We don’t hear as much about the so-called CRINKs these days, which is the supposed authoritarian axis between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
The reason is that, while Iran is down but not out, Russia and China have largely left Tehran to face the US and Israel alone. The CRINKs are, some say, nothing more than a marriage of convenience, a highly transactional partnership in which each nation works to further its own narrow self-interest.
Even if the regime in Tehran falls and is replaced by one more friendly towards the West, the axis is very real and dangerous.
So are the CRINKs a strategic and military force to be reckoned with, or is the new “axis of evil” over-hyped? Regardless of what happens in Iran, and even if the regime in Tehran falls and is replaced by one more friendly towards the West, the axis is very real and dangerous. We ignore this group of revisionist authoritarian powers at our peril.
We should be careful not to use our own frameworks and standards to judge all other non-Western strategic relationships. The CRINKs do not sign and ratify treaties between them in the same way we do with the United States. They are not all legally bound to defend each other as NATO signatories agree to do under their collective security agreement.
China and Russia each have mutual defence treaties with North Korea separately, but not with each other or with Iran. Even so, they all have an enduring common interest in the weakening and eroding of American power and that of its allies. This is what binds them.
Importantly, it is the strategic effects of their friendships of convenience that we ought to take seriously. There is growing evidence that the CRINKs are working together to help each other engage in and sustain wars.
Iran’s drone and ballistic missile capabilities are as formidable as they are in the current conflict because of the direct support it has received from both those countries, as well as North Korea.
Iran is a case in point. The regime has always enjoyed diplomatic cover and opportunities to alleviate its pariah status through its recent membership of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and BRICS, courtesy of China and Russia. But it is about much more than words. Iran’s drone and ballistic missile capabilities are as formidable as they are in the current conflict because of the direct support it has received from both those countries, as well as North Korea.
This has occurred through trade and technology transfer between them through a complex network used to evade Western sanctions.
Iran’s arsenal of liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles used against neighbouring Persian Gulf states and Israel, and its emerging intercontinental ballistic missile program, are all based on North Korean technology, going back to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Iran’s short-range Qiam-1 missile, medium-range Emad-1 and Ghadr missiles and the Khorramshahr-4 missile with a cluster-munition warhead are variants of North Korean Scud-C, Nodong, and Musudan missiles.
All of these have been improved and manufactured in Iran with direct engineering and technical assistance from Pyongyang.
Whilst Iran’s vast drone technology is largely home-grown, key dual-use components that enhance their accuracy and lethality rely on the import of Western engines, batteries, semiconductors and navigation components that are under Western sanction, but reach Tehran via Chinese distributors and trading companies.
Recent reports have suggested that, in addition to an increase in dual-use technology trade, China has directly transferred offensive drones to Iran and had finalised a deal in 2024, but had not yet delivered anti-ship cruise missiles that could be used to directly target US ships in the Gulf. And in 2025, US intelligence reported that two state-owned Iranian ships left China loaded with 1000 tonnes of sodium perchlorate, a key ingredient for solid rocket fuel for missiles, at a Chinese port.
The development of this formidable capability has been underwritten by Chinese purchases of around 90 per cent of Tehran’s oil exports, equating to around nearly half of Iran’s governmental budget in 2025. These purchases evade US secondary sanctions through a clandestine shadow-banking network globally facilitated by China, which includes trade transacted in Chinese yuan, or as part of a barter system.
Whilst China, Russia and North Korea may not have sent troops to defend Iran in the current war, one should not downplay Russia’s provision of real-time targeting data to Iran that has significantly improved the precision of retaliatory strikes on American and Israeli assets.
Whilst China, Russia and North Korea may not have sent troops to defend Iran in the current war, one should not downplay Russia’s provision of real-time targeting data to Iran that has significantly improved the precision of retaliatory strikes on American and Israeli assets. Nor should one ignore recent reports that Russia is in the process of supplying drones to Iran or China’s decision to allow Tehran the use of its BeiDou global positioning satellite network.
This increase in support can only bode ill for prolonging and escalating the current conflict and portends what support the CRINKs are likely to provide Iran to rebuild its military forces, should the regime survive.
Donald Trump complains that European and Asian allies have not done enough to assist the US and Israel in stabilising the Strait of Hormuz. The fair response is that Trump gave these allies little warning about the impending attack against Iran and can hardly complain when victory was not as easy or quick as he anticipated.
Regardless, the point is that even long-standing European and Asian allies do not always do what the US might demand. They will assess risk and tend to act in their own interest, just as the CRINKs are doing in offering Iran less direct military assistance than Tehran might have hoped.
Nevertheless, these authoritarian powers are helping each other to fight wars against First World states, which is more than some democratic allies are doing for each other. That’s worth worrying about.