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Allies and partners4 December 2025

Allies and partners poll 2025: Where the Quad countries stand on Trump, security and the future of the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

In August 2025, the United States Studies Centre polled more than 1,000 citizens in each of Australia, the United States, Japan, and, for the first time, India, on their views of the key issues shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region. Their responses reveal a region shaken by a year of disruptive developments in the United States but still aligned on co-ordinated responses to the region’s security challenges.

Majorities in Australia, Japan and India say that US President Donald Trump’s second term so far has been bad for their countries. All four countries are deeply concerned about domestic political violence and misinformation in the United States, and Australians and Indians are more likely to see the United States as harmful rather than helpful in Asia.

Yet, despite increasingly negative perceptions of the United States, allies and partners think their US alliances and partnerships should continue. Only small minorities in Australia and Japan want to withdraw from their US alliances, and pluralities in Australia, Japan and India say their country needs the United States more than ever.

Even with tensions brought on by the Trump administration’s tariffs and diplomatic disputes, Australian and Japanese respondents still overwhelmingly describe the United States as an ally, while Americans themselves continue to believe that their alliances with Australia and Japan make the United States itself more secure.

When it comes to the region, negative perceptions of China persist, and all four Quad nations continue to want to work together on supporting regional democracies and human rights. Australian, American, Japanese and Indian support for AUKUS outweighs opposition. Perhaps most notably, however, all four countries are more likely than not to support a formal Quad military alliance between them.

Together, this year’s poll reveals these four maritime democracies are anxious about the region and concerned about domestic developments in the United States, but confident in the need to work together to address regional challenges.

Key findings

On Trump:

  • Australian, Japanese and Indian respondents hold negative views of Trump’s second term — and increasingly view the United States as harmful rather than helpful in Asia

On alliances:

  • Despite increasingly negative perceptions of the United States, allies and partners think their US alliances should continue

On China and Taiwan:

  • Negative perceptions of China persist, though a plurality of Australians now think the US handling of China is too aggressive

On AUKUS:

  • Australian, Japanese and Indian support for AUKUS outweighs opposition — but few Australians believe their government has properly explained why Australia needs nuclear-powered submarines

On the Quad:

  • Support for a formal Quad military alliance outweighs opposition in all four countries

On trade and AI

  • Most Australians and Americans believe future US presidents will be less aggressive with tariffs than President Trump, but Japanese and Indian respondents are less certain
DownloadAllies and partners poll 2025: Where the Quad countries stand on Trump, security and the future of the Indo-Pacific

Key finding 1 on Trump

Australian, Japanese and Indian respondents hold negative views of Trump’s second term — and increasingly view the United States as harmful rather than helpful in Asia

  • A majority of Australian (56%), Japanese (59%), and Indian (54%) respondents think that President Donald Trump’s second term has been bad for their countries.
  • Americans and their allies are deeply concerned about the future of US democracy (63–80% in each country are very concerned or a little concerned).
  • Concern about domestic political violence and misinformation in the United States has grown across all four countries.
    • A majority of Australians (62%) and Americans (69%) say they are very concerned about misinformation — an increase of 13 and 14 percentage points respectively from 2024. In Japan, concern has doubled since 2024, with 38% now saying they are very concerned (up from 19%).
    • Similarly, 48% of Australians are very concerned about US political violence (11-point increase since 2024), compared to 56% of Americans (5-point increase), 30% of Japanese (12-point increase) and 39% of Indians.
  • Australians are now more likely to see the United States as harmful rather than helpful in Asia (33% say mostly harmful compared to 24% who say mostly helpful).
    • This sentiment is shared by Indian respondents (35% say the United States is mostly harmful, compared to 28% who say mostly helpful), but contrasts with the few Japanese (15%) and American (18%) respondents who think the United States is mostly harmful in Asia.
  • Only 42% of Australians say the US alliance makes their country more secure — a 14-point decrease since 2024 and the first time support has dropped below a majority since USSC polling began in 2022.
    • By contrast, roughly half of Japanese respondents (47%) think the US alliance makes them more secure, decreasing 5 percentage points since 2024 (only 16% of Japanese think the US alliance makes Japan less secure compared to 29% of Australians who say the same).
  • Australians view America as an ally (69%) — but almost a third say the United States is a danger to Australia (30%).

 

 

 

 

Key finding 2 on alliances

Despite increasingly negative perceptions of the United States, allies and partners think their US alliances should continue

  • Only 17% of Australians and 9% of Japanese respondents want to withdraw from their US alliance. The majority of respondents in Australia (54%) and Japan (50%) disagree with withdrawing from their respective US alliance.
  • A plurality of Australian (47%), Japanese (40%) and Indian (41%) respondents think that their country needs the United States more than ever.
  • Americans continue to think that their alliances with Australia (50%) and Japan (59%) make their country more secure, almost identical to 2024 levels (52% of Australian and 56% of Japanese respondents).
  • Compared to 2023, regional allies and partners demonstrate less confidence that the United States would come to their aid if they were attacked by China. Roughly three quarters of Australians (73%) believe it is likely that the United States would come to their aid (an 11-point decline since 2023), while 61% of Japanese respondents say the same: a 16-point decline since 2023.
  • Labor voters are twice as likely as Coalition voters to believe the Australia-US alliance is too militaristic (45% compared to 20%) and does not benefit them (41% compared to 19%).
  • Labor voters are far more likely to support Australia developing an independent foreign policy (73%) compared to Coalition voters (48%).

 

 

Key finding 3 on China and Taiwan

Negative perceptions of China persist, though a plurality of Australians now think the US handling of China is too aggressive

  • Australian (48%), American (40%), Japanese (58%) and Indian respondents (46%) remain more likely to view China as harmful rather than helpful in Asia.
    • By comparison, 33% of Australians, 18% of Americans, 15% of Japanese and 35% of Indians say that the United States is more harmful in Asia.
  • Japanese respondents are the most likely to say that their country’s handling of China is too weak (59%) — roughly 30 points higher than the other countries.
    • A minority of Australians and Japanese (4% in each public) say their country’s handling of China is too aggressive, while there has been a 9-point increase in Australians saying the handling is appropriate.
  • A plurality of Australians now think the US handling of China is too aggressive, up 20 points since 2024 to 40% in 2025. Australians continue to be twice as likely to make this assessment compared to Japanese and American respondents.
    • There is a clear partisan split. This increase has primarily been driven by Labor voters (32-point increase since 2024), with a sizeable but less significant 12-point jump from Coalition voters saying that the US handling is too aggressive.
    • A majority (56%) of Labor voters compared to only a quarter (25%) of Coalition voters share this sentiment.
  • Few Australian (9%), American (11%), Japanese (7%) and Indian (22%) respondents believe it is very likely that their country will be in armed conflict with China in the next ten years.
  • When asked to choose, a majority of Australians (53%) and Indians (62%) want to prioritise fighting climate change over competing with China. A plurality of American (48%) and Japanese (41%) respondents share this sentiment.
  • A plurality of respondents in the Quad countries view Taiwan as a like-minded economic partner (44–65%) and a fellow democracy (44–59%). By comparison, only a minority in each country view Taiwan as a danger — less than 10% of American, Australian and Japanese respondents (compared to strong majorities in each country who disagree), while Indians are less certain (51% either don’t know or neither agree nor disagree).
    • The plurality of Australian (46%) and majority of American (57%) and Japanese (53%) respondents view Taiwan as an ally, while most Indians are uncertain (52% are unsure or undecided).
  • All four Quad countries are more likely than not to support sending military forces to help the United States in the event of an attack on Taiwan.
    • Over a third of Indians (34%) support sending military forces to help the United States defend Taiwan in the event of an attack, compared to only 23% who disagree with doing so, with the rest either neutral or unsure (43%).
    • Since 2022, Australian support has declined from 46% in 2022 to 37% in 2025 (a 9-point decrease). By comparison, willingness among American and Japanese respondents has remained steady or even increased, with 38% of Americans (increasing from 33% in 2022) and 33% of Japanese respondents (decreasing from 35% in 2022) now agreeing.

Key finding 4 on AUKUS

Australian, Japanese and Indian support for AUKUS outweighs opposition — but few Australians believe their government has properly explained why Australia needs nuclear-powered submarines

  • Only 13% of Australians, 8% of Japanese respondents and 4% of Americans think that AUKUS makes Asia less safe.
    • While the majority of American (58%), Japanese (64%) and Indian (52%) respondents say they don’t know or are undecided, nine times as many Americans, three times as many Japanese respondents and twice as many Indians agree that the partnership makes Asia safer compared to those who disagree.
  • Only 17% of Australians think that AUKUS should be cancelled — compared to twice as many (44%) who disagree with cancelling it, while the rest (39%) are uncertain.
  • Roughly half of Australians (44%) and Americans (56%) are unsure about whether Trump will cancel AUKUS, similar to 2024 levels (46% of Australians and 51% of Americans said they either are undecided or don’t know).
  • Australians continue to see AUKUS as good for creating jobs, even if they think it locks Australia into supporting the United States in a conflict and is not worth the price tag.
    • A majority of Australians (51%) continue to believe it is a good idea for Australia to have nuclear powered submarines (compared to 20% who disagree). However, there continues to be a clear gender and partisan divide.
  • There continues to be a 20-point gender gap in Australian public support for AUKUS.
    • A majority of Australian men (60%) think it is a good idea for Australia to have nuclear powered submarines, compared to only 41% of women — mirroring the 20-point gender gap from 2024.
  • Coalition voters continue to be more supportive of AUKUS than Labor voters (62% think it is a good idea compared to 52% of Labor voters).
  • Only a quarter (27%) of Australians think the Australian Government has properly explained why Australia needs nuclear-powered submarines.

 

 

 

 

Key finding 5 on the Quad

Support for a formal Quad military alliance outweighs opposition in all four countries

  • Respondents in each country are far more likely to agree than disagree with the Quad becoming a formal military alliance. Australians are the most supportive (49% agree), followed by Indians (44%), Americans (42%) and Japanese respondents (41%).
    • Only a small number of respondents in each country oppose the Quad becoming a formal military alliance (7–15%), although many either don’t know or are unsure (37–50%).
  • Majorities across the Quad (57–59%) support increasing economic links between the Quad countries in order to reduce dependence on China.
  • Majorities in each country agree with helping developing countries in Asia to hold democratic elections (59–75%) and promoting democracy as the best form of governance in Asia (61–78%).
  • A plurality of Australian (53%) and Japanese (42%) respondents continues to think a bilateral military alliance would make their countries more secure — though support has declined by 7 percentage points among both publics since this question was last asked in 2022. Very few respondents in Australia (7%) and Japan (6%) think it would make their country less secure.
  • Prior to Trump imposing tariffs on India, a majority of Americans (55%) and a plurality of Indians (41%) were unsure or undecided about the idea of establishing an India-US military alliance. However, only 7% of Americans and 23% of Indians thought it would make their country less secure (compared to 37% of Americans and 36% of Indians who said more secure).
  • The overwhelming majority of respondents in each Quad country support a democratic political system (83–92%).
    • However, compared to their Australian (32% agree) and American (31%) counterparts, Indian (70%) and Japanese (70%) respondents are more likely to want a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections.
  • A majority of Australian (51%), American (56%) and Japanese (50%) respondents think it would be damaging for their countries if Russia defeats Ukraine — compared to less than a third (29%) of Indians.

 

 

 

 

 

Key finding 6 on trade and AI

Most Australians and Americans believe future US presidents will be less aggressive with tariffs than President Trump, but Japanese and Indian respondents are less certain

  • A plurality of Australian (34%), Japanese (43%) and Indian (45%) respondents think trade and economic ties should be the top priority for their relationship with the United States, compared to regional stability, defence, climate and technology cooperation.
  • Japanese respondents are most likely (55%) to think tariffs between the United States and its trading partners will be bad for their country’s economy.
  • Most Australians (64%) and Americans (63%) think that future US presidents will be less aggressive with tariffs compared to President Trump, while Japanese and Indian respondents are less certain (35% of Japanese and 31% of Indians say less aggressive, compared to 12% and 21% who say more aggressive).
  • Australians (67%) and Americans (60%) overwhelmingly want to prioritise the regulation of AI even at the cost of innovation — while Japanese and Indian respondents are divided (32% of Japanese and 44% of Indian respondents want to prioritise AI regulation, compared to 32% and 45% respectively who think their country should prioritise rapid innovation).
  • A plurality of respondents in the four countries want to prioritise domestic manufacturing over free trade, even if it increases consumer costs. Since 2024, support for prioritising free trade has grown by 12 percentage points among Americans, from 22% to 34%.
  • A majority of respondents in the four Quad countries (53–64%) support holding China to account on human rights, even if it hurts domestic businesses.

Methodology

Unless indicated otherwise, the polling data used in this report was derived from surveys conducted between 7 and 20 August 2025. These surveys were conducted by YouGov, a global public opinion and survey company, which fielded representative samples drawn from Australia, the United States, Japan and India. The surveys were administered online to adult, citizen populations with sample sizes of 1,070 in Australia, 1,002 in the United States, 1,011 in Japan and 1,005 in India. These surveys build on previous USSC surveys of representative Australian, US and Japanese samples in June 2024, August 2023 and September 2022. Question wording was kept as consistent as possible to permit valid inferences about trends and changes over time.

The maximum margin of error is approximately 3% for the entire sample of respondents in each country. This is the 95% confidence interval for a 50% proportion. It is larger for the subsets of population (for instance, by vote and age).