Materially and technologically, we gain significantly from the alliance and agreements such as AUKUS.
This past Tuesday marked five years since Scott Morrison, Boris Johnson and Joe Biden stood together to launch the AUKUS trilateral security partnership – a pact that has survived a change of government in every one of the three founding nations.
One common prediction was that Donald Trump would kill it. His administration did perform a review of AUKUS before declaring it was “full steam ahead”.
Critics of the agreement remain. Ironically, the loudest objections seem to be within Australia. These objections fall into two main categories. The first is focused on the cost of the nuclear submarine component of the agreement and its knock-on effects. The second set of objections is more serious. It is that AUKUS was and remains strategically misconceived.
These two objections are not unrelated as any strategy is only as credible as the funding behind it. But for the purpose here, we’ll give this and future governments the benefit of the doubt that they will meet the spending required to deliver AUKUS and build the broader defence capability we need.
What about the more damning argument that AUKUS is strategically misconceived? A strong case can be made that it is not. These are the general arguments against the agreement. First, there are those who argue that AUKUS is designed in response to an adversary – China – that poses no direct or near-term military threat to Australia. Paul Keating has emphasised that China has not threatened Australia militarily and lacks the intention to ever invade.
Regardless of intent, others question China’s capacity to invade Australia. The People’s Liberation Army Navy may have deployed a naval task group to circumnavigate Australia in February 2025. But that is a long way from acquiring the naval power projection capabilities to threaten our territory, with Darwin being 4000km away from China’s Hainan Island naval base.
Because of our island geography, one does not need to invade Australia to bring it to its knees. Controlling and obstructing our access to vital maritime trade routes would be enough.
Let’s deal with intent. For a country that is not facing any threat of invasion, China nevertheless is embarking on the most rapid conventional military build-up since World War II. Its rate of nuclear expansion means it is on track to reach 1000 nuclear warheads by 2030. It possesses the largest navy by number, a theatre missile advantage over the US within the first island chain, and outpaces the US and allied countries on its shipbuilding and production of precision-strike missiles. Those who watched China’s September 2025 Victory Day Parade would have seen its display of cutting-edge hardware, from hypersonic “carrier killer” missiles, laser air defence systems, dual-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, uncrewed vehicles and display of the full nuclear triad.
There is still the issue of defining the threat to our national interests. It is likely China has no desire or need to invade Australia. But this is constructing a strawman argument only to knock it down. Because of our island geography, one does not need to invade Australia to bring it to its knees. Controlling and obstructing our access to vital maritime trade routes would be enough. An undetected nuclear-powered submarine makes it hazardous for Chinese vessels to operate within our approaches. China too has the capability to strike northern Australia with ballistic missiles it could deploy from its artificial island bases or by air.
This leads to the second strategic objection, which is that AUKUS diminishes our strategic autonomy, forces us to conform passively to US policy and interest, and commits us to a US war against China.
The structure and distribution of power in our region and the world is increasingly hierarchical. For a country with a relatively small population, large landmass and an economy one-tenth the size of China’s, an alliance with a great power and agreements such as AUKUS are not a luxury. All this gives us far more relevance and freedom of strategic manoeuvre than we would have otherwise.
Besides, it is obvious that deterring China from using force to achieve its territorial ambitions in the region is not only in the American interest but also Australia’s.
Even if we sat it out, Australia would be profoundly affected by any major-power war in our region. Which means there is no option but to raise deterrence above every other strategic priority. When China is changing hard power facts on the ground and openly committing to expansionism, deterrence is the only and urgent option.
What difference can a middle power such as Australia make? That’s the line critics of AUKUS like to run. They forget the importance of geostrategy. The US has territories in Guam and Honolulu but remains a distant power. It cannot project power without the use of territory in the region. This is where the growing importance of joint facilities being developed in Western Australia and the Northern Territory under the AUKUS arrangement comes into play.
A key component of Chinese grand military strategy is to exploit the US difficulty of projecting power from afar into East Asia.
The more dispersed and developed US and allied military options are in Asia, the more complicated it becomes for the PLA to prevail in various scenarios. It is why China detests AUKUS. The latter creates a challenging geostrategic problem for the PLA.
Keep in mind that a key component of Chinese grand military strategy is to exploit the US difficulty of projecting power from afar into East Asia. The more allies hang back, do less or free-ride, the harder it is for the US to project power and the greater China’s strategic advantage. This is due to the simple mathematics in that there is no balance in Asia without US military power or its ability to combine with allied forces.
There is a third argument based on two key narratives that Beijing deliberately and persistently promotes to the region. This is the argument that when it comes to supposedly core Chinese interests such as Taiwan, the PLA is undeterrable and will pay any price to achieve its objectives. The second related narrative is that the US is in decline, chaotic and unreliable, therefore it is better for countries such as Australia to refrain from entering into reckless agreements such as AUKUS that will lead only to disaster and defeat.
These narratives, which have been internalised by many critics of AUKUS, underline much of the criticism of the agreement in our national debate. The reasoning is circular and unsupported by empirical evidence. It goes like this. China cannot be deterred from using force, will out-escalate its adversaries and therefore inevitably will dominate the region. In contrast, the determination and stakes are not as high for the US, which means it is pointless and perilous for a regional middle power to provoke the future dominant power rather than accommodate it.
Every government and military undertakes a cost-benefit analysis when it comes to the use of force. That it cannot be certain it will prevail with acceptable cost is why China has not yet gone down that path. Deterrence will be successful if these Chinese doubts grow. On US unreliability, it is easy to make this case given the unconventional nature of the current administration in Washington. Yet look at the evidence rather than commentary. Trump’s transactional bargain with Asian allies is this: do and spend more if you want American presence and protection. That’s not unreasonable in the current strategic circumstances.
Despite the focus on Western hemispheric defence in its official documents, these same documents are also clear that preventing China from dominating the first island chain – an imaginary line that runs from Japan and South Korea through Taiwan and Southeast Asia – remains a fundamental strategic objective. Look at the activities and presence of US forces in Japan, the Philippines, and indeed Australia, and it is clear abandonment is not on the cards.
Besides, it is clear Trump is obsessed about increasing US hard power abroad. AUKUS achieves that for both countries.
There’s a final point about the character of nations. Materially and technologically, we gain significantly from the alliance and agreements such as AUKUS. It is also about how we see the Australian national character and strategic culture. Local voices loudly warn that America is losing the will to contribute public security goods to the world and is retreating, yet tend to push for a similar insular and cautious Australian outlook. That would be a poor choice.