An Australia–United Kingdom agenda for economic security

Foreword

In 2026, an Australian and a British think tank — the United States Studies Centre (USSC) at the University of Sydney and Chatham House based in London — partnered to host two Track 1.5 economic-security-focused workshops. The purpose of the workshops was to develop a shared Australia-UK agenda for economic security and to support their governments and private sectors to navigate an increasingly turbulent economic environment. The workshops were convened in London and Sydney between March and May 2026, thanks to the generous support of the UK and Australian governments.

The Track 1.5 dialogues brought together government, industry and academic participants to share perspectives and identify potential policy solutions. This report is a compilation of key themes and recommendations captured at these workshops, although there was not always complete consensus. This report begins by examining each government’s approaches to economic security, then highlights participant recommendations to strengthen both governments’ approaches individually, before turning to four specific topic areas — attracting trusted capital to critical technologies, managing foreign investment risks, strengthening energy security and securing critical minerals supply chains. While this initiative was supported by the UK and Australian governments, the views in this report do not necessarily reflect the positions of either government. Discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule.¹

Executive summary

The global strategic environment is becoming increasingly unpredictable and contested, shaped by the weaponisation of economic interdependence and major global trends like AI adoption, the clean energy transition and national militarisation. In this context, economic security — a nation's ability to protect its economic stability and growth from external threats and the use of economic tools to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives — has arisen as a priority issue for many developed economies.

In the face of these challenges, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) are developing economic security policies to help manage economic security risks. However, the challenges they face are cross-cutting and complex, necessitating close collaboration with each other and like-minded partners.

Australia and the United Kingdom stand as natural partners in this space; they have a shared history, common values, and similar risk profiles and economic security priorities. Though each has a different economy and trade profile, there is deep alignment on both governments’ approaches to economic security, with structural similarities across government architecture and policy. Discussions across both workshops revealed a strong appetite for closer bilateral coordination between the two countries. In particular, closer cooperation on critical minerals supply chains stood out as a priority to participants.

To leverage their alignment and shared drive, Australia and the United Kingdom can deploy a two-pronged approach: institutionalising knowledge sharing while taking coordinated action in priority sectors. Similar governance structures and domestic challenges create strong scope for mutual learning, complemented by practical cooperation and joint initiatives in areas of shared strategic importance.

Yvette Cooper, then UK Foreign Secretary, welcomes Australia's Foreign Minister Penny Wong at Chevening House Sevenoaks, southern England in June 2026. (Photo by Carl Court)Source: Getty

Policy recommendations

Participants in both roundtables identified recommendations across five key areas to guide cooperation — critical technology, foreign investment, clean energy, critical minerals and international coordination.

Attracting trusted capital to critical technology sectors

• Coordinate existing public financing mechanisms, like the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF) and Australia’s Advanced Capabilities Investment (ACI) Fund.
• Harmonise approaches to emerging technologies, particularly AI, to align hardware demand and build shared strategic demand signals.
• Mobilise trusted private capital, such as pension funds, to support critical technology companies.

Managing foreign investment risks in strategic sectors

• Establish more systematic Australia–UK information-sharing on foreign investment risks, including high-risk investors, to strengthen screening decisions.
• Share investment screening approaches, particularly on lifecycle monitoring to ensure ongoing compliance with foreign investment conditions throughout the whole investment and mitigation measures.

Strengthening energy security and building clean energy supply chains

• Explore greater alignment between emissions reduction policies, such as the United Kingdom's Emissions Trading Scheme and Australia's Safeguard Mechanism.
• Align public finance mechanisms, such as Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) and the United Kingdom’s National Wealth Fund, to pool capital in shared priority areas.
• Strengthen intelligence sharing on clean energy supply chain risks.
• Share best practices on maximising renewable energy potential for AI infrastructure buildout.

Securing critical minerals supply chains

• Build demand-side signals for critical minerals from trusted sources through developing end-to-end supply chain initiatives to link supply and guaranteed offtake.
• Deepen intelligence sharing on risks to critical minerals mining and processing industries and responses to coercive economic pressures.
• Strengthen coordination on R&D in midstream minerals processing and refining, including through increased information-sharing engagement between the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in Australia and Innovate UK and the Materials Processing Institute in the United Kingdom.
• Share best practices on circular economy approaches for recycling critical minerals.

Coordinating international engagement and partnerships

• Coordinate engagement with other international partners to strengthen cooperation on economic security.
• Use existing structures — such as AUKUS, Five Eyes, the G7+ and the CPTPP — more effectively as platforms for economic security.
• Seek to strengthen preparedness and response to economic security crises, such as the US-Iran conflict and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, with like-minded partners.

A fragmented economic world order requires greater cooperation

In recent years, the global economic order has been marked by intensifying volatility. This has been driven by the erosion of the multilateral rules-based trade system, increased use of coercive trade measures by major powers, and supply chain disruptions from shocks such as COVID-19 and regional wars. In response, developed countries are turning to trade and economic policy as instruments of geopolitical statecraft. Key features of this new dynamic include countries seeking to reduce their trade dependencies, protect their domestic industry and de-risk their strategic supply chains.

Middle powers like Australia and the United Kingdom face a distinct set of risks in this environment. Their deep market integration with the Chinese economy and security alliances with the United States create challenges in navigating growing US-China strategic competition. Additionally, China’s dominance in key strategic sectors such as critical minerals and technology supply chains creates structural vulnerabilities that are difficult to resolve without long-term government support. These challenges are further compounded by the fact that both countries operate under tighter fiscal constraints than major economic powers and face domestic political pressures that make it difficult to build the public consensus required for sustained economic security investment.

Critically, Australia and the United Kingdom share a range of common priorities in economic security. Both have a vested interest in upholding the rules-based economic order. Both see a strategic imperative to protect and support domestic industries and are leveraging tools such as industrial policy, investment screening and tariffs in that pursuit. Both are looking to build diversified and reliable supply chains for critical goods. Finally, both seek to promote equitable growth that reflects democratic values, as seen in efforts to develop governance frameworks for emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), that promote safety, transparency and ethical use.

Recognising shared values and risks, Australia and the United Kingdom have already taken decisive action to strengthen cooperation. In 2023, the two governments established the Track 1 UK-Australia Economic Security Dialogue, which convenes annually, with 2026 marking its third meeting.² This is underpinned by the Australia-United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement (A-UKFTA), which entered into force in 2023, and focuses on expanding export opportunities, reducing tariffs and streamlining labour mobility.³

Translating this alignment into joint action on economic security is a strategic imperative for Australia and the United Kingdom. As one participant described, Australia and the United Kingdom aim to be “influential middle powers with agency,” yet neither carries sufficient economic weight to shape the geoeconomic environment alone. This will require closer partnership and increased effort to share strategies, risk assessments and resources.

Throughout the discussions, it became evident that both governments can operationalise their alignment using a two-pronged approach. The first prong involves deepening the structural relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom by moving toward a more deliberate process of knowledge sharing and refining government approaches together. This could mean more formalised and routine information sharing at the official level to support government decision-making, or an ongoing Track 1.5 mechanism that includes trusted business partners. The second involves extending cooperation from a “reference relationship,” in which ideas and experiences are shared, to an “anchor relationship,” in which both countries jointly pursue policy responses in areas of shared interest by harmonising regulations and policy where possible and co-investing in strategic sectors. Together, these tracks would allow Australia and the United Kingdom to leverage their alignment not only as a source of mutual learning, but also as a platform for coordinated action.

This report outlines a suite of recommendations identified by participants across both dialogues to help drive the Australia-UK relationship to where it needs to be to meet the strategic moment.

Comparing responses to economic security: Government systems, economic security policies and priorities

Government systems

In response to growing economic security challenges, Australia and the United Kingdom have both undertaken government reform to strengthen their ability to respond to a rapidly shifting global landscape.

Both governments have largely taken a diffused, horizontal approach to economic security policymaking, with responsibility spread across a range of departments in each government, though the United Kingdom has recently begun to centralise its approach. This model stands in comparison to the vertically integrated Japanese model, in which coordination is centralised under a dedicated Economic Security minister.⁴

In July 2026, under the Burnham government, the United Kingdom has moved to consolidate economic security policymaking under the new Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade (DBIST). DBIST merges the functions of the Department for Business and Trade with the former Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Investment Security Unit into a single body. DBIST now holds most of the levers relevant to economic security, including trade policy, industrial policy and investment screening.

Participants raised a series of challenges inherent to both governments’ structures. The distribution of economic security responsibilities across multiple departments creates risks of fragmentation, with competing agency priorities and knowledge siloes hindering consistent policymaking. The UK government's recent consolidation reflects efforts to address this challenge.

Speed also emerged as a key concern, with participants highlighting the value of learning from each other's rapid crisis-response capabilities to build more agile decision-making mechanisms. More broadly, several non-government participants expressed the need for both governments to shift from a risk-averse posture to one that is more willing to accept and manage risk, stating that governments are “taking on risk by not taking risks.”

Facing broadly similar systems challenges, Australia and the United Kingdom are well placed to learn from one another as they work to adapt their systems to the evolving threat landscape.

Facing broadly similar systems challenges, Australia and the United Kingdom are well placed to learn from one another as they work to adapt their systems to the evolving threat landscape.Source: Getty

Australian and UK economic security policies

Over the past five years, both governments have implemented a suite of economic security policies to better respond to emerging challenges. Figure 1 highlights key policies enacted in recent years.

Figure 1. Key economic security policies in Australia and the United Kingdom (2021–2026)

Both Australia and the United Kingdom have taken meaningful steps to strengthen their economic security response through new policies and reforms that expand sovereign capability, diversify supply chains and embed economic security considerations into national strategy. Both have implemented industrial policy to support domestic industry, strengthened their investment screening regimes to mitigate foreign influence, conducted supply chain analysis to identify vulnerabilities, and developed critical minerals strategies — with the United Kingdom looking to secure supply while Australia seeks to secure demand. Neither has enacted a codified definition of economic security to allow for greater flexibility in their responses.

Economic security policies viewed via the "Promote, Protect, Partner" lens

In both countries, economic security policies are relatively nascent but broadly align with the ‘3P’ promote, protect, partner framework: investing to promote sovereign capabilities, protect strategic industries and partner with allied nations. Developed by Japan and subsequently adopted by the European Union, the 3P terminology is a useful framework to conceptualise economic security challenges across domains. The following section outlines Australia and the United Kingdom’s activities across the 3P framework.

Promoting sovereign capabilities

Australia and the United Kingdom have both leveraged industrial policy to support sovereign capabilities in critical sectors.

Under the Future Made in Australia (FMIA) initiative, the Australian Government has committed A$22.7 billion to build net zero capabilities and invest in strategic domestic industries.⁷ While the Australian Government recognises that industrial policy is needed to compete in the global market, domestic challenges constrain its use. One participant expressed that, in Australia, "industrial policy has gone from a dirty word to something real and live that we see the need for."

The United Kingdom similarly released its Modern Industrial Strategy,⁸ which identifies eight priority sectors for long-term investment, skills development and innovation.⁹ It also introduced the Procurement Act in 2023, aimed at boosting the competitiveness of domestic firms in strategic sectors, like steel and AI, in public procurement decisions.¹⁰ The United Kingdom’s history of inconsistent deployment of industrial policy has led to some concerns among industry participants about the long-term reliability of the policy, which could pose challenges to attracting private capital.

Participants generally agreed that industrial policy represented the least developed element of the economic security frameworks adopted by Australia and the United Kingdom. Both governments have been hesitant to make large-scale, strategic investments in high-risk sectors such as emerging technologies, owing to capital constraints, institutional capacity limitations and a longstanding political aversion to 'picking winners'.

Participants generally agreed that industrial policy represented the least developed element of the economic security frameworks adopted by Australia and the United Kingdom.

Protecting strategic industries

A key concern of Australia and the United Kingdom is protecting critical national infrastructure and strategic sectors from high-risk investors who might compromise their national security.

While Australia has some of the most comprehensive foreign investment screening provisions globally, both governments have strengthened their investment screening regimes in recent years. In 2024, Australia expanded the Foreign Investment Review Board’s (FIRB) powers, lowering thresholds and broadening the scope for review.¹¹ In 2021, the United Kingdom overhauled its foreign investment screening system, introducing the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act, which established mandatory notification requirements and government call-in powers for transactions across sensitive sectors.¹²Across both countries, these reforms have increased scrutiny of foreign investments, leading to a greater focus on reviewing transactions involving defence and security, critical sectors and links to China.¹³ Both have also implemented export controls and research security measures to limit the unauthorised transfer of sensitive technology and intellectual property outside their borders.

Under the 3P framework, participants judged both governments as being the most advanced in the ‘protect’ category. However, some concerns were raised that both governments were too focused on screening and blocking foreign investment without providing or mobilising the domestic support needed for strategic sectors to fill the gap left by foreign investment — with protective policies sometimes perceived as undermining ‘promote’ goals. This sentiment was particularly pronounced in the UK context, with an industry participant raising concerns about the due diligence and legal costs associated with the NSI Act making investment, particularly for small businesses. Further, Australian and British industry participants expressed concerns that unclear government risk profiles, particularly regarding Chinese investment, are costing missed investment opportunities, as investors favour capital with predictable outcomes over funding that risks being blocked or delayed under foreign investment screening.

Unclear government risk profiles, particularly regarding Chinese investment, are costing missed investment opportunities, as investors favour capital with predictable outcomes over funding that risks being blocked or delayed under foreign investment screening.

Partnering with allies

In response to the heightened use of economic statecraft, Australia and the United Kingdom have pursued bilateral and minilateral agreements to diversify their trade partnerships, strengthen their supply chain security, and co-invest in a range of strategic projects (like critical infrastructure, energy security and strategic technologies).

Australia has leveraged its resource endowments to build international ties and agreements focused on minerals and energy security, and looked to diversify its trade relationships, including through a dedicated Southeast Asia trade strategy¹⁴ and the Australia-US critical minerals deal.¹⁵ The United Kingdom has focused on deepening cooperation with key partners on critical and emerging technologies, economic security and investment through initiatives like the Investment and Frontier Technology Partnership with Japan,¹⁶ while seeking to maximise trade opportunities for domestic industry through the UK Trade Strategy.¹⁷

Alongside these new agreements, there was a strong appetite for making better use of existing structures to address economic security challenges. Among participants there was a broad consensus that, rather than creating new groupings, existing structures — such as AUKUS, Five Eyes, the G7+ and the CPTPP — could be used more effectively as platforms for economic security. Re-tooling and reinvesting in existing mechanisms were preferred to creating new frameworks, which would require additional resources and delay progress.

Figure 2. Australian and UK economic security priorities, 2026

Source: United States Studies Centre

Australian and UK economic security priorities compared

Australia and the United Kingdom have both divergent and convergent economic security priorities shaped by a range of factors, including economic structure, geography, domestic policies, and existing strengths and vulnerabilities. Figure 2 provides a Venn diagram of Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s overlapping and separate economic security priorities.

As visualised, Australia and the United Kingdom share several economic security priorities. Specifically, they are particularly well positioned to cooperate on supporting free trade rules and norms; foreign investment screening; critical infrastructure security; critical minerals supply chains; and clean energy manufacturing.

There are also areas where they would be better off working individually, given their different economic structures, strengths and weaknesses.

As a leading destination for foreign investment and global capital flows, the United Kingdom is more exposed than Australia and most other nations to the risk of foreign adversaries leveraging investments, acquisitions and other financial relationships to gain access, influence or control over strategically important sectors and assets. Dependence on imports of strategic goods, such as critical minerals and energy, further exposes supply chains in sectors essential to domestic growth, leading the United Kingdom to prioritise import diversification. In addition, the United Kingdom has identified advanced manufacturing capabilities as a key priority, building on an existing industrial foundation. Australia comparatively has a significantly smaller manufacturing base that is more nascent and highly concentrated. Finally, safeguarding the United Kingdom’s research and innovation ecosystem has become a strategic priority, with efforts focused on protecting intellectual property, preventing malign technology transfer, and ensuring foreign state exploitation of research partnerships does not compromise the United Kingdom's technological advantage.

As a resource-export-oriented economy, Australia faces a separate set of risks. Overconcentration of exports — with over 30% of exports directed to China — leaves Australia vulnerable to economic coercion, political pressure and external demand shocks, making export diversification a top priority. Limited domestic refining capacity creates significant energy security risks, meaning that external supply disruptions have large domestic repercussions. At the same time, Australia recognises opportunity in its resource wealth, looking to position itself as a major supplier of energy and critical mineral commodities.

Navigating the new economic security era: Options for structural responses

At the structural level of governance, participants identified two main reforms that Australia and the United Kingdom could adopt to strengthen their economic security resilience:

1. Raise public awareness and understanding of economic security challenges.
2. Institutionalise closer government-industry engagement.

Sharing learnings and best practices in this space between London and Canberra could help both countries strengthen their response to economic security challenges.

• Raise public awareness and economic understanding of economic security challenges

Across both dialogues, non-government participants highlighted the need for increased strategic communications by government with private industry and broader society to build national resilience to economic security challenges.

Both London and Canberra were seen as needing to be more vocal publicly and privately on the trade-offs economic security requires. Non-government participants expressed concern that current communication, particularly regarding evolving threats, lacked clarity, which contributed to limited public awareness of the scale and nature of the challenges. Clearer government communication on challenges could help build the social license necessary for long-term, costly government policies, such as industrial policy. Suggestions to address this include engaging a ministerial-level ‘champion’ who can publicly explain economic security challenges.

Furthermore, participants felt that, while both governments have taken steps to respond to economic security threats, industry often lacks clear, practical guidance on the nature of economic security risks, how those risks should be assessed and mitigated, and what government support, tools and resources are available to help businesses. In particular, there was a perception that existing resources offered by government were not well signposted or easy to navigate for industry.

Both governments could therefore improve the clarity and visibility of their support by making resources easier to access and more intuitive to use, including through more user-friendly websites and tailored online tools that respond to user needs.

• Institutionalise government-industry engagement

Participants agreed that the current economic and security circumstances necessitated closer government-business communication. As one participant described, “countries that succeed [in this strategic environment] will develop mature, trusted and pragmatic engagement with industry.” Currently, a lack of trust between government and industry limits effective information sharing. Government can also over-classify some intelligence and could share more with industry through appropriate channels. Industry often spots market shifts and supply chain risks before government does, while government holds intelligence that industry lacks. Integrating both perspectives is critical for timely, comprehensive risk identification.

Developing mechanisms that enable structured and confidential two-way information sharing between government and industry is needed. The United Kingdom was seen as slightly further ahead than Australia in this regard, particularly through the establishment of the Economic Security Advisory Service (ESAS).¹⁸ However, given the ESAS’ early stage of development and initial narrow focus, it is too soon to assess its effectiveness. Australian participants acknowledged the potential value of a comparable function, as no equivalent mechanism currently exists.

Industry participants urged governments to engage with them, not merely as an interested and involved party but as a genuine “strategic partner.” Some private-sector representatives also recommended the institutionalisation of early public-private engagement on market interventions. To strengthen this capability, participants proposed a range of measures including two-way secondments, scenario-based ‘war-gaming’ exercises with industry, the creation of a single industry ‘front door’, and the use of industry groups as intermediaries between business and government. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were cited as useful models to draw learnings from, with close government–industry collaboration underpinning techno-industrial strategy.

Driving the shift from engagement to joint action: Sectoral areas for economic security cooperation

While sharing approaches to economic security challenges provides a foundation for cooperation, there is potential to go further via joint action on specific sectoral areas. Australia and the United Kingdom share a broad set of economic security sectoral priorities. Given significant capacity constraints and fiscal pressures facing both governments, however, focusing on a core few is essential to direct resources toward shared challenges where cooperation can have the greatest impact.

Four main economic security challenges can act as a starting point for building a shared Australia-UK agenda for economic security. These include:

• Attracting trusted capital to critical technology sectors
• Managing foreign investment risks in strategic sectors
• Improving energy security and building clean energy supply chains
• Securing critical minerals supply chains.

These four initiatives emerged in policy documents, private consultations and the two workshops as being high priority for both countries with significant potential for collaboration.

Attracting trusted capital to critical technology sectors

Australia and the United Kingdom have both identified the development of strategic capability in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing as central to future economic prosperity and national security. However, building globally competitive industries in these areas requires sustained, long-term capital that exceeds public funding capacity, leading both governments to rely on private and foreign investment to fill the gap. This introduces a layer of risk, as foreign capital can also create dependencies and channels of influence. Both countries, therefore, face a dual challenge: attracting the investment needed to scale these sectors while ensuring it does not undermine national security objectives. As a result, policy has converged on the idea of mobilising ‘trusted capital’ from like-minded partners.

Industry participants signalled that the current level of investment is not enough to support emerging technologies, particularly in supporting industry to overcome the so-called ‘valley of death’ — the funding and development gap between early-stage research and successful commercialisation. To address this, both countries have introduced public financing mechanisms, such as the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF),¹⁹ UK Research and Innovation and Australia’s proposed A$500 million Advanced Capabilities Investment (ACI) Fund.²⁰ Participants suggested that greater harmonisation of public finance between the two countries could increase both the scale and effectiveness of investment, including through a potential joint investment mechanism that would pool these resources to catalyse funding in priority sectors or areas — for example strategic technology projects under AUKUS Pillar II.

AUKUS Pillar II commits Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to joint development across advanced capability areas, including quantum technologies and AI. (Photo by Robbie Stephenson)Source: Getty

Both countries can take lessons from one another in deploying capital effectively. The United Kingdom could learn from Australia’s superannuation system in how pension funds can be mobilised to support long-term strategic investment. While the United Kingdom has a large pool of pension assets, its more fragmented pension system has historically been less effective at deploying this capital into strategic sectors and nationally significant projects. On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s approach to supporting domestic quantum industry was highlighted as a model that Australia can look to, offering clear investment signals, defined timeframes and articulated strategic ambitions.²¹

In addition, Australia and the United Kingdom could look to align their technology strategies to avoid undercutting one another and maximise the impact of limited capital. One participant proposed synchronising AI strategies to signal demand more clearly to markets, reduce procurement competition and encourage co-investment in enabling infrastructure such as compute capacity.

As trusted partners, Australia and the United Kingdom are well poised to scale capital together, with existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks providing a foundation which could be more effectively operationalised. AUKUS Pillar II commits Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to joint development across advanced capability areas, including quantum technologies and AI.²² In parallel, the Australia–UK Free Trade Agreement’s Innovation Chapter supports open investment and technology collaboration. Appendix 1 includes a complete list of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral frameworks that cover foreign investment and investment in strategic technologies.

Managing foreign investment risks in strategic sectors

In parallel with efforts to mobilise capital, both governments are also seeking to strengthen oversight of foreign investment and more actively manage associated risks. Each country has tightened scrutiny of investment in critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies amid concerns that foreign ownership could create vulnerabilities enabling espionage, coercion or disruption in crisis scenarios.

Given their divergent risk profiles and priority industries, bilateral cooperation between Australia and the United Kingdom on foreign investment screening is best suited for information sharing and selective alignment of frameworks. Participants raised the potential to make greater use of the Five Eyes partnership to share intelligence on foreign investment risks, including the activities of state-linked investors, corporate ownership structures and emerging investment threats. However, there was some scepticism regarding the feasibility of shared mechanisms such as a common database of high-risk entities, reflecting differing views among Five Eyes members on what constitutes a ‘risky’ investor.

Beyond these proposals, participants also highlighted opportunities for increased intelligence sharing on the practical implementation of investment screening regimes, particularly in relation to lifecycle monitoring of investments and effective mitigation measures for potentially risky investments.

Industry highlighted several common challenges across both countries, particularly the need for clearer and more accessible information on foreign investment processes. A key concern was the perceived lack of specificity in government guidance, which participants said can lead to missed investment opportunities. More targeted, sector-specific and country-specific guidance, along with clearer signalling of government expectations, was seen as important in supporting industry. Participants also cautioned that overly opaque or complex screening processes can impose significant compliance costs on firms, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Overall, some industry participants suggested that governments might reframe their approach to “place greater emphasis on promotion over protection,” to streamline investment pathways into capital-poor sectors and reduce unnecessary compliance burdens where risks are lower.

Strengthening energy security and building clean energy supply chains

Ensuring access to reliable, resilient and affordable energy is a necessary precondition for sustainable growth, and a challenge that Australia and the United Kingdom both face. Despite their energy resources and clean energy ambitions, both countries remain dependent on imported energy inputs, leaving them highly exposed to disruptions in global energy markets. Australia is heavily reliant on imported refined fuel, with around 90% imported,²³ while the United Kingdom depends on imported oil and gas, with imports making up 52% and 49% of total supply, respectively.²⁴ The impacts of the US-Iran conflict have placed a renewed focus on energy security and resilience, making diversification of supply a primary driver for decisions.

Australia and the United Kingdom are both looking to integrate a higher percentage of renewables into their energy mix to decrease reliance on imports, build sovereign supply and reduce emissions. Both have committed to net-zero by 2050, but with different near-term targets and transition pathways. Australia has set an 82% renewable electricity target by 2030,²⁵ with solar as the primary driver, while the United Kingdom is targeting 95% clean power by 2030,²⁶ with strengths in offshore wind. As shown in Figure 3, the United Kingdom has integrated a larger percentage of renewables into its energy mix than Australia.

Figure 3. Renewables account for a larger share of the United Kingdom's energy mix than Australia's

Both face domestic challenges in securing social licence for the energy transition, with Australia experiencing backlash over the rapid build-up of renewable projects in regional areas²⁷ and the United Kingdom navigating concerns over green infrastructure developments.²⁸ Neither country is expanding their renewable energy capacity to sufficiently support its ambitions for AI infrastructure buildout, which requires substantially more energy and capacity than their grids currently support. Participants noted that governments will need to depoliticise energy transition messaging and build bipartisan frameworks that provide the public and investors with long-term certainty about the trajectory of the renewables build-out. In Australia specifically, state and local governments will need to be adequately engaged to achieve this goal.

Structural similarities between Australia and the United Kingdom support closer collaboration on renewables. Both countries have similar emissions-reduction frameworks that can be more closely connected. Participants proposed examining options for greater alignment between the UK Emissions Trading Scheme²⁹ and Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism³⁰ to support bilateral energy cooperation and trade. This could focus on collaboratively setting emissions reduction pathways or mutual recognition of carbon credits. In addition, both countries have strengths in R&D, with globally competitive universities and national research agencies. Deepening joint R&D collaboration and co-funding early-stage projects in renewable technology can help catalyse innovation and build capabilities. Appendix 2 outlines domestic, bilateral and multilateral frameworks relevant to energy security and clean energy.

The scale of capital required to support renewable energy innovation and deployment emerged as a challenge for both countries. Pooling capital in areas of shared priority would enable both to collaboratively support a larger pipeline of projects and send stronger signals to private investors. One proposal to operationalise this was to more closely align public financing institutions such as Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC)³¹ and the United Kingdom’s National Wealth Fund.³² Through co-investment, coordinated financing or shared project pipelines, these institutions could help de-risk strategic projects, crowd in additional private capital and accelerate the deployment of clean energy technologies across both countries.

Several questions were raised around the exposure of clean energy supply chains to broader foreign state-related risks. A shared vulnerability is the overconcentration of clean energy supply chains in a single market, as overdependence on any one country poses challenges to ensuring long-term, reliable access to components needed.³³ Compounding this is the fact that a significant percentage of clean energy infrastructure in both countries is foreign-owned.³⁴ While achieving clean energy ambitions will inevitably require some reliance on foreign entities, this creates difficult policy trade-offs, with one participant noting governments will need to be clear on “whether we are okay to have one supplier for solar panels.” Although Australia and the United Kingdom face different exposures, there is scope to deepen intelligence sharing on risks arising from foreign ownership in clean energy and develop a shared understanding of where key vulnerabilities lie.

Securing critical minerals supply chains

Critical minerals are essential inputs for defence technologies, advanced manufacturing and the clean energy transition, making them a strategic priority for both Australia and the United Kingdom. China currently dominates the processing and refining of most critical minerals and has demonstrated a clear willingness to weaponise this position, most recently through a series of escalating export controls. As a result, both governments view critical minerals supply chain diversification as a matter of economic and national security, with the United Kingdom setting a strategic target that no more than 60% of aggregate demand can be met by one country by 2035.³⁵

There is strong alignment between Australia and the United Kingdom’s approaches to critical minerals, creating a basis for cooperation. Australia is resource-rich and has strengths in mining and expanding refining capabilities but faces challenges in securing the long-term demand certainty needed to support project financing. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has downstream strengths, with global mining finance, research institutions and manufacturing, but remains heavily dependent on critical mineral imports. This creates a natural opportunity for Australian producers to become trusted long-term suppliers to the UK market, linking up supply and demand.

Despite broad alignment, cooperation on critical minerals between the two countries has remained limited. In 2023, Australia and the United Kingdom signed a joint statement of intent to deepen bilateral collaboration in this area. However, participants noted that the United Kingdom still lags behind other investors in Australia due to the absence of a clearly defined domestic case for critical minerals financing — whether linked to clean energy, defence or broader industrial policy objectives — constraining external investment. Ultimately, participants suggested the next step would be for the UK Government to bring forward a concrete investment proposal to Australia to operationalise bilateral cooperation. The 11 June 2026 Australia-UK Ministerial Joint Statement announced a new bilateral Joint Statement of Intent on securing minerals for defence, which can act as a catalyst for investment.³⁶ For further information on domestic, bilateral and multilateral initiatives relevant to critical minerals, please see Appendix 3.

Midstream processing and refining remain the key chokepoint in the supply chain, offering an area for bilateral action. China holds a monopoly over mineral processing technology and intellectual property, and the 2025 expansion of Chinese export controls to cover processing technologies reflects a deliberate effort to leverage its dominance for strategic advantage. In response, Australia and the United Kingdom are building midstream expertise but lack a depth of experience and technical know-how. Strengthening coordination on R&D, with a focus on midstream capabilities, offers an opportunity to combine both countries’ strengths in research and mining, with potential to “innovate out the problem.” Further, linking funding mechanisms for R&D in this space could help accelerate the development of new technologies. Beyond innovation, some participants also proposed exploring joint funding for processing in Southeast Asia.

Bilateral government coordination on building a ‘demand signal’ for industry is another area for coordination. As one participant described, the minerals problem is a “demand problem masquerading as a supply challenge.” With new supply coming online, governments will need to consider how to incentivise industry to purchase from trusted suppliers or risk a growing demand-supply mismatch. At present, it was widely agreed that most companies are unlikely to voluntarily pay a “resilience premium” for derisked supply.

Participants proposed several ways to strengthen the demand function. One suggestion was to focus collaboration on end-to-end mine-to-product supply chains that explicitly link supply with guaranteed demand. Starting with a single “head-turner” initiative would allow governments to test coordination mechanisms, identify barriers and then scale successful approaches across other projects. The battery supply chain was identified as a potential high-value starting point, given Australia’s wealth of battery minerals and the United Kingdom’s growing battery industry. In addition, participants suggested that broader multilateral coordination could help reinforce demand signals, including through aligned policy tools, such as mandatory quotas requiring diversified sourcing.³⁷ 

Intelligence sharing offers a third avenue for deepening Australia–UK cooperation on mineral supply security. As both governments seek to build resilient refining and processing capacity, they should establish mechanisms for sharing economic security intelligence on challenges companies face. Some participants referenced actions taken by China that are challenging domestic industry, including market flooding, extra-territorial economic coercion and foreign investment activities. Enhanced intelligence sharing would help both governments better understand the pressures confronting industry, identify emerging risks and coordinate responses to support firms seeking to diversify critical minerals supply chains.

The minerals problem is a "demand problem masquerading as a supply challenge."

The path forward, key principles and recommendations

Australia and the United Kingdom are inextricably linked through deep cultural and historical ties, shared interests and values and a strong economic relationship. Critically, these form the basis of trust, which is an increasingly important factor shaping economic cooperation in a competitive geoeconomic landscape. In periods of economic uncertainty, the two Commonwealth partners have often turned to one another. However, a more complex and riskier geoeconomic environment now calls for closer cooperation in key areas.

Both countries are well-positioned to strengthen their economic security cooperation. Their policy frameworks are broadly aligned, strategic interests converge and a high degree of trust already underpins the relationship. This project has identified both areas of convergence and divergence in their approaches, as well as practical initiatives for government and industry to take forward.

Across discussions, recommendations to strengthen Australia–UK cooperation converged around three guiding principles:

• Deepening information sharing between governments
• Harmonising regulations, policies, and programs where possible
• Jointly investing in shared strategic priorities.

These principles provide a practical framework for advancing cooperation across key economic security challenges. While the specific mechanisms will vary by sector, each reflects a common objective: strengthening collective resilience, reducing strategic vulnerabilities and building greater economic security through closer bilateral coordination. While not explored in these roundtables, the AUKUS partnerships and growing Indo-Pacific risks also underscore the need for greater economic security cooperation between the United Kingdom and Australia. Outlined below is a menu of policy options in areas identified by participants across both workshops as high priority and strategically aligned with the interests of both countries.

Participant recommendations for cooperation

Attracting trusted capital to critical technology sectors

• Coordinate existing public financing mechanisms, such as the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF) and Australia’s Advanced Capabilities Investment (ACI) Fund, in shared priority areas to boost the scale and impact of investment.
• Harmonise approaches to emerging technologies, particularly AI, to maximise complementarity in hardware demands, avoid undercutting one another and build shared strategic demand signals.
• Mobilise trusted private capital across both countries, such as pension funds, to support strategic technology companies in moving from research and development (R&D) to commercialisation.

Managing foreign investment risks in strategic sectors

• Establish more systematic Australia–UK information-sharing on foreign investment risks, including high-risk investors, to strengthen screening decisions and coordinate mitigation efforts. This could mean a regular schedule of exchange meetings between both governments’ foreign review boards and trusted industry partners.
• Share knowledge on approaches to investment screening, particularly on lifecycle monitoring to ensure ongoing compliance with foreign investment conditions and mitigation measures, to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of investment security frameworks in both countries.

Strengthening energy security and building clean energy supply chains

• Explore greater alignment between existing emissions reduction policies, such as the United Kingdom's Emissions Trading Scheme and Australia's Safeguard Mechanism. This could focus on aligning sectoral emissions reduction ‘baselines’ or mutual recognition of carbon credits across both schemes.
• Explore aligning public finance mechanisms such as Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) and the United Kingdom’s National Wealth Fund to pool capital in areas of shared priority.
• Share intelligence about risks to clean energy supply chains, including disruption, strategic control of critical inputs and coercive economic practices, to enable earlier detection of vulnerabilities and more informed responses.
• Share best practices on maximising renewable energy potential for AI infrastructure buildout, especially in areas where clean energy and sovereign AI economic security objectives align.

Securing critical minerals supply chains

• Build demand-side signals for critical minerals from trusted sources by developing end-to-end supply chain initiatives that link supply with guaranteed offtake. Consider multilateral policy alignment to expand the market for trusted critical minerals.
• Deepen intelligence sharing on risks facing critical minerals and processing industries, enabling earlier identification of market disruptions, coercive economic pressures and investment-related vulnerabilities.
• Strengthen coordination on R&D in midstream minerals processing and refining to address key supply chain chokepoints. In practice, this could mean additional information sharing and engagement between our scientific agencies, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in Australia and Innovate UK and the Materials Processing Institute in the United Kingdom.
• Share best practices on circular economy opportunities for recycling rare earths back into domestic technology supply chains.

Coordinating international engagement and partnerships

• Coordinate engagement with other international partners to strengthen cooperation on economic security.
• Use existing structures — such as AUKUS, Five Eyes, the G7+ and the CPTPP — more effectively as platforms for economic security.
• Seek to strengthen preparedness and response to economic security crises, such as the US-Iran conflict and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, with like-minded partners.

Appendixes