It is now obvious that US President Donald J. Trump is stuck in a box of his own making on Iran.
Hawks argue that the only way out is to escalate until the Iran regime caves, but it does not seem that this can be achieved without significant risk to US forces, the global economy and Trump’s own political standing.
Doves maintain that Trump should just cut his losses and unilaterally “end” the war, but there too the risks and costs are greater than the status quo.
For some observers there is a certain schadenfreude in the President finally reaping the rewards of his rash actions after escaping decades of legal, business and political jeopardy.
But the reality is that while this may be Trump’s war politically, the US and its allies must work together to manage the consequences and develop coping strategies designed for months and years rather than the days and weeks that drive market and media attention. That strategy should begin with an accurate assessment of what went wrong.
The Trump administration’s mistake was not that it identified Iran as a serious threat to regional and global stability. The Iranian regime exists to destroy Israel, fight the US and demean women. Those are the ends and not just the means for an Islamist revolution dedicated to overthrowing the Westphalian system from behind the veil of a Westphalian state, as Henry Kissinger put it.
The mistake was assuming that decapitation airstrikes would lead to regime change and neatly solve the ongoing threat from Iran once and for all.
The Obama administration’s nuclear negotiation – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – was a useful diplomatic accomplishment but not sufficient to contain Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions. Whether Trump was right to withdraw from the JCPOA will remain a partisan debate in Washington but the necessity of setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions with military strikes was likely a matter of when and not if.
Estimates that Tehran was on a trajectory to deploy 10,000 missiles by 2028 also merited consideration of a kinetic response since that number of missiles would have overwhelmed Israeli, US or Gulf missile defences. Seriously contemplating the use of force was not the mistake.
The mistake was assuming that decapitation airstrikes would lead to regime change and neatly solve the ongoing threat from Iran once and for all. Previous US or Israeli strikes to set back Iranian nuclear, missile, or proxy capabilities had resulted in only limited counterstrikes from Tehran. One option would have been to continue regularly “mowing the lawn”, as the Israelis put it, but this calibrated use of force did not satisfy Trump’s political or strategic ambitions, particularly after the US military had successfully grabbed Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and reset the balance of power in Latin America.
In a massive failure of strategic empathy (reading the enemy), the US and Israel targeted the Iranian leadership and declared regime change as their war aim. A desperate, rudderless and vengeful regime now facing an existential threat responded with attacks across the region in a gamble for resurrection that paid off.
That initial US strategic mistake was then compounded by Trump’s zero-sum and improvisational style of diplomacy. His disparaging approach to allies, especially in Europe, leaves his administration with fewer cards to play now that he faces a growing strategic problem in the Gulf.
Previous presidents all consulted with allies before campaigns of this importance. (I did so with Australia, Japan and others on Iraq and Afghanistan while on the US National Security Council staff.) When the going got tough, as it did in Iraq, US presidents quickly set aside differences with allies over trade or other issues to focus on the immediate national security challenges.
None of that has happened in the conflict with Iran. All allies other than Israel were caught off guard by the attack, and despite a slightly less confrontational tone from Trump at the recent NATO summit the ridiculous clashes over Greenland and European “civilisational decline” continue.
Meanwhile, Trump failed to see the danger of growing alignment among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea on the other side of the table. The administration appeared surprised by the accuracy of Iran’s drone and missile strikes against US bases in the region, but anybody realistically assessing Russia foreign policy should have considered the possibility that Vladimir Putin would help the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps try to kill Americans. If not for the administration’s disdain for the “deep state” and experts in think tanks, there would have been ample warning of this scenario.
Greater reliance on regional and diplomatic expertise also would have prevented the alternating triumphalism and despair of the diplomatic process being led by the President’s unprepared business partner and son-in-law.
Trump is not about to admit these mistakes. That is not his style of politics. However, he does seem to appreciate the lessons in terms of his available options at this point. He knows an expanded military campaign with boots on the ground is not possible when the war has less than 40 per cent of Americans in support and Iran’s military and terrain are exponentially more complex than Iraq’s were.
The administration also faces limits in available munitions – particularly for missile defence – which are needed for sustained combat operations. The depletion of global oil reserves creates another serious vulnerability.
Put simply, the political, military and economic risks of pushing for victory over Iran are less acceptable than the impact of a continuation of the current shocks to the markets and domestic US politics.
For a US president focused on legacy, if not careful strategy, the thought of going down as the biggest loser in American military history is unthinkable.
Trump is also unlikely to choose the alternative option of just pulling out, as the anti-war isolationists on the far left and far right of American politics urge. Iran would fill that vacuum, assert control over the Strait of Hormuz, then use the expanded revenue to reconstitute missile and nuclear arsenals and reinforce terrorist proxies in Yemen and Lebanon. The geopolitical shockwaves would go well beyond the Gulf.
For a US president focused on legacy, if not careful strategy, the thought of going down as the biggest loser in American military history is unthinkable.
Operating between those two unpalatable options, the Trump administration for now is “escalating to de-escalate”: trying for a credible deal by raising the pain level to unacceptable levels for Tehran through blockade, more bombing and potentially the limited insertion of ground forces.
Before February 28 that approach might have worked, but now the regime may be too vengeful and too confident in its ability to make Washington blink first. This does not mean Iran is “winning” the war. Tehran is guilty of hubris and strategic miscalculation of its own. The regime is unable to defend its airspace and faces continued degradation of its warmaking potential while sustained blockade starves the regime of revenue needed for survival. The regime also faces the continued danger of resistance at home, even if the protests early this year ended in violent defeat for those who took to the streets.
Unable to impose their terms on each other but also unwilling to abandon them, Washington and Tehran are likely to continue alternating between diplomacy and violence for months if not years to come – taking breathers but not achieving a stable status quo post bellum, let alone a return to the status quo ante bellum.
The Trump administration is justified in using military pressure in search of a near-term diplomatic solution. And there may be more escalation to come.
News reports suggest the administration is positioning ground forces – a marine expeditionary unit and the 82nd Airborne – potentially to seize Kharg Island and choke off Iran’s energy exports. That would carry significant risk since those forces, as agile and capable as they are, eventually would be providing fixed targets close to Iran’s drone and missile sites. It is possible the head-fake of deploying these forces gets Iran to the table. Successfully seizing Kharg Island would likely give more leverage. But the Iranian regime’s defiance and self-confidence will not be broken so easily.
The reality is that the US soon may need to prepare a longer-term strategy to manage the crisis. And Australia and other US allies will have too much at stake to avoid being part of this effort.
First, Australia will have a role to play in ensuring the US alliance system maintains the right distribution and co-ordination of military effort between the Gulf and East Asia. The strategic co-operation that started between NATO and Asian allies during the Biden administration will have to be restarted in the wake of the Russian and Chinese alignment behind Iran (and coincidentally North Korea).
Superficially there are two military efforts in the Gulf right now, one led by the US Central Command and the other notionally co-led by France and Britain. The latter is predicated on a clean cessation of hostilities before operations begin. That is no longer logical and the lie to that story is evident in the fact Australia’s Wedgetail surveillance flights are straddling the two efforts with the US Central Command being the far more important partner. France will advocate autonomy from the US as always but will not be the one leading the world community out of this crisis. Of course pushing for alliance solidarity will run against the grain of the Trump administration, but it will have little choice, particularly as congress imposes conditions for further funding of the war.
Rather than chortle at the administration’s missteps on alliances, Australia should be building bridges between NATO and Asian alliances alongside Japan with the aim of constructing an effective coalition to deter Iran, managing strategic relationships with the splintering Gulf states and ensuring freedom of navigation. The vulnerabilities exposed by the military campaign in the Gulf also will require Australian effort, including turbocharging munitions production under the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance initiative and prioritising integrated air and missile defence, counter-drone technology, and hardening and resilience of infrastructure on bases and in critical civilian nodes such as utilities and banking.
Beijing will have noticed the American glass jaw exposed in the Iran conflict. That will be partly offset by the unexpected willingness by Trump to persist and fight on despite setbacks, but deterrence depends on will and material capabilities both. Australia and the US have gaps to fill on the capabilities front.
Second, Australian industry and government will need to forge a new energy security strategy that goes beyond the debates about taxing gas exports to consider how Australia can lead on the formulation of a coalition of like-minded states to ensure reliable supply of gas, not only for key allies such as Japan but also for vulnerable economies in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
Longer-term investments will be needed to wean numerous Indo-Pacific economies from the current level of dependence on the Gulf, and this goes for securing supply chains for related imports such as lubricants, jet fuel or fertiliser where prices will continue to be hardest hit. Redundancy costs more but is going to be unavoidable. Even if Iran’s effort to use the Houthis to close the Red Sea routes for Saudi oil dissipates, the threat will not go away.
Finally, since stability in the Gulf will be impossible with the current regime in Tehran, investments must be made to weaken the pillars of the regime’s power within Iran. That obviously means denying Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz and any revenue that would result, but also imposing strategic costs on Russia for assisting Tehran.
A strategy that keeps the pressure on Tehran, limits the consequences of conflict and energy shocks, and reinforces the internal weaknesses of the regime will yield more results in time than the current approach.
Strengthening US support for Ukraine would be a good start, though the Ukrainians have done well for themselves by providing drones and other capabilities to Gulf allies. The information campaign also matters. The Trump administration hastily reversed its decision last year to cut funding for Voice of America’s Farsi service and should go further to expand broadcasting. More controversial but necessary would be arming the Kurds and other groups within Iran that will tax the regime’s military capabilities and weaken the IRGC’s control.
Like it or not, we are probably in the long game now. Though small comfort, it is worth recalling that the Korean war armistice in 1953 was considered a setback at the time because the Korean Peninsula remained divided, but we now celebrate the liberation and subsequent dynamism of the Republic of Korea. Similarly, George W. Bush’s surge in Iraq in 2007 did not restore political support for his presidency but it did pave the way for the more stable and democratic Iraq we see today.
A strategy that keeps the pressure on Tehran, limits the consequences of conflict and energy shocks, and reinforces the internal weaknesses of the regime will yield more results in time than the current approach. It is time to prepare for the long game.