President Donald Trump’s attack on Venezuela and seizure of President Nicolas Maduro may prove to be a tactical success, but the strategic implications have yet to unfold. Those consequences could be felt as far away as the Korean Peninsula.
The removal of Maduro was, in itself, a success. As British Prime Minister Keir Starmer remarked, there is little reason to “shed a tear” for the collapse of a regime that brutally suppressed political dissent, trafficked in narcotics and supported the Cuban dictatorship. Venezuelans living in exile in the United States welcomed the news, and many inside Venezuela, though uncertain about what comes next, were likely relieved to see the dictator gone.
What matters now is what follows. Three broad scenarios present themselves.
The most favourable outcome for the Trump administration and U.S. allies would be for Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to emerge as a credible leader willing to cooperate with Washington. That path could open the door to financial assistance and commercial engagement, expand political participation and reverse the massive emigration that saw roughly 11% of Venezuelans flee the country under Maduro. It could also help erase Venezuela’s reputation as a hub for narcotics trafficking.
In this scenario, U.S. allies and regional partners would likely support a more liberalised and economically viable Venezuela, regardless of their views on Trump or the use of force. Improved U.S.-Venezuela relations would weaken Caribbean support networks for Cuba, Russia and China. Iran, already under pressure from growing domestic protests, would feel additional strain. With Venezuela stabilised, Washington might increase pressure on Cuba while freeing diplomatic and strategic bandwidth to refocus on the larger challenge posed by China in East Asia.
Even this best-case scenario, however, would have limits. Trump would likely reap only modest political benefit at home. Polls taken before the operation showed that only 17% of Americans supported removing Maduro. China and Russia, armed with nuclear weapons, cyber capabilities and massive ground forces, would not fundamentally alter their efforts to challenge U.S. alliances simply because of a successful special forces operation.
North Korea would also be unlikely to feel significantly deterred. Kim Jong-il briefly disappeared from public view after the George W. Bush administration killed Saddam Hussein’s sons in 2003, but his son Kim Jong-un commands a far more formidable military and has already brushed aside Trump’s “fire and fury” threats in 2018.
A second scenario might appear successful from Trump’s perspective, but would be far less welcome to Congress and much of the international community. In this case, Trump would follow through on his promise that the United States would control Venezuela’s oil and gas revenues while effectively administering the country from Caracas.
Such an arrangement would echo the worst examples of American gunboat diplomacy from the late nineteenth century. It would invite international condemnation, provoke resistance inside Venezuela and almost certainly trigger congressional scrutiny, especially if energy revenues were perceived to benefit Trump’s family or close associates.
Recent history offers a warning. When Trump attempted to block the release of the Epstein files, defections from within his own MAGA movement enabled Democrats to force their disclosure. Some of those same Republicans are now furious about the Venezuela operation. They could side with Democrats demanding hearings and investigations, possibly even before the expected Democratic gains in the November midterm elections. Taken too far, this approach could turn Venezuela into a political and diplomatic disaster of Trump’s own making.
Politically and strategically, losing control in Venezuela could rival the humiliation of the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
The third scenario would be the worst outcome for both Trump and the global order: the loss of U.S. control over Venezuela. The first scenario depends on cooperation from Vice President Rodriguez, yet she has so far condemned the U.S. attack and demanded Maduro’s return. That stance may be tactical, or it may reflect deeper resistance that Washington has underestimated.
If opposition persists under Rodriguez or another Maduro loyalist, Trump would face public humiliation on the world stage. While he has indicated a willingness to deploy ground forces if necessary, Venezuela is larger than Ukraine and far more difficult terrain. If Venezuelans were to mount sustained resistance, counterinsurgency operations would pose a severe challenge for the United States.
Politically and strategically, losing control in Venezuela could rival the humiliation of the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Beijing and Moscow would welcome either a prolonged U.S. entanglement or the emergence of a successor regime that openly defies Washington. Such a quagmire in Latin America would inevitably distract from security challenges in East Asia and on the Korean Peninsula.
It remains unclear whether the Trump administration adequately planned for the most favourable of these scenarios. Allies and Congress were not briefed in advance. A tactical success could still yield strategic benefits, but the margin for error is narrow, and the consequences of miscalculation would extend well beyond Venezuela.