USSC Director of Foreign Policy and Defence, Dr Lavina Lee, is co-author with Dr John Lee (Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute) of this report published by the Hudson Institute.
Executive summary
This report is divided into three chapters.
Chapter 1 delves into the strategic mindset of several Southeast Asian states and discusses the essential elements of statecraft that they have pursued to manage risk and maximize opportunity from deepening United States–China tensions.
This section also examines the significant differences between the hedging strategies these countries have chosen, which have been shaped by distinct strategic cultures, geographies, and material considerations.
Chapter 2 compares US and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, focusing on the normative, institutional, and material factors that shape the perceived and actual opportunities and constraints these countries face. While not necessarily decisive, these factors are relevant to an understanding of how the countries view US-China tensions, and importantly, a potential conflict over Taiwan.
This section also explores the material and nonmaterial ways that China has built dependencies and manipulated the risk and opportunity calculations of Southeast Asian states.
Chapter 3 offers two separate but related assessments based on the analysis in chapters 1 and 2. The first discusses whether Southeast Asian states will likely continue to distance themselves from Taiwan diplomatically and institutionally to comply with Chinese demands, as tensions deepen between Beijing, on the one hand, and Washington and Taipei, on the other. Put differently, are current trends likely to continue, assuming those tensions do not lead to overt conflict over Taiwan?
The second assessment covers how these countries think (or are likely to think) about a conflict if one becomes imminent. What are their response options? This is different from the question of what they would do during a conflict in tactical and operational terms, which is dependent on specific wartime scenarios not covered by this report.
This chapter then reviews the strategic options, constraints, and dilemmas these countries face as US-China tensions deepen over Taiwan, including in the event of a probable or imminent Taiwan conflict. It assesses how these elements would shape their responses to such a conflict.
Assessing how these Southeast Asian states think about a conflict over Taiwan, how they would respond, and what they believe the United States or China might demand of them is far more difficult. For many of these countries, properly considering such a terrifying and complex situation is almost taboo.
Yet these assessments are necessary, given their urgency and importance, and the authors hope this report will significantly advance the conversation.