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Introduction
Both the first and second Donald Trump presidencies have generated a period of significant constitutional change and controversy in the United States. Trump’s first term in office saw the appointment of three conservative Justices to the US Supreme Court (‘the Court’), which shifted the interpretive and ideological balance of the bench. Following the commencement of Trump’s second term in January 2025, the US constitutional and political landscape continues to evolve. Sweeping assertions of executive power have led to a series of legal challenges in federal courts, while concerns over the Trump administration’s potential reluctance, or even outright refusal, to comply with judicial orders sparked rhetoric of a “constitutional crisis.” Against this backdrop, this explainer surveys key decisions from the Court’s recently concluded October 2024–25 term, critically analysing emerging doctrinal trends, their practical implications and broader trajectories in US constitutional law.
The legacy of Trump’s first term
A defining legacy of Trump’s first presidency was the appointment during one four-year term of three Justices to the Court — Neil Gorsuch (in 2017), Brett Kavanaugh (in 2018) and Amy Coney Barrett (in 2020). Gorsuch filled the seat left by the late Justice Antonin Scalia after a prolonged Senate blockade prevented President Barack Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, from being considered. Kavanaugh succeeded Justice Anthony Kennedy, a moderate ‘swing’ vote on key issues such as abortion and LGBTQ+ rights, in a confirmation hearing marred by allegations of sexual assault. Barrett was nominated and then swiftly confirmed in the final months of Trump’s presidency following the passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, widely perceived as a liberal icon and stalwart of the Court’s liberal wing.
A defining legacy of Trump’s first presidency was the appointment during one four-year term of three Justices to the Court.
These appointments served to cement a 6-3 conservative ‘supermajority’ on the Court, and were shortly followed by a series of landmark cases overturning longstanding precedents. In the 2022 decision of Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization,1 a bitterly divided Court overruled Roe v Wade and held that the US Constitution does not guarantee the right to an abortion.2 The following year, in Students for Fair Admissions v Harvard,3 the Court effectivelyoverruled two precedents and held that race-conscious affirmative action programs in most university admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo,4 handed down in 2024, the Court abolished the 40-year-old doctrine of ‘Chevron deference’ (under which courts would defer to federal administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statues) — a reversal that has the potential to significantly reduce the regulatory power of the administrative state over time.
These rulings coincided with — and likely contributed to — a sharp decline in public confidence in the Court as an institution.5 Gallup polling indicates that while 58% of Americans expressed approval of the Court’s performance in July 2020, this figure dropped to just 40% in September 2021, at the time the lowest level recorded in the past two decades. For context, when Gallup first began tracking Supreme Court job approval in the early 2000s, ratings typically hovered near 60%. Since 2021, public confidence in the Court has remained persistently low. Approval ratings have not exceeded 44% since, and as of July 2025, just 39% of Americans approve of the Court’s performance.
Significantly, however, this decline in trust is deeply polarised. In July 2025, a record-breaking 64-point gap was recorded between Republican and Democrat evaluations of the Court’s performance: 75% of Republicans said they approved of how the Court is handling its job, compared to just 11% of Democrats — the lowest level Gallup has measured for any party group. This stark partisan divide underscores how the Court is increasingly being viewed not just as a legal institution, but a political one.
This stark partisan divide underscores how the Court is increasingly being viewed not just as a legal institution, but a political one.
Two major cases handed down in 2024 provide a further critical backdrop to Trump’s return to office in January 2025. In Trump v Anderson,6 the Court unanimously reversed a Colorado Supreme Court ruling that barred Trump from appearing on the state’s primary ballot, effectively clearing the way for his national re-election campaign. This was followed by the landmark case of Trump v United States,7 in which a 6-3 majority held that former presidents have absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions undertaken within their “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority, and presumptive immunity for all other official acts. Due to this decision, Trump commenced his second term with dramatically reduced accountability for conduct committed while in office.
The October 2024–25 term
The Court’s most recent term, spanning decisions from October 2024 to June 2025, featured a number of high-profile cases that delivered outcomes favourable to the Trump administration. Among the more consequential rulings — surveyed below — were decisions with far-reaching implications for the scope of presidential power and accountability, as well as others that aligned with key conservative policy priorities. Notably, most of these contested cases were decided along sharply divided ideological lines, with the Court’s six Republican-appointed Justices forming the majority, and the three Democrat appointees consistently dissenting.
Nationwide injunctions and executive power
On 27 June 2025, the Court handed down Trump v CASA8 — a landmark ruling with significant implications for the balance of power between the judiciary and executive. The case arose in response to Executive Order 14160, signed by President Trump within hours of his inauguration on 20 January 2025, that purported to end birthright citizenship.9 The order was immediately subject to multiple legal challenges on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which relevantly provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”10
Three federal district courts issued universal preliminary injunctions, blocking the order’s implementation nationwide. These so-called ‘universal’ or ‘nationwide’ injunctions are provisional orders issued by a court that temporarily bar an executive official from applying a challenged executive order to anyone who might be harmed by it — not just the named plaintiffs in a particular case — thereby preserving the status quo pending further legal proceedings. One of the judges, Reagan appointee John Coughenour, called the executive order “blatantly unconstitutional.”
Lawyers for the Trump administration sought to challenge these rulings in the US Supreme Court. Notably, however, rather than defending the constitutionality of the executive order itself, the administration’s appeal focused solely on a procedural question: whether district courts possess the authority to issue universal injunctions. Both the first Trump administration and Biden administration had previously asked the Court to weigh in on whether such injunctions are legally authorised, but it had declined to take up the issue.
In Trump v CASA, however, the Court directly addressed this question. Writing for a 6-3 majority,11 Justice Amy Coney Barrett held that universal injunctions “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts [under the Judiciary Act of 1789]’.”12 In reaching this conclusion, the majority employed a strikingly historically-bounded methodology — continuing its professed (albeit inconsistent) commitment to identifying and applying the original public meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes. Justice Barrett framed the relevant inquiry as “whether universal injunctions are sufficiently analogous to the relief issued by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act.”13 After surveying founding-era practices of such courts, the opinion concluded that universal injunctions do not have a “historical pedigree,”14 and that US federal courts therefore lack the power to issue this remedy broader than what is necessary to provide “complete relief” to the parties directly before the Court.
By limiting injunctive relief strictly to the parties formally involved in a lawsuit, federal district courts can no longer use this mechanism to temporarily halt the enforcement of laws and policies nationwide — even those that appear to patently violate the US Constitution.
This ruling has far-reaching practical consequences. By limiting injunctive relief strictly to the parties formally involved in a lawsuit, federal district courts can no longer use this mechanism to temporarily halt the enforcement of laws and policies nationwide — even those that appear to patently violate the US Constitution. Unless individuals can obtain legal representation and bring their own lawsuits seeking relief, potentially unconstitutional executive orders will generally remain in effect until — or unless — the Supreme Court gets involved. This also creates the potential for a ‘patchwork’ legal landscape, under which federal policies may be blocked in some jurisdictions, while remaining enforceable in others — a situation particularly striking on an issue such as citizenship.
The decision is therefore likely to reshape how litigants challenge presidential and executive actions going forward, prompting a shift towards alternative avenues that still offer broad forms of relief. One such strategy is increased reliance on class actions, which Justice Sonya Sotomayor (in dissent) explicitly encouraged the parents of children covered by the birthright citizenship order to promptly pursue.15 Within hours of Trump v CASA being handed down, both CASA (the immigrants’ rights organisation named in the case) and the ACLU filed class action suits on behalf of all current and future children born in the US whose citizenship Executive Order 14160 purports to deny.16 On 10 July 2025, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the order against anyone in this protected nationwide class. The CASA ruling also leaves open other potential pathways for obtaining effective universal relief, including claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (which authorises courts to ‘set aside’ an unlawful agency rule),17 certain lawsuits brought by states, and associational suits (where organisations sue on behalf of their members). However, as the dissent points out, these alternatives often face significant practical and procedural hurdles, potentially making them less accessible or effective in urgent constitutional disputes.18
Importantly, Trump v CASA is not a constitutional ruling (in which case the outcome could not be reversed absent constitutional amendment).19 Instead, the majority’s reasoning rests on narrow statutory grounds — whether Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorised federal courts to issue universal injunctions. As such, it remains open to Congress to amend this statute — or to pass a new law — explicitly restoring this power to federal courts. Moreover, the decision should not be read as affirming the constitutionality of the underlying executive order concerning birthright citizenship. The question of the substantive merits of this policy is likely to return to the Court in the upcoming term.
First Amendment and religion
The recent term featured a number of cases concerning the two ‘religion’ clauses of the First Amendment: the guarantees that Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”20 Collectively, these decisions continued a trend towards increasingly robust protections for religious liberty vis-à-vis other rights and interests, and a more permissive approach to the relationship between church and state.
In Mahmoud v Taylor,21 the same 6-3 majority held that parents have a constitutional right to “opt out” their children from public school instruction involving LGBTQ+ characters and themes. The case arose after the Montgomery County Board of Education (‘the Board’) in Maryland introduced a set of LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks into the elementary school curriculum during the 2022–23 school year. While parents were initially permitted to be notified and exempt their children from lessons featuring these books, this policy was later rescinded on the grounds that it caused significant disruption to the classroom environment and risked stigmatising LGBTQ+ students and families. A group of six parents from various faiths filed a lawsuit arguing that the Board’s refusal to provide parental notice and opt-outs violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court sided with the parents. Justice Alito characterised the storybooks as “unmistakably normative”22 and “impos[ing] upon children a set of values and beliefs that are ‘hostile’ to their parents’ religious beliefs.”23 Citing the 1972 case of Wisconsin v Yoder24 (which held that the First Amendment prohibits a state from requiring Amish families to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade), the majority ruled that the no opt-out policy placed an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ ability to direct the religious upbringing of their children.
This conclusion was strongly countered by Justice Sonya Sotomayor in dissent (joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson), who argued that “[s]imply being exposed to beliefs contrary to your own does not ‘prohibi[t]’ the ‘free exercise’ of your religion.”25 The dissent asserted that the majority’s reasoning “offers no limiting principle,”26 and could open the door to parents in public schools demanding opt-outs from countless other topics — such as evolution, gender roles and vaccinations — that may conceivably conflict with sincerely-held religious beliefs.
The closely watched case of Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v Drummond27 concerned a proposed Catholic virtual charter school in Oklahoma, which — if established — would have become the first religious charter school (publicly funded but privately owned and operated educational institution) in the country. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the Establishment Clause28 prevents the public funding of religious schools, and that this blocked the creation and funding of the proposed institution. This decision was appealed to the US Supreme Court, where Justice Amy Coney Barrett notably recused herself — that is, she formally withdrew from participating in the case to avoid any perception of bias. This was likely prompted by her prior affiliation with Notre Dame Law School, whose religious liberty clinic was involved in the case in support of the proposed religious charter school. As a result, the case was heard by only eight Justices.
Should a similar case return to the Court with all nine Justices participating, there is a strong possibility that a five-justice majority — joined by Barrett — would rule in favour of allowing religious charter schools.
On 22 May 2025, the Court issued a brief, one-line ‘per curiam’ order (a typically short, unsigned opinion issued by the Court as a whole, rather than being attributed to a specific judge) stating that “[t]he judgment [of the Oklahoma Supreme Court] is affirmed by an equally divided Court.” While the opinion does not reveal how individual Justices voted, the tie indicates that one of the conservative Justices (likely Chief Justice John Roberts) sided with the liberal bloc. Due to the 4-4 split, the decision carries no precedential weight (that is, it is not binding in subsequent cases), and the lower court’s ruling barring creation of the religious charter school stands. However, should a similar case return to the Court with all nine Justices participating, there is a strong possibility that a five-justice majority — joined by Barrett — would rule in favour of allowing religious charter schools.
Equal Protection and transgender minors
In another high-profile case decided by a 6-3 vote, the Court in United States v Skrmetti29 upheld a Tennessee law — known as ‘SB1’ — that bans certain gender-affirming medical treatments for transgender minors, including puberty blockers and hormone therapy. The central legal question was which test should be applied to assess SB1’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 This matters because the Court has developed a framework of different ‘tiers of scrutiny’ for evaluating equal protection claims. These tiers determine how rigorously a court will examine a law, and the level applied often plays a decisive role in whether a law is upheld or struck down.
The Tennessee ban was challenged by three transgender teenagers, their parents and a physician, who were joined by the Biden administration in support.31 The plaintiffs argued that SB1 discriminates based on sex, as it restricts medical treatments only when provided to induce physical effects inconsistent with one’s birth sex. Laws that draw classifications on this basis receive a heightened (or “intermediate”) form of constitutional review and will only be upheld if the law is ‘substantially related’ to an ‘important’ government interest.
However, the Court rejected this argument. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts held that SB1 did not discriminate based on sex, but rather, drew distinctions based on age and “medical use.” As such, it was subject to only the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny that is most deferential to the government (“rational basis review”), which was found to be satisfied. In a rare dissent delivered from the bench, Justice Sotomayor strongly disagreed, arguing that the law should receive intermediate scrutiny, and be struck down on this basis. The dissent asserted that the majority’s ruling “invites legislatures to engage in discrimination by hiding blatant sex classifications in plain sight,” and authorises “untold harm to transgender children and the parents and families who love them.”32
The immediate effect of Skrmetti is that the Tennessee law — along with similar laws in other states — remains in force. However, it does not impact access to gender-affirming care for minors in states without such bans
The immediate effect of Skrmetti is that the Tennessee law — along with similar laws in other states — remains in force. However, it does not impact access to gender-affirming care for minors in states without such bans. The majority opinion also leaves open two potential avenues for future challenges. Firstly, it did not address the parents’ substantive due process claim raised in lower court proceedings: that these bans violate their right to make medical decisions for their children. This issue is currently being litigated in lower courts and could reach the Supreme Court. Secondly, the majority declined to decide whether heightened scrutiny applies to laws classifying based on transgender status, though the concurring opinions — especially Justice Barrett’s — expressed scepticism about this argument.
Themes and future directions
As outlined above, the 2024–25 term was defined by high-stakes rulings on executive power and accountability, religious liberty and LGBTQ+ rights, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s deep ideological divide. Several themes emerge from these developments.
First, as illustrated by Trump v CASA, checking presidential power has become increasingly difficult — even as the current administration continues to push the boundaries of executive authority in unprecedented ways. This trend has been reinforced by the Trump administration’s increasing and often successful reliance on the Court’s emergency (or ‘shadow’) docket. Unlike the regular ‘merits’ docket, which involves full briefing and oral arguments, the emergency docket allows the Court to hear urgent applications and issue interim relief on an expedited basis, often through unsigned orders and without written reasons. Critics argue that the Court has disproportionately ruled in President Trump’s favour in such applications in the recent term,which included decisions allowing the administration to proceed with deportations of a group of immigrants to South Sudan, and to remove the heads of independent federal agencies without cause, while their legal challenges proceed. However, the administration did not prevail in every instance: the Court temporarily barred the removal of a group of Venezuelan men under the Alien Enemies Act, and declined to block a lower court ruling requiring the US Government to ‘facilitate’ the return of a Maryland man mistakenly deported to El Salvador.
Many of the cases that came before the Court touched on these ideological debates, and in a series of sharply divided rulings, the Court consistently sided with the conservative position.
Second, the term highlighted the Court’s deepening involvement in the nation’s ‘culture wars’, set against the backdrop of an increasingly polarised political climate. Many of the cases that came before the Court touched on these ideological debates, and in a series of sharply divided rulings, the Court consistently sided with the conservative position. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, once speculated to be a potential moderating force, firmly aligned with the conservative bloc — authoring the majority opinion in Trump v CASA, and going beyond the majority in Skrmetti to reject LGBTQ+ status as a protected class entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Looking ahead, the upcoming 2025-26 term is poised to deliver another round of high-stakes constitutional litigation. On the docket currently are challenges to campaign finance regulations, the constitutionality of Colorado’s ‘conversion therapy’ ban, and a case regarding Louisiana’s congressional map. The Court is also expected to hear a challenge to a recent US appeals court ruling that Trump’s sweeping tariffs (which rely on emergency powers) are illegal, and to return to the substantive question of birthright citizenship. In this way, the Supreme Court will likely remain a central battleground in shaping the contours of presidential authority and civil liberties in the United States going forward.