An era of confrontation and cooperation: Japan's crisis response in a new security landscape

Executive summary

• Over the last decade, Japan has built a stronger system for responding to security crises and can now act faster than it once could.
• Key institutional reforms, notably the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Secretariat (NSS), drove this change.
• In May 2026, Japan followed with one of the most significant intelligence reforms of the postwar era, creating a prime minister-chaired council and a coordinating bureau.
• These reforms have moved Japan’s security decision-making beyond its old reliance on precedent and process, so that it now weighs a wider range of factors.
  • Those factors include legal interpretation, political management, coordination with the United States (and increasingly Australia), military advice and technical expertise.
  • The 2026 Iran war showed both sides of the change. Japan moved quickly where its authority was clear — evacuating nationals and releasing oil reserves — but as of 4 September 2026 had not decided to deploy naval forces to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
• Significant constraints remain. Political sensitivities still limit what leaders can do, the legal framework for emergencies is fragmented, and coordination beyond the core security ministries is weak. Each can cause delay. Even so, there are grounds for cautious optimism.
  • Japan is working on these gaps and is better placed to respond to security threats than it was.
  • It has acquired counterstrike capabilities and, under the Takaichi government, which returned with a landslide majority in February 2026, has shown more willingness to act.
• For Australian policymakers, understanding where Japan’s crisis response system is strong and where it slows matters for our commitment under the 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation to consult each other on contingencies and consider measures in response.

About this report

This report examines Japan’s security crisis decision-making system: the factors that drive it, the constraints that slow it down, and the implications for Australian policymakers. It draws on fieldwork interviews with Japanese officials and experts conducted in Tokyo in February and March 2025 under the United States Studies Centre’s Japan–Australia Dialogue and Exchange for Next Generation (JADE) program, alongside open sources. It extends the author’s chapter in the inaugural JADE Fellows report.¹ Part One examines the drivers of Japan’s crisis decisions and Part Two considers the constraints. The implications that follow are drawn from that analysis.

Scope of the analysis: Crisis response focus

Examining real-time decision-making under pressure sheds light on how Japan manages situations that threaten its national security. The country’s security policy settings have markedly changed, with the establishment of the NSC in 2013 and the NSS in 2014; the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to allow limited collective self-defence (implemented through the 2015 security legislation); and the 2022 publication of three strategic documents — the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. Those documents are themselves under revision, with successors due by the end of 2026.²

Implications for Australian policymakers

For Australia, Japan is an unusually instructive case; a fellow US ally and maritime democracy that has moved further than most in the region to modernise its crisis decision-making. It’s a partner that Canberra has committed to consult in a contingency. How Tokyo decides, and where its system slows, is therefore directly relevant to Australian planning.

That commitment increasingly has machinery behind it. The Framework for Strategic Defence Coordination, established in December 2025, gives the security partnership a standing structure led by defence ministers. And the May 2026 Leaders’ Statement on Enhanced Defence and Security Cooperation sets a working agenda that spans intelligence cooperation to the joint sustainment of the upgraded Mogami-class frigates Australia is buying. In October, the defence ministers also welcomed preparations to use Australian test ranges for Japan’s hypersonic missile programme, following a Japanese survey team’s September visit.These developments take place as the two governments elevate the Special Strategic Partnership around the 50th anniversary of the Basic Treaty.³

This remains the furthest the two countries have gone in promising to act together, and it puts a premium on a clear-eyed view of where Japan’s crisis response is strong and where it slows. Four implications follow.

1. Japan can decide faster than a decade ago, but the bottleneck is recognition. The NSC–NSS framework has shortened the distance between information and decision. Yet Japanese tabletop exercise simulations repeatedly identify the decision to recognise a "situation in which an armed attack is anticipated" as the most contested moment in a crisis. This is the step most likely to be prolonged.⁴ An early Japanese commitment therefore cannot be assumed while a crisis is still ambiguous, and plans that depend on one rest on the part of the system most prone to delay.
2. What Japan can lawfully do is category-dependent. The same request for assistance or coordinated action may be one Japan can meet in one declared situation and not in another, so the legal category in force — and when it is declared — shapes what is possible.
3. Coordination beyond core security ministries is where delays are most likely. Sectionalism has narrowed inside Japan’s security ministries but persists across the wider bureaucracy. A contingency would draw in evacuation, shipping, infrastructure and health portfolios, along with local and prefectural governments.
4. Civil protection is the clearest point of practical overlap. The two countries’ nationals, airlift and sealift needs would overlap in a regional contingency. Japan’s planning to evacuate its southwest islands, alongside Australia’s own experience of large-scale evacuations, marks a field for shared lessons and coordinated planning.

Japan can decide faster than a decade ago, but the bottleneck is recognition.

Part one: Decision-making drivers in Japan’s security crisis response

Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy sounds a stark warning: “the free, open, and stable international order… is now at stake… [W]e are in an era where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined…”⁵ Facing this environment, Japan is strengthening its ability to protect itself against the gravest threats to its security. But how effectively would a country, which has not faced armed conflict since the end of the Second World War, be able to respond to an existential security crisis? What obstacles would stand in its way?

Political, bureaucratic and legal obstacles persist, and Part Two examines them. But Japan has strengthened its crisis response framework, improving its capacity for swift, decisive and agile crisis management. Part One traces the institutions behind this change and the wider range of considerations they now bring into the Japanese Government’s decisions.

Defining security crises

This report defines a ‘security crisis’ as a situation in which the fundamental safety and security of a nation, its citizens or its critical infrastructure is imminently threatened or has been compromised.⁶ This definition encompasses the various scenarios identified in Japanese policy and planning documents, such as ‘armed attack situations’; ‘survival-threatening situations’ — where an armed attack against a foreign country closely related to Japan occurs, threatening Japan’s existence and the fundamental rights of its people; and ‘grey-zone situations’ — including hostile conduct that does not cross the threshold of an armed attack but still threatens Japan’s security.⁷

Adapting to security crises: Building the crisis machinery

Constrained by a deeply pacifist political environment following the Second World War, Japan began to recognise the need for a more systematic approach to crisis management in the early 1980s, prompted by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the Soviet military build-up in the Far East that sharpened Cold War tensions.⁸ As a result, Japan established the first iteration of its Security Council in 1986.

The Security Council replaced the National Defense Council that had operated since 1956. It was a deliberative body for the political and civilian control of defence policy, built around a nine-minister meeting chaired by the prime minister, with a mandate to cover serious emergency situations. In practice it approved decisions that had already been made rather than shaping them, its nine-minister format was too unwieldy for fast-moving events, and it lacked a strong secretariat.⁹

The 1990s saw the further development of Japan’s crisis response capabilities in response to events such as the Gulf Crisis, the Kobe earthquake and the Tokyo subway sarin attack. The Gulf Crisis in particular had a large impact. Japan’s response was criticised at home and abroad as ad hoc, reactive and incoherent, and a contemporary postmortem traced the failure to a “malfunctioning internal crisis management system.”¹⁰ The bottom-up, consensus-building process was too slow for a crisis that demanded top-down decisions, and Prime Minister Kaifu reportedly barred his cabinet from even mentioning the Self-Defense Forces when options were discussed.¹¹ These events highlighted the need for stronger leadership and coordination than the Security Council had provided, resulting in the creation of a crisis management centre in the prime minister’s office and the Cabinet Information Collection Centre in 1996, and the post of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management in 1998.¹²

Then-US President Barack Obama (R) pauses as he speaks during a joint press conference in the Rose Garden with Japan's then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on 28 April 2015, in Washington, DC, where the update to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation was announced. (Photo by MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images)

Precedent as a foundation

Although Japan has reformed its crisis response architecture, particularly over the last ten years, the underlying decision-making culture has changed more slowly. Japanese decision-makers have typically responded to security crises by following established procedures, reflecting a strong preference for stability and continuity.⁴² Tokyo has often looked to past experiences for guidance, seeking to avoid the mistakes of previous administrations. This reliance on process and norms stems from the Japanese Government’s 19th century continental European origins, which sought predictable governance by adhering to rules and procedures.⁴³

Japan’s preference for relying on procedures has led its decision-makers to prefer a consensus-based approach to navigating crises.⁴⁴ Practices such as nemawashi (informal consultations) and ringisei (formal approval process) ensure that response proposals are circulated and revised within the bureaucracy to establish broad agreement before implementation.⁴⁵

This reliance on procedures and processes, although labour-intensive, would help the Japanese Government implement the planned response.⁴⁶ MOD and MOFA prepare standing internal procedures for responding quickly to crisis events such as the firing of North Korean missiles.⁴⁷ Events that exceed routine handling rise to the Cabinet’s standing crisis machinery and, for security matters, to the NSC, whose emergency ministerial meeting format was used for the first time during the COVID-19 pandemic.⁴⁸

When a crisis event occurs, a pre-prepared procedural response framework is activated. MOD and MOFA staff quickly establish agency operations centres, gather and share information, and await orders from principals.⁴⁹ Responders have been trained to react promptly and remain attuned to leadership demands, which allows for the fast implementation of decisions. For example, in the event of a North Korean missile launch, MOFA and MOD officials would immediately proceed with countermeasures because they have trained for various scenarios — taking into account factors such as the type of missile, launch timing, trajectory and landing point.⁵⁰ This coordination extends beyond Japan to cooperation with the United States.⁵¹

The strengths of this reliance on process and procedure include the Japanese Government’s ability to ensure thorough consideration, reduce the risk of impulsive actions and reduce internal friction.⁵² But in a security environment of rapid technological change and unpredictable adversaries, Japan faces a growing number of security challenges for which its established protocols and past experiences offer inadequate guidance.⁵³

Japan's crisis-management system has often struggled to confront difficult trade-offs and low-probability contingencies in advance, allowing some risks to be treated as unforeseen rather than incorporated into planning.

When confronted with rapidly evolving and complex threats, relying on precedent and process can lead to bureaucratic inertia, slow responses and a reluctance to try new approaches.⁵⁴ Japan’s crisis-management system has often struggled to confront difficult trade-offs and low-probability contingencies in advance, allowing some risks to be treated as unforeseen rather than incorporated into planning. Fragmented responsibilities and the difficulty of building interagency consensus can compound these delays.⁵⁵ The Sakishima case illustrates the time it can take the Japanese Government to translate a recognised contingency risk into concrete, nationally coordinated arrangements. Following tabletop exercises from FY2022, the Japanese Government published an initial framework in March 2025 for evacuating approximately 120,000 people from the Sakishima chain in the event of conflict in the region.⁵⁶

Novel threats — such as cyber-attacks and grey-zone incidents — expose the limitations of Japan’s security frameworks.⁵⁷ These incidents force a departure from established practices and demand rapid, agile responses beyond the scope of traditional precedent. The strong emphasis on predefined responses can also crowd out flexible, creative responses to unforeseen crises.⁵⁸ The institutions described above — and especially the NSC and NSS — have been introduced in an attempt to address these limits. On 1 October 2026, provisions strengthening public–private cyber cooperation and authorising access and neutralisation measures against serious cyberattacks entered into force, subject to statutory safeguards.

Expanding the spectrum of decision-making drivers

With the NSC and NSS at the centre of this architecture, Japan has been able to more systematically broaden the range of factors considered in security decision-making, moving beyond precedent and process to take in a fuller analysis of security threats and crises. These factors include:

• Legal deliberation and constitutional interpretation
• Managing political constraint
• Integrated alliance coordination
• Enhanced strategic military counsel
• Integrated technical expertise.

Legal deliberation and constitutional interpretation

As long-standing drivers of Tokyo’s security crisis response, Japan’s Constitution, laws and administrative regulations have served as guardrails constraining decision-making response options.⁵⁹ Tokyo’s approach to national security has traditionally been characterised by a strong adherence to pacifist principles enshrined in the Constitution, particularly Article 9, which renounces war and the maintenance of war potential. As a result, there has been a deep-seated aversion to the use of force. It also led to a restrictive interpretation of permissible military actions, limiting the JSDF to defensive operations .⁶⁰

However, the establishment of the NSC and NSS has strengthened the integration of expert legal analysis into security deliberations, making legal considerations — including those relating to constitutional interpretations — more systematically integrated into security crisis response decisions.⁶¹ NSC meetings — particularly the expanded nine-minister meeting — provide platforms for discussing complex issues, where legal implications form part of the deliberation.⁶²

Further, the NSS facilitates interagency legal consultations and integrates legal perspectives for the NSC’s deliberation of security policy.⁶³ The NSS’s mandate is broad, and legal questions fall within it whenever a policy has significant legal implications. By bringing together bureaucrats from the security-related ministries, including those with legal expertise or those whose portfolios have significant legal dimensions, the NSS builds legal expertise into policy development from the start.⁶⁴ For example, when discussing defence policy, the MOD’s legal expertise would be important, and for foreign policy matters, MOFA’s legal advisors would be consulted.⁶⁵

An example of the NSC and NSS facilitating legal deliberation is the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9. For nearly 70 years following the Second World War, the Japanese Government maintained that Article 9 of its Constitution prohibited the exercise of the right to collective self-defence, meaning Japan could only use force when directly attacked.⁶⁶ Responding to a deteriorating security environment, the Abe administration sought to reinterpret Article 9 to allow a limited right of collective self-defence.⁶⁷

The NSC and NSS were central to enabling the reinterpretation. The NSS assisted the advisory panel that recommended reinterpreting the Constitution, and senior NSS staff supported the interparty negotiations that preceded the July 2014 cabinet decision. Following this, the NSS formed a team of 30 staffers to prepare drafts for the new national security laws. One sub-team managed interagency coordination, while the other worked on laws requiring revision.⁶⁸

The same architecture shaped a later decision. In December 2022 the Kishida administration (2021 to 2024) committed Japan to acquiring long-range counterstrike missiles capable of hitting military targets such as launch sites in an adversary’s territory.⁶⁹ The capability was circumscribed as it was acquired. Any counterstrike must satisfy the three conditions for the use of force that the 2014 decision revised rather than discarded — an armed attack on Japan, or on a close partner such that Japan’s survival is threatened; no other available means of averting it; and force limited to the minimum necessary.⁷⁰ Pre-emption is not permitted. Japan’s ‘anticipated armed-attack situation’ allows deployment before an attack occurs, but not a strike against a gathering threat. Nor, in principle, may force be used until the Cabinet designates one of the statutory situations and obtains Diet approval. For an armed-attack situation, that approval may follow the decision in an emergency.⁷¹ Kishida’s counterstrike policy shows legal interpretation being built into a major security policy. Arguably, during a security crisis the Japanese administration would take a similarly integrated approach, ensuring its response was defensible in law as well as strategy.

Managing political constraint

In addition to legal factors, political considerations also shape Japan’s security decision-making. The NSC–NSS framework has strengthened Japan’s ability to integrate political factors into its security decision-making processes. These political factors include domestic public opinion, coalition management and inter-party dynamics, and integrated alliance coordination. The NSC creates a dedicated space for political deliberation within the decision-making process, allowing the prime minister and key ministers to anticipate and mitigate potential political risks. Additionally, the NSS — through its interagency coordination function — provides a means for the prime minister to quickly receive integrated political information.⁷²

Another enduring legacy of Japan’s Second World War experience is a strong historical sensitivity towards issues of military force and national security among the Japanese public.⁷³ That sensitivity has proved durable even as most of the public sees Japan as exposed to security threats. In the Cabinet Office’s most recent defence survey, conducted in November–December 2025, 44.7% said the Self-Defense Forces should be reinforced while 50.1% judged the current level adequate. The Cabinet Office cautions that methodological differences prevent direct comparison with earlier rounds, although 44.7% is the highest level it has recorded. That balance has held even though four in five still perceive a danger of Japan being attacked or drawn into war.⁷⁴

Japanese administrations have not only focused on justifying their security policymaking, but have also proactively shaped the political environment in which it applies. Some have clearly described to the public the threats Japan faced and what it needed to do to protect its own security.⁷⁵ A case in point was the Kishida administration’s framing of the Ukraine war as “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” first delivered in June 2022 and repeated throughout 2023.⁷⁶ This conceptualisation linked the European conflict to Japan’s security concerns in its region, suggesting a deliberate effort to educate the public about the need for preparedness.⁷⁷ The Kishida administration defined the issue as fundamental to Japan’s national security, which helped bolster public support for security and defence policies that would have been considered too controversial in the past.⁷⁸

The 2014 Article 9 reinterpretation, discussed above for its legal dimension, also demonstrates the NSC–NSS framework doing political work. During the drafting of the new national security laws, the NSC was a crucial element of the Abe administration’s management of the relationship between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner Kōmeitō.⁷⁹ The Abe administration used the ruling party’s political capital to garner support from its coalition partner and opposition parties, while also engaging in public diplomacy to explain the necessity of the new laws.⁸⁰

In an example from 2023, circumstantial evidence suggests that Kishida drew on Abe’s NSC–NSS framework as part of his toolkit while seeking Kōmeitō agreement on the export of internationally co-developed next-generation fighter jets to third countries.⁸¹ The process combined executive policy formulation with separate coalition bargaining. Kishida said that the Japanese Government would prepare its position and asked the coalition policy chiefs to conduct consultations. Government officials supplied explanations and draft formulations, while the joint Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–Kōmeitō working team and the parties’ policy chiefs conducted coalition negotiations.⁸² This process broadly resembled the two-track process used in 2014–2015, when the NSS led executive drafting while party figures conducted coalition negotiations.⁸³ The resulting compromise was formalised through Cabinet and NSC decisions on 26 March 2024, which allowed future direct transfers of the fighter only to countries covered by an agreement or arrangement with Japan requiring UN Charter-compliant use, excluded countries in which fighting was taking place as part of an armed conflict, and required a separate Cabinet decision for each transfer.⁸⁴

This coalition-management constraint has since shifted. Japan’s political parties had already converged by the mid-2010s on the view that North Korea and China pose serious threats, narrowing security policy debate.⁸⁵ In April 2026, the Takaichi Cabinet — acting on a ruling-coalition proposal, and after February’s landslide election — revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and their implementation guidelines. The Japanese Government abolished the ‘five categories’ rule that had restricted certain finished-equipment transfers to rescue, transport, vigilance, surveillance and minesweeping, and expanded permitted exports of lethal weapons, subject to a prohibition on transfers to countries in active armed conflict that itself allows exceptions.⁸⁶

But public opinion did not support the change. Asked in late 2025 about promoting transfers under the rules then in force, 68.2% were positive.⁸⁷ On the rule changes themselves, a Yomiuri survey published the day before the Cabinet decision in April 2026 found 49% opposed and 40% in favour.⁸⁸ Although the public backed the previous, more restrictive framework, it split against expanding lethal-weapons exports. The measure proceeded regardless — it required no parliamentary authorisation, and the Cabinet rejected opposition demands for advance notification of large exports, settling instead on informing the Diet only after decisions have been taken. Takaichi defended the measure in an X post, insisting there was “absolutely no change” in Japan’s commitment to the path it has taken as a peaceful nation. Under the revised framework, decisions on lethal exports are to be examined by the NSC and confined to the 17 countries holding transfer agreements with Japan.⁸⁹ Arguably, this episode indicates that public opinion constrains the presentation and pace of security policy more than its substance. The NSC–NSS framework gives the executive an avenue to deliberate how best to manage public opinion.⁹⁰

Public opinion constrains the presentation and pace of security policy more than its substance.

On the international front, the NSC has assisted Japan in navigating complex international political dynamics. The 2026 Iran war offers a recent example. The Japanese Government moved quickly on the steps within its authority — evacuating nationals and then releasing oil reserves. But, despite pressure from the United States to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the administration had not decided to deploy the Maritime Self-Defense Force to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz as of 4 September 2026. On 19 October, Kyodo reported that plans to extend Japan’s existing Middle East information-gathering mission continued to exclude the Strait of Hormuz.⁹¹ The legal and political obstacles behind that hesitation are examined in Part Two.

In a contingency, the same factors would be at play before a decision was taken. The NSC would weigh political support within the coalition, public tolerance and expectations from the United States, alongside legal and operational advice. The NSS would assemble that picture for the prime minister.

Integrated alliance coordination

The NSC–NSS framework has also improved coordination with the United States and like-minded countries such as Australia, enhancing crisis response capabilities and ensuring a unified approach to regional security threats.⁹² When information important to decision-making is shared in advance, it reduces the risk of miscalculation. In emergencies, the NSC can use hotlines between Tokyo and Washington to facilitate timely security and crisis coordination.⁹³

Beyond immediate crisis management, the NSC–NSS framework is a critical facilitator in building security and defence relations. It has deepened strategic alignment with the United States and like-minded countries, particularly in areas such as maritime security and cyber defence.⁹⁴ The alignment rests on regular high-level dialogues and joint exercises.⁹⁵ Additionally, mechanisms such as the Alliance Coordination Mechanism handle the practical requirements for this kind of cooperation, including coordinating necessary approvals for joint activities.⁹⁶

For example, Japan’s National Security Adviser regularly meets with foreign counterparts, especially the US National Security Adviser, to consult on strategic planning.⁹⁷ Japan has institutionalised this formula with India and the United Kingdom, and used it with Russia before 2022.⁹⁸ These institutionalised interactions build a network of relationships between Japan and partners, supporting mutual understanding and coordination in a crisis.⁹⁹

Enhanced strategic military counsel

As discussed above, Japan’s historically ingrained pacifism and aversion to the appearance of militarism have traditionally limited the role of the JSDF in crisis management. However, since the 1995 Kobe earthquake, when a slow initial mobilisation drew criticism and the relief effort that followed won public gratitude, the JSDF has gradually played a more active role, winning greater public acceptance of its involvement in non-combat roles such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.¹⁰⁰ This gradual shift has also paved the way for a more accepted role for senior military officers to provide strategic military counsel to political decision-makers.¹⁰¹

The NSC facilitates direct access for military leaders to offer their expertise and perspectives on critical security issues. The prime minister is authorised to invite JSDF officers to NSC meetings when their expertise is required, and during NSC emergency ministerial meetings, there is a permanent seat at the table for a JSDF representative.¹⁰² This direct channel ensures political leaders have timely access to advice on military capabilities, risks and operational considerations. For example, in a scenario involving a North Korean missile launch, the Joint Staff Chief could be expected to brief the prime minister as assessments of the missile’s trajectory and impact became available. This illustrates the kind of direct military advice that the NSC–NSS framework is designed to make available during a fast-moving contingency.¹⁰³

Further, JSDF officers are also posted to the NSS, enhancing the integration of strategic military counsel into national security discussions at the working level.¹⁰⁴ This integration includes providing expertise in threat assessments, operational planning and evaluating military capabilities.¹⁰⁵ The presence of JSDF officers in the NSS also improves civil-military interaction. This can help bridge gaps in understanding between civilian policymakers and uniformed military personnel, ensuring policy decisions are made with a clearer appreciation of military realities and constraints.¹⁰⁶

Sanae Takaichi, Prime Minister of Japan observes participants demonstrating disaster response capabilities alongside Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force and Japanese government and civilian emergency responders during Big Rescue Kanagawa 2026 at Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, Sept. 1, 2026. The exercise is a disaster prevention drill primarily focused on medical relief activities, conducted by Kanagawa Prefecture and Atsugi City in cooperation with medical and disaster prevention organizations, alongside the U.S. Armed Forces. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Julian Batista)

Integrated technical expertise

Finally, the NSC–NSS framework has facilitated the integration of a broader range of expert and technical advice in security crisis decision-making than was previously the case.¹⁰⁷ Prior to the NSC’s establishment, security crisis decisions relied heavily on career bureaucrats who had developed subject matter expertise, leading to a limited range of perspectives and potential blind spots.¹⁰⁸ The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami exposed these gaps.¹⁰⁹

The NSC and NSS fill these gaps by soliciting input from external experts, including academics, researchers and private sector specialists, bringing outside viewpoints and current technical expertise into policy decisions.¹¹⁰ For example, an expert advisory panel was established in February 2023 under the Cabinet Secretariat’s economic security legislation preparation office to examine establishing a security-clearance system. Similarly, an expert panel established in February 2013 advised on the design of the NSC.¹¹¹

During the drafting of the three security-related documents in 2022, the Kishida administration integrated expert recommendations into the final policy. Instead of assembling a conventional expert panel reporting at arm’s length, then NSS Director-General Takeo Akiba and his staff drew on the recommendations of more than 50 outside experts.¹¹² This approach fed into the Cabinet’s decisions to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP and to adopt a strategy that went beyond the previous focus on defence buildup.¹¹³ Ryōichi Oriki — a former JSDF Chief of Staff and member of the Expert Panel on the Establishment of the National Security Council — argues that the Kishida administration used the NSC and NSS to advance Japan’s defence policy further than he had expected.¹¹⁴ In a crisis, the NSC–NSS framework would feed expert views into response deliberations.

The shift towards broader decision-making drivers represents an evolution rather than a break from tradition. Precedent and process remain important, but the NSC–NSS framework integrates the other factors more systematically and consistently. How quickly that machinery moves in practice, though, depends on constraints that sit outside it. Part Two turns to those.

Part two: Constraints in Japan’s security crisis response

These changes to Japan’s security architecture and decision-making processes give decision-makers the primary tools they need to respond more swiftly, decisively and with agility to security crises. But enduring political, legal and bureaucratic obstacles remain.

Political leadership and public support

Effective security crisis management requires a well-informed and decisive executive, capable of issuing clear directives to ministries and agencies and communicating appropriately with the public.¹¹⁵ While prime minister, Abe displayed strong leadership in framing much of the crisis response architecture and overcoming public opposition to implement necessary reforms. These developments formed part of a broader centralisation of foreign and security policy decision-making in the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Office under Abe, including through the NSC and NSS.¹¹⁶ Since Abe’s tenure, former Prime Minister Kishida also implemented security reforms and further developed the security crisis response architecture.¹¹⁷ He drove the December 2022 strategy overhaul, the decisions to acquire counterstrike capabilities and lift defence spending towards 2% of GDP, and, in March 2024, the easing of defence-export rules over coalition hesitancy.¹¹⁸

Japan would be most likely to respond swiftly and decisively under strong leadership, particularly if facing an existential crisis where the threat to sovereignty is clear and immediate, such as a missile attack on a Japanese city. Such a crisis would arguably prompt a strong defensive response, lest the Japanese Government be accused by its public of not defending Japan.

Without strong leadership, Japan's response would almost certainly be delayed or weakened — particularly if facing an ambiguous or less directly threatening security situation.

But without strong leadership, Japan’s response would almost certainly be delayed or weakened — particularly if facing an ambiguous or less directly threatening security situation. First, the prime minister’s standing and that of their party are central to the administration’s ability to project leadership.¹¹⁹ An unstable political foundation would undermine the prime minister’s ability to make decisions, especially ones that push the boundaries of Japan’s security policy settings or processes — a vulnerability on display during the minority governments of 2024 and 2025, led for most of that period by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.¹²⁰

Second, strong leadership is necessary to navigate the political process quickly. A clear and immediate threat could be expected to shorten, but not eliminate, political bargaining. Past security cases, such as Japan’s response to the Iraq War in 2003, show that strong prime-ministerial leadership can accelerate Cabinet, coalition and Diet processes.¹²¹ But simulations conducted on how the NSC would likely function during a contingency highlight that the timing of recognising a ‘situation in which an armed attack is anticipated’ is particularly problematic.¹²² Political sensitivities to the use of force could lead to hesitation and risk aversion among policymakers for fear of prompting an escalation of tensions.

Third, strong leadership is necessary to maintain public support for the response.¹²³ That support has measurable limits. In a Yomiuri poll conducted in February–March 2024, 69% opposed the staged tax increases planned to fund Japan’s five-year defence buildup under the December 2022 Defense Buildup Program, against 28% in favour — even as 84% of the same respondents felt that Japan’s security was under threat.¹²⁴ Nor did support for the capability itself grow as it was acquired: backing for counterstrike capabilities stood at 57%, down slightly from 62% in a survey taken in July 2022, months before the December 2022 commitment.¹²⁵ The administration’s crisis response may be slowed by a lack of public support for offensive operations or sustaining military and civilian casualties.¹²⁶ But in a contingency, there would quite likely be resistance from some of the public to deploying the JSDF beyond strictly defensive or disaster relief operations — particularly if the administration is not able to clearly explain why it is in Japan’s interests to do so.¹²⁷

Administrations may seek to avoid sparking a political backlash, such as anti-government or anti-US demonstrations.¹²⁸ Successive administrations have accordingly avoided actions that might be perceived as Japan returning to militarism or violating the Constitution, reassuring the public by emphasising continuity with past practice — categorising the 2009 anti-piracy deployment as a law-enforcement response to crime by non-state actors, and so not military action prohibited by the Constitution.¹²⁹

Finally, public sensitivities ensure there is a high degree of political scrutiny of decisions to deploy the JSDF, particularly overseas.¹³⁰ The 2026 Iran war showed scrutiny operating even under a strong government. Tokyo moved quickly on evacuations and energy security but had not decided to deploy vessels to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz as of 4 September 2026.¹³¹ The political sensitivities in Japan surrounding the use of force and overseas military activity ensure that any major JSDF deployment is likely to involve prolonged engagement with the Diet to define the parameters of the deployment, even if the strict legal requirement for prior approval might not apply in every situation.¹³²

Further, coalition dynamics could play a crucial, and possibly time-consuming, role.¹³³ These dynamics shifted in late 2025, when Kōmeitō ended its 26-year partnership with the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party replaced it as coalition partner.¹³⁴ They shifted again at the February 2026 election, when the LDP won 316 of 465 seats — a two-thirds majority in its own right and sufficient to override the upper house, where the LDP continues to lack a majority.¹³⁵ Kōmeitō’s lower-house members had joined a new opposition bloc, which was reduced to 49 seats in that election. For now the LDP does not depend on its coalition partner’s votes in the lower house and so the parliamentary constraints described here have arguably eased.¹³⁶

A fragmented legal framework

Japan’s fragmented legal framework for emergency response is another potential source of delay and confusion in a crisis.¹³⁷ Effective security crisis management requires a legal framework that is clear, comprehensive and flexible — one that defines roles and authorities, covers the range of crises and their phases, and enables cooperation across agencies.¹³⁸

In Japan, historical legacies and constitutional constraints have led to a fragmented crisis management system with distinct legal frameworks for different types of threats. Japan recognises two broad categories of crisis: ‘disaster management’ (bōsai)¹³⁹ addressing natural and technological disasters; and ‘civil protection’ (kokumin-hogo),¹⁴⁰ which covers human-made crises, such as armed attacks and terrorism. These hazards are further divided into sub-categories, each with specific laws and authorities.

This compartmentalised approach complicates crisis response, especially during novel or complex emergencies with overlapping threats. For example, the same type of damage, such as infrastructure destruction, might trigger different responses and support mechanisms depending on whether it is classified as a disaster or a civil protection event.¹⁴¹ This requires Tokyo to make a clear determination of the hazard type before acting, potentially delaying response efforts. The Japanese Government’s response to COVID-19 illustrates how an unforeseen emergency had to be fitted into statutes designed for other infectious-disease risks.¹⁴² In this case a fragmented legal framework was adapted, but that adaptation took place incrementally during a fast-moving crisis.

Likewise, the ambiguous authorisation process for resorting to military force could hinder swift action. Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war and the threat or use of force, limiting Japan’s military response options.¹⁴³ Japan has developed a set of guiding principles for authorising military force while upholding constitutional restrictions. These are the ‘New Three Conditions’ (shin san-yōken), recast following the 2014 reinterpretation, which reflect a narrow reading of self-defence and lay down strict conditions for the use of force.¹⁴⁴

1. Japan must be facing an armed attack against itself or a closely related country, which threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning the people’s rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
2. Force can only be used as a last resort when no other appropriate means are available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and the protection of its people.
3. The use of force must be limited to the minimum extent necessary for self-defence.¹⁴⁵

The limits of these thresholds continue to be debated. In November 2025 Prime Minister Takaichi told the Diet that a blockade using warships and accompanied by the use of force could amount to a survival-threatening situation, while a blockade by civilian vessels alone would not, and that a determination would depend on the circumstances. The remarks drew a sharp diplomatic and economic reaction from Beijing.¹⁴⁶

In an ambiguous crisis, however, political and practical difficulties may be the initial constraining factor, rather than debate over the applicable legal category. Satoru Mori from Keio University argues that under the 2015 security legislation, the Japanese Government would assess the operational requirements created by a particular contingency and then determine which legally defined situation applied.¹⁴⁷ This assumption illustrates how operational and legal deliberation could proceed in parallel. This analysis suggests that if a novel crisis did not fit comfortably within an existing statutory category, the Japanese Government might test the interpretive limits of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act (JP) while seeking a legally available response. Whether it could do so, and whether that interpretation would withstand legal and public scrutiny, would depend on the facts of the contingency.¹⁴⁸

The 2026 Iran war provides a useful test case. As of early August, the Japanese Government has avoided identifying a domestic legal category that would authorise a deployment to the Strait of Hormuz. It has judged escort duty under the maritime security provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (JP) impracticable and concluded that clearing mines before a complete ceasefire would breach the Japanese Government’s interpretation of Article 9 as it would constitute a use of force exceeding the minimum necessary for self-defence.¹⁴⁹ Further, public opinion was divided when the war first broke out and hardened against dispatch as the fighting paused in June.¹⁵⁰

Rather than testing the interpretive limits of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act (JP), this case shows Japan looking for a narrower authority. As of early August 2026, the Japanese Government has identified the removal of abandoned mines after a ceasefire as an activity requiring no situation designation, because it treats such removal as falling outside the use of force prohibited by Article 9.¹⁵¹

The persistence of bureaucratic sectionalism

Effective responses to security crises also depend on coordination across government and here as well Japan’s record is uneven.¹⁵² Among the international security-focused ministries — the MOD, MOFA, Cabinet Secretariat, and increasingly, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry — the NSC–NSS framework has greatly strengthened cooperation and coordination.¹⁵³ In 2024, Oriki noted that over the last ten years the NSC had eliminated the barriers to cooperation between the MOD and MOFA. Today, MOFA and MOD officials meet daily to discuss security-related issues and are in constant communication on threats such as North Korea’s missile program.¹⁵⁴

The NSC has also bridged the gap between diplomatic and defence strategy.¹⁵⁵ As a result, cooperation between diplomacy and defence has strengthened — leading to achievements such as the formulation of three security-related documents at the end of 2022. This alignment was seen during the Kishida administration. Prime Minister Kishida was the first Japanese prime minister to attend a NATO summit, in Madrid in June 2022, concluded reciprocal access agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom, and signed the renewed Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in October 2022.¹⁵⁶

Former Prime Minister of Japan, Kishida Fumio and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attend the Ceremonial Welcome on 22 October 2022 in Perth, Australia, before signing the renewed Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. (Photo by Stefan Gosatti/Getty Images)

However, commentators still observe vertical divisions and poor coordination (known as tatewari gyōsei — bureaucratic sectionalism) among the wider non-security related ministries and agencies.¹⁵⁷ This culture, rooted in historical practices that gave considerable autonomy to individual ministries, prioritises individual agency interests and autonomy over broader government goals. Public administration scholars Hiroko Shimada-Logie and Atsushi Konishi argue that the Japanese bureaucracy continues to struggle with the prioritisation of individual ministry interests, hindering effective cross-departmental coordination.¹⁵⁸

Bureaucratic sectionalism threatens effective security crisis management because it jeopardises interagency coordination and cooperation during complex, cross-cutting crises.¹⁵⁹ Beyond the core international security-focused ministries, there is reportedly still a lack of trust and understanding about security crisis management.¹⁶⁰ Managing a complex security crisis would involve multiple ministries and agencies with distinct jurisdictions and priorities. While interagency planning and training are increasingly taking place at prefectural and local levels, whether they extend beyond the security-focused agencies to the wider bureaucracy will determine how much interagency trust and understanding is available in a crisis.¹⁶¹

Civil protection is where that gap would likely show the most. Resident evacuation is triggered by the recognition of an anticipated armed attack situation — a political judgement taken before any attack occurs — and carried out by prefectural and municipal governments.¹⁶² Yet the official account of roles sets out the main civil protection measures without showing how they fit into the wider armed attack response, leaving the agencies involved without a shared picture of the tasks that would arise, or of whether the people and equipment needed could actually be found. The May 2026 intelligence reform shows Japan acting on this problem in one cross-ministerial domain. However, the reform does not reach the wider ministries whose coordination is the central challenge.¹⁶³

Although not a security threat, Japan’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how these bureaucratic hurdles can impede a national-level emergency response.¹⁶⁴ The Japanese Government’s response was marred by a lack of coordination between central and local governments and between prefectural and municipal governments in infectious disease control.¹⁶⁵ The ministries moved quickly once they received orders from political and departmental leaders, but without this direction, agencies were unable to respond to the emergency.¹⁶⁶

Japan’s COVID-19 experience shows that even in the face of a national emergency, the ingrained nature of bureaucratic sectionalism can impede a coordinated response. It is possible that similar challenges could surface in responding to a complex security crisis.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the nation’s sense of urgency would be far greater if Japan were under attack from a hostile power and this could provide momentum to overcome ministry self-interest.¹⁶⁸

Interconnections between constraints

Bureaucratic silos beyond the core security agencies exacerbate the ambiguities of the fragmented legal framework, while political sensitivities shape the interpretation and application of those same laws.

These political, legal and bureaucratic constraints are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Bureaucratic silos beyond the core security agencies exacerbate the ambiguities of the fragmented legal framework, while political sensitivities shape the interpretation and application of those same laws. Together, these constraints would likely slow the Japanese Government’s initial response — particularly if the administration were politically weak, that is, commanding thin margins or a minority in the Diet, holding low public approval, or resting on a fragile coalition. Under the Takaichi government’s supermajority, securing the agreement of the ruling parties is less of a constraint than under the preceding minority administrations.¹⁶⁹ Nonetheless the standing of the prime minister and the cohesion of the coalition would continue to shape how quickly a response could be agreed.

These constraints, however, are not insurmountable barriers but obstacles being actively addressed. While the system would likely face structural limitations and delays in formulating an initial response to a security crisis, improvements and growing capabilities position Japan to be able to respond in a swift, decisive and agile manner once given the green light to act. In a truly existential security crisis, the political will to overcome any obstacles to defend the nation would be high, as would fear of the political costs of being seen to have failed. Added to this, likely external pressure (gaiatsu) from the United States — public calls to act, expectations of alliance contribution, requests for specific support — which Tokyo has a long record of responding to, would also contribute to the Japanese Government’s sense of urgency to act.¹⁷⁰

Critiques of the reformed system

The reforms implemented since 2013 have strengthened the Prime Minister’s Office, helping it overcome the vertical divisions between bureaucracies and accelerate decision-making.¹⁷¹ However, speed alone is not a sufficient measure of an effective crisis response. Centralised leadership can also compress consultation and reduce the influence of bureaucratic expertise, potentially weakening the quality and implementation of decisions.¹⁷²

The 2026 intelligence reform — an extension of this centralising trajectory — highlights one risk in particular: a closed-loop decision-making process. The newly established National Intelligence Council’s membership overlaps with the NSC’s nine-minister meeting. Compared with that meeting, the council adds the justice and financial-services portfolios while omitting internal affairs, with the remaining positions overlapping.¹⁷³ Takatoshi Oyama of Kyushu Institute of Technology warns that overlap between intelligence curation and policymaking increases the risk that information will be shaped to fit preferred conclusions. He therefore advocates for structured accountability and institutionalised challenge analysis as safeguards against groupthink.¹⁷⁴

The Japanese Government maintains that separate meetings and secretariats will preserve the functional distinction between intelligence assessment and policy formation.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, some administration officials have reportedly expressed concern that placing the new National Intelligence Bureau on the same footing as the NSS could lead to overlapping requests for information from ministries, blur lines of authority and create operational confusion.¹⁷⁶ These concerns do not negate the value of stronger central coordination, but they do identify a possible failure point. The system may reach decisions quickly on the basis of an incomplete, mistaken or insufficiently challenged assessment.

A related concern is external oversight. The 2026 National Intelligence Council Establishment Act (JP) does not establish either a dedicated parliamentary oversight mechanism or an independent review body. The Japanese Government’s position is that the Act reorganises coordination without conferring new investigative powers, and that ministerial direction through a prime minister-chaired council strengthens democratic control.¹⁷⁷ Commentators Philip Shetler-Jones and Masashi Umehara similarly argue that this arrangement makes the prime minister more directly accountable for intelligence priorities.¹⁷⁸ But the additional assurances secured during Diet consideration took the form of a ministerial undertaking and supplementary resolutions rather than provisions in the Act itself.¹⁷⁹ As Yoshiki Kobayashi of the Institute of Information Security cautions, the reform’s long-term success will depend on embedding stronger intelligence capabilities in a durable culture of accountability.¹⁸⁰

Taken together, these critiques suggest that the reforms’ crisis-response advantage lies in speed and coordination, but that their effectiveness will also depend on preserving independent analysis, clear lines of authority and credible oversight.

Conclusion: From reactive to proactive security settings

This report has argued that Japan has strengthened — primarily through the NSC–NSS framework — its capacity to respond to existential security threats over the past decade. These bodies changed how Japan makes security decisions. The old approach was fragmented and bound by precedent, whereas decisions now run through a coordinating structure, and the prime minister has more power and backing to act quickly in a crisis. The NSC and NSS also widened the range of factors that go into security deliberations. These include legal interpretation, political considerations, military advice, coordination with the United States (and increasingly with Australia), and technical expertise. The broader range of inputs should enable a fuller assessment of unfamiliar situations than Japan could previously manage.

These reforms are shifting Japan from a reactive security posture to a more proactive one. Japan’s decision to acquire counterstrike capabilities demonstrates this shift. This development represents a departure from the post-Second World War emphasis on a solely defensive security posture towards an approach aimed at better deterring potential adversaries before they launch an attack against Japan.¹⁸¹ Japan has also exercised a proactive security approach with four transits of the Taiwan Strait by Maritime Self-Defense Force ships between September 2024 and April 2026.¹⁸² And, in March 2025, the Japanese Government released an evacuation plan for Okinawa’s remote islands, in which approximately 120,000 people would be evacuated within six days in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Tabletop exercises (TTXs) have also been conducted since fiscal 2022 and the first field evacuation drill is scheduled for January 2027, in fiscal year 2026 (although official material from Nagasaki, one of the receiving prefectures, states that the exercise is not based on a specific contingency such as a Taiwan conflict).¹⁸³

Japan’s more proactive response settings also surface in the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies tabletop exercises, run annually from 2021 to 2024 with serving parliamentarians and former senior officials.¹⁸⁴ Simulations are not predictions of real-world outcomes and should be interpreted with caution, but across the four years participants’ decisions became more proactive and better integrated.¹⁸⁵ For example, the 2023 TTX simulated the exercise of sophisticated defence capabilities such as counterstrike capabilities and active cyber defence, and the 2024 TTX simulated drawing on strengthened coordination with the United States and partners to augment Japan’s crisis response.¹⁸⁶ The exercises worked within Japan’s existing legal and political limits rather than assuming new powers. In imminent-threat scenarios, they also moved quickly to raise preparedness and reinforce the Southwestern Islands.¹⁸⁷

Despite these proactive security settings, Japan’s security crisis decision-making will continue to face dangers and entrenched hurdles. Foremost among them is the standing of the prime minister and their party. The Abe and Kishida administrations demonstrated the ability to make decisive security decisions.¹⁸⁸ Although the Takaichi government currently holds a much stronger parliamentary base than its predecessors, political constraints remain. The LDP remains a minority in the upper house, and legal and public-opinion constraints persist.¹⁸⁹ Administrations with weaker political foundations would face greater decision-making constraints. And lingering public pacifist sentiment continues to influence some political considerations.

Further, Japan’s fragmented legal framework for emergency response could cause delays and confusion in the initial stages of a complex crisis. Additionally, although cooperation among core security-focused ministries has significantly improved under the NSC–NSS framework, the enduring challenge of bureaucratic sectionalism across the wider government apparatus could still impede whole-of-government coordination during a national-level emergency. On top of this, important questions also remain about the day-to-day authorities of the upgraded US Forces Japan headquarters, its relationship with the JJOC, and the process for coordinating allied strike operations.¹⁹⁰

But the Japanese Government continues to chip away at these hurdles. The country’s military capabilities are being upgraded and its policymaking system strengthened. The reforms of the past decade have left Japan much better placed to respond to security threats than it was ten years ago. It’s likely the next ten years will see further strengthening of the country’s security crisis response system.