Trump can be induced to offer a bigger concession. Pyongyang is betting on Trump’s desperation. But that will eventually collide with Trump’s obsession over whether history will judge him a loser.
A summit later this year remains possible. But if the year passes without another Trump-Kim meeting, I would not be surprised.