The NATO Summit in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026 marks a significant moment in the Alliance’s history. It takes place at a time when the Euro-Atlantic security order is facing profound challenges: Russia’s ongoing confrontation with the West, which extends far beyond the war against Ukraine, growing strategic competition with China, instability in the Middle East, and uncertainty regarding the long-term role of the United States in Europe all shape an increasingly complex security agenda. Despite rising defence expenditures and a renewed focus on collective and territorial defence, the Atlantic Alliance appears divided and uncertain about its strategic direction.
Against this backdrop, few NATO member states occupy a geopolitical position as pivotal as that of Turkey. The country controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, borders conflict zones such as Syria, Iraq and the South Caucasus and possesses one of the largest armed forces within the Alliance. While many NATO members closely align their foreign and security policies with the positions of Washington and Brussels, Ankara pursues its own version of ‘strategic autonomy’, which differs considerably from similar debates within the European Union. Rather than seeking greater institutional independence from the United States primarily within alliance structures, Turkey’s approach is aimed at maximising national freedom of action both inside and beyond NATO. In an increasingly multipolar international environment, Ankara seeks to maintain relations with competing centres of power simultaneously, thereby expanding its own influence.
Ankara is no longer situated at the margins of the Alliance; rather, it has become both a swing state and a pivotal state within NATO.
This approach is particularly evident in Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Turkey has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Turkish drones played an important role in Ukraine’s defence during the early stages of the war. At the same time, Ankara has refrained from joining Western sanctions against Russia. Moreover, Turkey has repeatedly acted as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, most notably during negotiations over the Black Sea Grain Initiative. While this might have kept channels of communication open between the Alliance and the Kremlin, this attitude has often been regarded as equivocation by other NATO member states.
The NATO Summit in Ankara is therefore likely to spark a broader debate about the Alliance’s future strategic orientation. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has understood itself not only as a defence alliance but increasingly also as a community of democratic values. Turkey challenges this self-image. In October 2019, after a new Turkish military offensive in northern Syria that even the Trump administration condemned as a “threat to peace,” a YouGov survey found that 61% of Germans supported a tougher stance on Turkey, including sanctions and an end to arms exports, while 58% of Germans were even in favour of removing Turkey from NATO. Since 2022, such criticisms have been much more subdued. Differences over the quality of democracy and the centralisation of power are still straining relations between President Erdoğan and many of his European counterparts. The Trump administration appears largely unconcerned by this dispute, however, raising the possibility that the president, despite his well-known scepticism toward the Alliance, may attend the NATO Summit. Such a visit would represent a significant diplomatic and prestige victory for Ankara and showcase Turkish convening power.
The agenda of every NATO Summit is influenced by the preferences of the host country, but the summit in Ankara is especially likely to be shaped by distinctly Turkish priorities. In particular, Ankara can be expected to advocate a deepening of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in order to expand security and defence-industrial cooperation between NATO and its Gulf partners — currently Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, with Oman and Saudi Arabia participating in selected activities. Activities under the ICI framework include defence planning, defence budgeting, the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation and civil preparedness. In light of growing instability across the Middle East, Turkey views this as an opportunity to strengthen the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO+ partners in the Indo-Pacific could also benefit from an expansion of this framework.
At the same time, the Turkish leadership is likely to highlight the growing capabilities of the country’s defence industry. Companies such as Baykar, TUSAŞ, and Roketsan have established themselves as important players in modern military technology and are already making a contribution to NATO’s industrial and technological resilience, including increased cooperation with European NATO members. Ankara will try to leverage this military-industrial might to increase its presence as an irreplaceable partner in the Alliance.
Turkey will seek to present itself in Ankara not merely as the host of the summit, but as a shaping middle power (Gestaltungsmacht) capable of making an independent contribution to NATO’s strategic adaptation to a multipolar world.
Another key focus is likely to be the Black Sea region. Turkey sees itself as a pivotal stabilising power between Europe, Russia, and the Caucasus and is expected to advocate a stronger NATO maritime presence and enhanced coordination in the Black Sea. Turkey leads MCM Black Sea, a mine countermeasures task group to ensure the safety of maritime traffic in the Black Sea and contributes to NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission to deter and defend against Russian drone incursions. These contributions will be leveraged to intensify NATO’s look south by strengthening the Alliance’s Southern Neighbourhood Security Dialogue (held for the first time in Naples in 2022) and by a focus on the Eastern Mediterranean, a region of growing importance to Ankara from both an energy and a security perspective.
The Turkish leadership has repeatedly emphasised that it regards the threats along its southern border as being just as significant as the challenges facing Eastern Europe. The summit therefore provides an opportunity to place Turkish perspectives more firmly on the Alliance’s agenda. In this regard, Ankara is no longer situated at the margins of the Alliance; rather, it has become both a swing state and a pivotal state within NATO. The Ankara Summit may thus be remembered as a multipolar turning point, broadening the Alliance’s strategic outlook beyond its eastern flank. Turkey will seek to present itself in Ankara not merely as the host of the summit, but as a shaping middle power (Gestaltungsmacht) capable of making an independent contribution to NATO’s strategic adaptation to a multipolar world.
In this sense, the summit should also send a signal in favour of a stronger integration of Turkey into the broader European security architecture. While this will not entail a renewed prospect of EU membership, it could facilitate more pragmatic forms of cooperation, particularly in the field of defence-industrial collaboration. Given the challenges facing Europe’s eastern and southern peripheries, closer cooperation between Ankara and Brussels increasingly appears to be in the Alliance’s strategic interest.
In this context, Berlin, a long-standing partner of Turkey, will have an important role to play as an intermediary and facilitator: Germany has deep historical and political ties to Turkey while being the most important driver of European defence integration and having the strongest transatlantic reflexes (and deepest military integration into NATO) of the larger Alliance member states. Berlin plans to have the largest conventional army in Europe by 2039. This ambitious rearmament project — part of Germany’s vaunted Zeitenwende — will deepen security and defence-industrial partnerships around the world, from Poland to Ukraine to South Korea, from the United Kingdom to Israel to Australia. Turkey is bound to benefit from this defence investment spree as well.
NATO+ partners such as Australia should welcome such a renewed commitment of the Alliance to industrial cooperation with like-minded countries. These collaborations might be difficult to get off the ground, but then often become the long-term backbone of bilateral defence partnerships where treaty frameworks are missing. Opportunities abound, as Europe is finally getting to terms with the harsh geopolitical realities and embraces a new, more pragmatic and more realist defence posture.