A major impediment to developing and implementing a collective strategy is the opacity of critical minerals supply chains.
With China increasing restrictions on critical minerals trade, including tighter export controls on rare earth elements announced in March, the United States and allied countries are trying to bring more mineral supply to market. To succeed, they need to start with more structured information sharing and fusion.
Following China’s mineral export restrictions, the US convened 54 countries in February as part of its FORGE initiative to ignite multilateral cooperation on mineral supply chains. This produced several bilateral memorandums of understanding, but establishing the intent to cooperate is relatively easy. As Australia found with its collection of more than 30 mineral-related agreements, fully activating them is harder.
Even among a smaller group of 10 like-minded countries convened by ASPI in northern Australia in April, coordinating minerals policies currently seems out of reach.
ASPI’s 2026 Darwin Dialogue underscored the widespread disparities in national critical-mineral lists, priorities, capacities, and ambitions for government intervention in markets. Despite the goodwill in the room, a pathway to collective action remained unclear, with the discussion dominated by debating tactics rather than outlining strategy.
A major impediment to developing and implementing a collective strategy is the opacity of critical minerals supply chains. Governments are unclear about where and how to intervene most effectively at the lowest cost. This is because, just like potential financial investors, governments lack a clear picture of risk and reward at various stages of mineral supply chains.
Like-minded countries need a coordination mechanism to gather, share and analyse information from both public and private sources across multiple markets.
Critical minerals such as rare earths and gallium are typically traded through a mix of private bilateral contracts, long-term offtake agreements and thin spot markets, rather than transparent, exchange-based systems. This means trade data reporting and price discovery are limited compared to major exchange-traded commodities such as ore. Various processing stages, movement through multiple jurisdictions, mineral blending and commercial sensitivity to sharing data all add to the complexity.
Improving mineral traceability through greater information sharing is the only way for countries to derisk supply chains. Traceability systems would help countries determine mineral origin, create true pricing benchmarks and protect standards. With increased supply chain transparency, strategic groupings with a mineral focus such as the FORGE, G7+ and the Quad could coordinate and act more effectively.
This starts with sufficient data. Like-minded countries need a coordination mechanism to gather, share and analyse information from both public and private sources across multiple markets. Right now, information sharing by governments and industry is ad hoc and unconsolidated. Insights aren’t shared broadly.
Of course, there are national security and commercial risks associated with information sharing. But it can offset other risks. There are compelling reasons for improving transparency: governments can better prepare for disruptions and design better market interventions, and industry can operate on a more level playing field. While much activity around critical minerals happens in China and can’t be captured, it would still be helpful to have a centralised mechanism that aggregates global information such as geological and trade data, investment flows and foreign ownership.
Maritime fusion centres — such as the one in the Indian Ocean operated by India and supported by the US, Japan and Australia — already provide a model for this type of information fusion.
Maritime fusion centres are hubs staffed by navy personnel and international analysts from various countries, enabling information sharing on ship movements, illegal activities and emergencies. There are three fusion centres currently operating in the Indo-Pacific, located in India, Singapore and Vanuatu. The Quad countries support these fusion centres through their Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Program.
Using information gathered from multiple sources including commercial shipping data, satellite and radar imagery, and maritime authorities, fusion centres create coherent pictures that can inform actions. And they’re getting better over time – thanks to improvements in AI analysis platforms, the analytical capabilities of fusion centres have advanced considerably since 2020.
Information fusion centres reflect governments’ recognition of the need for cooperation in monitoring activities across vast territories. They help countries coordinate and respond to risks, even when they don’t align politically. Such a mechanism is essential for understanding critical-mineral supply chains, because they are too complex and geographically widespread for any one country to gain a coherent picture.
The Quad is the most suitable grouping to trial a mineral fusion centre. Other groups, such as the FORGE and the G7+, are also looking to cooperate on minerals. But the Quad is a contained, close-knit group of countries that can each offer snapshots of the different parts of the critical-mineral value chain: financing, mining, processing, manufacturing and consumption.
The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative launched last year could provide the scaffolding to pilot a mineral fusion centre that focuses on one or two mineral supply chains. This could be set up with minimal financial outlay, although human resources would be needed. If the pilot Quad minerals fusion centre is successful, it could expand to include information and analysis from other trusted partners including South Korea and Canada, as well as countries in Southeast Asia and Europe.
Coordinated information sharing and fusion is the crucial next step in derisking mineral supply chains. The Quad is the ideal grouping to pioneer it.